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Abstract
A realist analysis of hospital patient safety in Wales: applied
learning for alternative contexts from a multisite case study
Andrea Herepath,1,2 Martin Kitchener2* and Justin Waring3
1Sir Roland Smith Centre for Strategic Management, Department of Entrepreneurship, Strategy
and Innovation, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
2Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
3Nottingham University Business School, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
*Corresponding author Kitchenermj@cardiff.ac.uk
Background: Hospital patient safety is a major social problem. In the UK, policy responses focus on the
introduction of improvement programmes that seek to implement evidence-based clinical practices using
the Model for Improvement, Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle. Empirical evidence that the outcomes of such
programmes vary across hospitals demonstrates that the context of their implementation matters.
However, the relationships between features of context and the implementation of safety programmes are
both undertheorised and poorly understood in empirical terms.
Objectives: This study is designed to address gaps in conceptual, methodological and empirical
knowledge about the influence of context on the local implementation of patient safety programmes.
Design: We used concepts from critical realism and institutional analysis to conduct a qualitative
comparative-intensive case study involving 21 hospitals across all seven Welsh health boards. We focused
on the local implementation of three focal interventions from the 1000 Lives+ patient safety programme:
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement, Reducing Surgical Complications and Reducing Health-care
Associated Infection. Our main sources of data were 160 semistructured interviews, observation and
1700 health policy and organisational documents. These data were analysed using the realist approaches
of abstraction, abduction and retroduction.
Setting: Welsh Government and NHS Wales.
Participants: Interviews were conducted with 160 participants including government policy leads, health
managers and professionals, partner agencies with strategic oversight of patient safety, advocacy groups
and academics with expertise in patient safety.
Main outcome measures: Identification of the contextual factors pertinent to the local implementation of
the 1000 Lives+ patient safety programme in Welsh NHS hospitals.
Results: An innovative conceptual framework harnessing realist social theory and institutional theory was
produced to address challenges identified within previous applications of realist inquiry in patient safety research.
This involved the development and use of an explanatory intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome
(I-CMAO) configuration to illustrate the processes behind implementation of a change programme. Our
findings, illustrated by multiple nested I-CMAO configurations, show how local implementation of patient
safety interventions are impacted and modified by particular aspects of context: specifically, isomorphism, by
which an intervention becomes adapted to the environment in which it is implemented; institutional logics,
the beliefs and values underpinning the intervention and its source, and their perceived legitimacy among
different groups of health-care professionals; and the relational structure and power dynamics of the
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functional group, that is, those tasked with implementing the initiative. This dynamic interplay shapes and
guides actions leading to the normalisation or the rejection of the patient safety programme.
Conclusions: Heightened awareness of the influence of context on the local implementation of patient
safety programmes is required to inform the design of such interventions and to ensure their effective
implementation and operationalisation in the day-to-day practice of health-care teams. Future work is
required to elaborate our conceptual model and findings in similar settings where different interventions
are introduced, and in different settings where similar innovations are implemented.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Glossary
Abduction Abduction is a hypothesis or inference that explains an observation. It differs from deduction
or induction because it infers a prior condition that gives rise to what is observed, rather than making
assumptions about what will be true as a consequence of the observation. Abduction is a ‘logic of
discovery’ used in realist research to set out an explanatory account of a mechanism acting in a
given context.
Abstraction In realist research, abstraction is a step in the analytical process that is used to identify and
isolate in thought discrete aspects of an object. The point of abstraction is, therefore, to select one or
more aspects, components or attributes and their relationships in order to understand how they impact
social reality.
Actor An individual who performs specific acts (see Agent).
Agency The purposive action of individuals (and organisations) that is the foundation of
changing practice.
Agent; agentic An agent is similar to an actor, but is one who acts within a social structure, although
there is debate about the degree to which the structure may or may not affect the action. In agentic
transactions, people are seen as producers as well as products of social systems.
Agentic emergent properties See Emergent properties.
The Campbell Collaboration The Campbell Collaboration is an international research network that
produces systematic reviews of the effects of social interventions (see Systematic review).
Causality; causal configuration See Mechanism.
Cochrane Cochrane is an international research network that produces systematic reviews of the
effects of health-care interventions (mainly randomised controlled trials) to assist the decision-making of
policy-makers, health-care professionals and others (see Systematic review).
Coercive force In terms of organisational change, a coercive force is one that imposes a change
(e.g. by regulation).
Cognitive Cognitive processes are the mental processes of perception, memory, judgement and
reasoning. They may be used consciously or happen unconsciously. Cognitive processes use existing
knowledge and generate new knowledge.
Comparative case study A research design that facilitates the longitudinal intensive analysis and
comparison of different ‘cases’, typically an organisation or a discrete function within an organisation.
Constraints In Archerian critical realism, constraints are causal powers that are internal to structural and
cultural emergent properties. For anything to exert the power of a constraint it has to obstruct the
achievement of a specific enterprise.
Context–mechanism–outcome configuration A configuration, used in realist inquiry, to explain what
aspects of an intervention work, for whom, why and in what circumstances.
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xv
Coupling–decoupling With regard to patient safety interventions, coupling refers to the deliberate
connection to – and decoupling to the deliberate disconnection from – organisational structures and
associated practices that enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of such interventions.
Critical realism Critical realism is a complex body of ideas: a movement in philosophy, the human
sciences and similar practices that describes an interface between the natural and social world. It is most
closely associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer and Andrew Sayer, among others.
Cultural emergent properties See Emergent properties.
Distributed leadership Distributed leadership is leadership which, rather than being performed solely
by one person, is shared between several people. It refers to purposive, concertive action, rather
than aggregated, individual acts. Important forms of concertive action are collaboration, intuitive
understandings that emerge from close working relationships and a variety of structural relations and
institutionalised arrangements. Under distributed leadership some functions may be shared by several
members of a group, some may be allocated to individual members and a particular function may
be performed by different people at different times.
Ear, nose and throat surgery Otolaryngologists (or otorhinolaryngologists) are commonly referred to as
ENT (ear, nose and throat) surgeons and deal with the diagnosis, evaluation and management of diseases
of the head and neck and, principally, the ears, nose and throat.
Emergents; emergent properties Emergents or emergent properties are new features or
transformations that differ qualitatively from the elements from which they came and, therefore, cannot
be returned to their previous forms (e.g. the NHS, once formed, could not be returned to the private
institutions which predated it). Agential emergent properties are transformations that come about as a
result of deliberate action at the level of the individual, group or organisation (e.g. the NHS was created by
Aneurin Bevan and the Labour government of the day). Cultural emergent properties are transformations
that are influenced by the cultural situation (the prevailing climate shaped by people’s collective beliefs,
values or ideologies) in which they occur (e.g. the NHS was influenced by both egalitarian principles and a
belief that free health care would profit the nation by improving the health of the workforce). Structural
emergent properties are transformations that are influenced by the circumstances in which they occur,
be they physical or social (e.g. the structure of the NHS was influenced by existing health-care structures
and the perceived needs of the post-war population).
Enablements In Archerian critical realism enablements are causal powers that are internal to structural
and cultural emergent properties. For anything to exert the power of an enablement it has to aid the
achievement of a specific enterprise.
Epistemology The nature and scope of knowledge – what we think can be known about the world.
Additionally, the study of knowledge, and justified belief, centred on the creation and dissemination of
knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.
Escherichia coli Escherichia coli are a group of bacteria that are an important part of the normal intestinal
flora of humans. Most strains of E. coli are harmless. However, some strains of E. coli can cause illness,
typically diarrhoea or urinary tract, respiratory or blood infections.
Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase Some strains of E. coli and Klebsiella pneumonia produce an
enzyme called extended-spectrum beta-lactamase. This enzyme can break down antibiotics and make
them ineffective. Infections caused by extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing strains of these
bacteria are, therefore, difficult to treat.
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First-order emergents (see Emergents) First-order emergents are the results of social interaction. In
Archerian critical realism, first-order emergents manifest as the agent’s involuntaristic placement within the
broader social context and role array; their vested interests; the opportunity costs associated with different
courses of action; and their perceived interpretive freedom and scope for strategic directional guidance.
Functional team The group of people who carry out the tasks involved in running a ward or department.
Generative mechanism See Mechanism.
Health-care-associated infection Health-care-associated infection refers to infections that occur as a
result of contact with the health-care system.
Heterarchy A non-hierarchical system of organisation characterised by horizontal positioning of power
and authority, with individuals sharing the same status.
Hierarchy A system of organisation characterised by vertical ranking relative to status or authority.
Higher-order societal logics See Institutions and Institutional logics.
Hospital-acquired infection Hospital-acquired infection – also known as nosocomial infection – refers
to an infection that develops in a patient ≥ 48 hours after admission to a hospital. Infections that occur
within the first 48 hours are referred to as community-acquired.
Hospital standardised mortality ratio Hospital standardised mortality ratio is the ratio of the actual
number of acute in-hospital deaths to the expected number of in-hospital deaths.
Institutional logics Institutional logics focus on how broader belief systems shape organisational interests
and individual preferences, define actors’ expectations about each other’s behaviour and organise their
enduring relations with each other. In institutional theory, higher-order societal logics refer to the central
institutions of contemporary societies – for example the family, the capitalist market, organised religion,
the state and democracy – which inform the core organising principles of these different sectors of society.
Institutional logics also operate at the level of professions.
Institutional pillars: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive Institutions are conceptualised as
composed of three pillars: the regulative pillar, which stresses rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning
activities, both formal and informal; the normative pillar, which sets out what is considered to be
appropriate behaviour given the demands of the situated context; and the cultural-cognitive pillar, which
emphasises the centrality of common schemas that guide behaviour.
Institutional theory Institutional theory is one of the dominant perspectives within organisation and
management theory.
Institutional work The purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining,
enhancing and disrupting institutions.
Institutions Institutions are the taken-for-granted social prescriptions that guide the behaviour of actors
in different societal, organisational and professional contexts.
Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration A configuration used in realist
analysis to explain what aspects of an intervention work, for whom, why and in what circumstances.
Intransitive dimension (see Ontology) The intransitive dimension is synonymous with ontology and
refers to the objects in the domain of the real of any human inquiry, theoretical or practical.
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Isomorphic institutionalism Increased similarity between institutions over time.
Klebsiella species Klebsiella species are a group of bacteria that are an important part of the normal
intestinal flora of man. Usually, healthy people do not get Klebsiella infections. However, in health-care
settings, patients who are receiving long courses of certain antibiotics and those whose care requires
invasive medical devices such as ventilators (breathing machines) or intravenous (vein) catheters are at risk
of Klebsiella infections.
Legitimacy façade In respect to patient safety interventions, a legitimacy façade is the outward
appearance of adhering to guidelines while, in reality, deviation from such guidelines is seen in
day-to-day practice.
Mechanism The power to bring about change: the characteristic way(s) of acting possessed by things by
virtue of their intrinsic structures. In realist enquiry, mechanisms refer to the engines of explanation
embodied in an agent’s reasoning and their selective attention to the disparate resources offered through
a social programme. Mechanisms are also part of a causal configuration emergent from a cluster of
contextual factors and organisational components.
Mediation of structure by agency In Archerian critical realism, the mediation of structure by agency
refers to the conditioning influence of context on the actions of individuals.
Metamechanism A metamechanism is a complex ‘bundle’ of mechanisms.
Metaphysics The branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract
concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time and space.
Methodology Methodology is the systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods used in research.
Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus Staphylococcus aureus is a type of bacteria commonly found
on human skin. Most of the time, S. aureus does not cause any harm. Meticillin-resistant S. aureus is a
bacterium that is resistant to many antibiotics. In the community most meticillin-resistant S. aureus
infections are skin infections. However, in health-care settings, such as hospitals and nursing homes,
meticillin-resistant S. aureus may cause life-threatening bloodstream infections, pneumonia, endocarditis
(infection of the heart valves), osteomyelitis (bone infection) and surgical site infections.
Mimetic force In terms of organisational change, a mimetic force is one which copies a change perceived
to be successful elsewhere.
Morphogenesis The process of social transformation.
Morphogenetic-morphostatic cycle The morphogenetic-morphostatic cycle is a method of analysing the
complex interplay of structure, culture and agency across three temporal phases: structural conditioning,
sociocultural interaction and structural reproduction or elaboration.
Morphostasis The process of social reproduction.
‘Never events’ Serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not occur if the available
preventative measures have been implemented. They include incidents such as wrong site surgery and a
retained instrument after operation.
Normative force In terms of organisational change, a normative force is one in which change is aligned
with what is perceived to be an existing norm, or standard.
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Nosocomial infection See Hospital-acquired infection.
Ontology The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being or the way we think the
world is.
Peripheral venous cannula A peripheral venous cannula is a very thin tube inserted into a small
peripheral vein for therapeutic purposes such as the administration of medications, fluids or
blood products.
Point prevalence survey A point prevalence survey is a count of the number of patients with a particular
condition or treatment (in this report either a health-care-associated infection or an antimicrobial agent) at
a particular time (a specified day), as a proportion of the total number of patients who are hospitalised at
that particular time. A point prevalence survey counts the condition or treatment only if it is present on the
specified day of the survey, and does not count it if it is present at other times during the patient stay in
the hospital.
Reflexive agency In Archerian critical realism, reflexive agency originates within the internal conversation
of the individual’s domain of mental privacy.
Reflexive theorisation Reflexive theorisation, the final stage of the mediation of structure by agency,
occurs through three stages: discernment, the preliminary review stage of an issue of concern, where
reflective retrospective and prospective thought informs practical action; deliberation, involving the ranking
of such concerns against others; and dedication, entailing their prioritisation and alignment to foster a
fallible yet corrigible commitment to a chosen path.
Relational structure Relational structure refers to social relations, or the ties that bind social actors,
specifically the pattern of causal interconnections and interdependencies among agents occupying defined
roles, and their subsequent actions. Relational structure is, therefore, the nexus of connections among
actors causally affecting their actions and, in turn, causally affected by them.
Reproduction In realist research, reproduction refers to a lack of change, persistence of the status quo ante.
Retroduction In realist research, retroduction is a step in the analytical process that is used to refine
understanding of a distinctive process or mechanism when the basic conditions for its existence have
been elaborated.
Risk-adjusted mortality index Risk-adjusted mortality index is a statistical tool by which an estimate is
made of probability of death for all admitted patients. Taking into account factors such as age, sex,
diagnoses, procedure, clinical grouping and admission type, it allows a calculation of risk of death.
From this prediction it calculates the number in a population expected to die. In publishing such data,
comparisons are made between the numbers of patients who actually die and those predicted. Where the
numbers are the same, the risk-adjusted mortality index will be reported as 100.
Second-order emergents Second-order emergents are the results of necessary and internal relations
among first-order emergents. In Archerian critical realism, the second stage of the mediation of structure
to agency addresses how an individual or group, confronted by contextual conditioning, exercise their
subjective and reflexive mental powers to formulate their strategic goals, individually or collectively.
This array of influences gives rise to four potential second-order emergents –’necessary complementarities,
necessary incompatibilities, contingent complementarities and contingent incompatibilities’ – which foster
the accompanying situational logics of protection, correction/compromise, opportunism and elimination.
The situational logic ultimately brought to pass through strategic negotiation – be that via power-induced
compliance, reciprocal exchange or the harmonisation of desires – represents the mechanism of
morphogenesis or morphostasis.
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Situated context Situated context refers to one of the many contexts in which groups and individuals
live and work, and which influence their actions in a particular environment.
Situational logic: contingent complementarities A prevailing situational logic of contingent
compatibilities entails a situational logic of pure opportunism that generates fundamental change.
Situational logic: contingent incompatibilities A prevailing situational logic of contingent
incompatibilities gives rise to the tensions in the strategic arena and fosters morphogenesis. Here,
opposing factions become party to the situational logic of elimination, where the greatest gain coincides
with inflicting maximum injuries on the other side.
Situational logic: necessary complementarities A prevailing situational logic of necessary
complementarities depicts a strategic arena in which transformation threatens the loss of vested interest all
round. Necessary complementarities, therefore, generate a situational logic of protection that is conducive
to morphostasis.
Situational logic: necessary incompatibilities A prevailing situational logic of necessary incompatibilities
depicts a strategic arena that is marked by incompatibilities between institutions, which are nonetheless
internally and necessarily related. Accordingly, a situational logic of compromise arises because necessary
incompatibilities means that the promotion of vested interests has to be a cautious balancing act – a
weighing of gains against losses – where to accrue bonuses is also to invite or incur penalties. The fragility
of this structural conditioning, therefore, offers a subtle potential for change.
Situational logic of protection See Situational logic: necessary complementarities.
Structural emergent properties See Emergent properties.
Systematic review A systematic review is a literature review that aims to identify, critically appraise,
select and synthesise published research studies that address a particular research issue. A systematic review
typically includes a description of the findings of the collection of research studies. The systematic review may
also include a quantitative pooling of data called a meta-analysis.
Third-order emergents In Archerian critical realism, third-order emergents arise from the effects of
first- and second-order influences on the outcomes of the intervention. This concept, therefore, captures
structural and ideational differentiation, together with the regrouping inherent to the power play of a
diverse array of agents.
Transitive dimension The transitive dimension is synonymous with epistemology and refers to human
understanding of the objects in the domain of the real.
Venous thromboembolism Venous thromboembolism is a condition that includes both deep-vein
thrombosis and pulmonary embolism. Deep-vein thrombosis is the formation of a blood clot in a deep
vein, usually in the leg or pelvic veins. Pulmonary embolism is a sudden blockage in a lung artery, usually
caused by a blood clot that travels to the lung from a vein in the leg.
GLOSSARY
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List of abbreviations
CAUTI catheter-associated urinary tract
infection
CHC Community Health Council
CMO context–mechanism–outcome
HIW Healthcare Inspectorate Wales
HOWIS Health of Wales Information
Service




IHI Institute for Healthcare Improvement
ILQI Improving Leadership for Quality
Improvement
IPAC infection prevention and control




NISCHR National Institute for Social Care
and Health Research
PSOW Public Services Ombudsman for
Wales
PVC peripheral venous cannula
RAMI risk-adjusted mortality index
RHAI Reducing Health-care-Associated
Infection
RSC Reducing Surgical Complications
WHAIP Welsh Healthcare Associated
Infection Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WHOSSC World Health Organization Surgical
Safety Checklist
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The safety of patients in British hospitals is a major social problem because 1 in 10 is harmed duringhis or her care. UK policy responses focus on new improvement programmes to implement
multiple ‘evidence-based’ interventions, such as checklists of what should be done during surgery.
Such interventions are tested on a small scale (e.g. in one operating theatre) before being rolled out
more widely.
Although it is known that the success of the programmes varies among hospitals, it is not known why.
This is the first study to examine how the ‘contextual’ features of a hospital (e.g. its size) and its
environment (e.g. political values) combine to influence patient safety programmes. Our study had
two main parts. First, we developed a new model for analysing the implementation of improvement
programmes that directs attention to multiple layers of context. Second, we used our model to conduct
seven in-depth case studies of the 1000 Lives+ patient safety programme across Wales. The main source
of our information was 160 interviews, supplemented by our archive of nearly 2000 documents, and the
observation of practice.
Our findings show how, for specified programme interventions (e.g. surgical checklists), hospital and
environmental features combine to derive varied outcomes seen as either more or less successful by
stakeholders such as public, professionals, researchers and policy-makers. Our model and findings provide
a valuable basis from which stakeholders can (a) better understand existing improvement programmes
and (b) design more effective ones in the future.
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Hospital patient safety is a major social problem that is central to global debates about the quality, affordability
and sustainability of health care. It is widely appreciated that patient safety is shaped by government policy and
demands a nuanced balance of health-care system design and resources to create high-reliability organisations.
Yet other factors intervene. Organisational performance management processes and governance systems,
together with the beliefs and values of health-care professionals, mould the local cultures of care. Patient safety,
therefore, demands leadership at all levels in the NHS. However, health-care professional leadership – especially
medical – remains paramount, and may function as catalyst for, or barrier to, patient safety improvement.
In the UK, it is estimated that 1 in 10 hospital patients is harmed during his or her care, and 1 in 300 dies
as a result of adverse events such as hospital-acquired infection. Along with these human costs, safety
incidents are a drain on NHS resources, costing an estimated £3.5B a year in additional bed-days and
negligence claims. This toll of avoidable harm manifests in various forms. Untoward errors, which occur
during drug prescribing, supply and administration, represent a significant and persistent burden. So, too,
do those that arise as a consequence of surgery. A more veiled cause is incorrect diagnosis, compounded
by variation in the delivery of evidence-based medical care.
In the UK, policy responses focus on the introduction of patient safety programmes that seek improvements
in service reliability through the implementation of evidence-based clinical practices using the Model for
Improvement, Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle. Empirical evidence that the outcomes of such programmes vary across
hospitals demonstrates that the context of their implementation matters. However, the relationships between
features of context and the outcomes of safety programmes are both undertheorised and poorly understood in
empirical terms.
Objectives
This study is the first to employ insights from institutional theory within a realist analysis framework to
study the implementation of patient safety programmes. It is designed to address gaps in methodological,
conceptual and empirical knowledge about the influence of context on the local implementation of patient
safety programmes. Our aim is to ascertain which contextual factors matter – how, why and for whom – in
order that processes and outcomes of future patient safety improvement may be improved. The study has
five main objectives:
1. to identify and analyse the organisational factors (e.g. structure, culture and managerial priorities)
pertinent to the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions
2. to identify and analyse the contextual mechanisms, centred on health-care professionals’ belief systems,
which interact with organisational factors to generate the health outcomes of hospital patient
safety interventions
3. to develop and test hypotheses concerning relationships between organisational factors, mechanisms
and the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions
4. to produce a theoretically grounded and evidence-based model of which organisational factors matter,
how they matter and why they matter
5. to establish and disseminate lessons for a broad range of stakeholders concerned with patient safety
policy and management.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xxv
Methods
The research design comprised a critical realist and institutional analysis of a qualitative comparative-
intensive case study located within the Welsh Government and NHS Wales. Encompassing seven health
boards and 21 hospitals, the study focused on the local implementation of three focal interventions
selected from the 1000 Lives+ national patient safety programme: (i) Improving Leadership for Quality
Improvement; (ii) Reducing Surgical Complications; and (iii) Reducing Health-care-Associated Infection.
Case site selection criteria centred on a two-stage sampling strategy. In phase 1, four clear and readily
operable criteria – corporate parent, complexity, function and geographical coverage – were employed to
define the purposive sample of case site hospitals within each health board (see Appendix 1 in main report).
Through this approach, three within-case comparators were selected from each health board: (1) a major
hospital, (2) a district general hospital and (3) a small community hospital.
Primary data collection included 160 semistructured interviews, undertaken with Welsh Government policy
leads; executive directors, senior managers and professionals in NHS Wales’ health boards; public sector
partner agencies with strategic oversight of patient safety; advocacy groups; and academics with expertise
in patient safety. These data were complemented by overt observation of practice and the collection of
relevant organisational documents and outcome data (e.g. risk-adjusted mortality index; ‘never events’)
within each health board.
Secondary data collection focused on an analysis of UK and devolved Welsh health-care policy spanning
the period from 1997 to 2014. The UK coalition government’s White and Green Papers, together with
other key legislative proposals, were accessed from the Department of Health’s website, while those of the
former UK New Labour government were sourced via the National Archives. Relevant Welsh Government
documents, together with those from the National Assembly for Wales, were accessed from site-specific
policy archives. In addition, Welsh health circulars and Ministerial letters spanning the period 1997–2012
were accessed via the Health of Wales Information Service intranet. A repository in excess of 1700
documents was, therefore, established and archived in an electronic database to facilitate the exploration
of the context and structural conditioning of the focal Welsh health-care system. These data were
complemented by an analysis of public inquiries into recent failings in health-care provision, together with
a comprehensive analysis of patient safety research.
Data analysis centred on interviewees’ perceptions of their working environments, the power play inherent
to the strategic negotiation of change during the local implementation of each focal intervention and
their experience of the ensuing outcomes. Outcome data were substantiated by relevant organisational
documents within each health board. The latter stages of analysis involved abstraction and retroduction,
processes which identify and examine various components of the focal intervention to aid understanding
of the ways in which they combined and interacted in each particular situation. In this way, the
mechanisms operating within the various environments were identified through a combination of theory
and experimental observation.
Results
Methodological development of realist analysis in patient safety
As one of the first studies of patient safety to apply realist philosophy of social science across inception,
design, fieldwork, analysis and writing, this study has generated a number of features that may inform the
field of patient safety research. Unlike the majority of health services research studies, this study has taken
seriously, and explicated, realist ontology (theories of being) and epistemology (theories of knowledge).
These foundations of our research conditioned its design, conduct and reporting. Moreover, our
consideration of ontological depth helped to shape our conceptualisation of contextual strata and the
identification and explanation of the underlying mechanisms that shape structure, agency, social relations
and ensuing practices.
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In terms of analysis, this one of the first studies of health services research to use the realist methods of
abstraction, abduction and retroduction to devise an explanatory structure through a combination of
theory and experimental observation. While acknowledging the many challenges posed by the critical
realist approach, and that the conclusions of our analysis are both provisional and fallible, this study
demonstrates its value in helping to reconstruct the basic conditions, structures and mechanisms relating
to the focal objects of our research.
Conceptual development of intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome
configurations in the realist analysis of patient safety interventions
We have developed an innovative framework that harnesses realist social theory and institutional theory
to address challenges we identify within existing applications of realist inquiry in patient safety research.
Four refinements are advanced to help explain which contextual factors matter, how they matter and why
they matter.
First, so that we may understand precisely ‘what’ is working, for whom, how and in what circumstances,
we include intervention as a separate analytical category in our realist analysis. Second, we forward a view
of ‘situated context’ as stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic. This involves identifying
the dominant structural and cultural emergent properties in play, and separating context from its
mediation. Third, we link both mediation and reflexive theorisation to mechanism, thus distinguishing the
conceptual elements of mechanism from its ensuing outcomes. Within outcomes we include the agential
emergent properties, expressed through the unfolding strategic negotiation of change and the mode of
institutional work enacted, which deliver sustainable outcomes, be they elaborative or reproductive. Finally,
in our realist framework, outcome is not perceived as a simple, single aspect of change, such as a defined
health outcome. Rather, we concentrate on structural and ideational differentiation, reproduction
and change. This fine-grained realist analysis, therefore, illuminates the fundamental effects of beliefs and
values – institutional logics – on the propensity to act, revealing the contested nature of institutional
change, health-care practice evolution, and, thus, social elaboration.
The products of our framework are demonstrated through the development of explanatory
intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome (I-CMAO) configurations, where I is a specified
component of a patient safety intervention; C is the situated context; M is the mechanism of explanation
expressed in peoples’ reflexive theorisation and reasoning; A is agency, the ensuing actions undertaken
to broker change; and O is outcome, classed in this study as a structural and cultural elaboration or
reproduction that manifests over time.
The focal patient safety interventions examined in this study were framed in relation to bureaucratisation
and normalisation, thereby generating multiple nested I-CMAO configurations. These illustrate that local
implementation is modulated by context, specifically isomorphism, by which an intervention becomes
adapted to the environment in which it is implemented; the manifestation of complementary, co-existent
or countervailing institutional logics, and their perceived legitimacy among different groups of health-care
professionals; and the relational structure and power dynamics of the functional group, that is those
tasked with implementing the initiative. This dynamic interplay shapes and guides actions leading to the
normalisation or the rejection of the patient safety programme.
Empirical contribution of realist analysis to patient safety research
For each of the three focal interventions of 1000 Lives+ programme analysed, this study offers a nuanced
explanation of how local conditions differentially combine with mechanisms to derive various qualitatively
different outcomes. Reflecting social reality, these causal configurations are complex and nested.
Accordingly, we augment our textual description with an innovative series of explanatory graphics.
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This approach to the presentation of our findings allows us to clearly specify how particular configurations
of factors, across multiple layers of context, generate the outcomes of patient safety interventions, as
outlined below.
l At the level of the ward or department and those that work in it (the functional team), context is
perceived to be distinctively different from that of the wider organisation. Indeed, it resonates with
that of a bounded health-care managerial or clinical micro-work system. We argue that this finding
challenges the use of the health-care organisation as a unit of analysis for patient safety programmes.
l Across the stratified contextual strata of the Welsh health-care institutional field, each individual –
whatever their position or professional status – has to negotiate, both personally and as part of a
functional team – the influences of the institutional logics evident in their environments. Furthermore,
our findings indicate that the precise balance of such logics impacts patient safety. The paradigmatic
logic of bureaucratic command and control, which fosters mandated engagement with 1000 Lives+
via coercive institutional isomorphism is dominant at the level of the infrastructural system. However,
professional logic is ascendant at sub-board organisational levels across each health board. This gives
rise to conflict between logics that challenges the moral and pragmatic legitimacy of the 1000 Lives+
programme. Importantly, it is not the central issue of patient care that promotes such contestation, but
the means through which it is imposed. Mandated engagement is perceived in a pejorative light as a
means of management control that erodes professional autonomy, a core component of
professional logic.
l The local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme is widely coupled to desired programme
goals. However, when key actors’ institutional logics are in opposition, the operationalisation of
1000 Lives+ is distorted and disruptive behaviours that hinder the remoulding of underlying belief
systems, thereby diminishing the legitimacy and moral foundation of the 1000 Lives+ programme.
l High-status professional individuals, typically board-level managers and consultant medical or surgical
health-care practitioners, play a pivotal role in reconfiguring other actors’ belief systems to support the
local implementation of 1000 Lives+. Our findings, therefore, echo those that recognise the role of
managerial, medical and nurse leadership in patient safety, especially in facilitating change across
different staff teams. However, there was a need to empower and emancipate a wider array of
health-care staff to lead patient safety.
These findings provide a valuable resource for policy-makers, managers and practitioners, locally, nationally
and internationally. They can aid stakeholders to develop improvement interventions that are more likely to
‘work’ for specified stakeholders in their local contingent circumstances, thereby leading to the design of
more differentiated and context-sensitive patient safety interventions.
Conclusions
Heightened awareness of the influence of situated context on the local implementation of patient safety
programmes is required to inform the design of such interventions, and to ensure their effective
implementation and operationalisation in the day-to-day practice of health-care teams.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
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This chapter introduces our study and is presented in three main parts. We begin by discussing the
development of patient safety as the field of research that is concerned with one of the most significant
social problems of our time: avoidable harm, waste and variation in health-care. Using the available
literature, we outline the nature of this problem and present five factors which are thought to represent
its foundations: (1) deficits in cultures of care, (2) leadership inadequacies, (3) ineffective team working,
(4) problematic governance systems and (5) limited patient and public engagement. We then introduce the
current agenda for patient safety improvement across the devolved NHS in the UK.
Second, we discuss the role of patient safety improvement programmes. We consider the design,
implementation and evaluation of these complex social interventions and highlight the current lack of
systematic analysis of relations between contextual (organisational and environmental) factors and the
outcomes of patient safety interventions.
We then introduce the focal case of our study, the 1000 Lives+ national patient safety programme in
Wales, and the three interventions selected for our detailed analysis: Improving Leadership for Quality
Improvement (ILQI), Reducing Surgical Complications (RSC) and Reducing Health-care-Associated Infection
(RHAI). We conclude this chapter by outlining the aim and objectives of our study, the structure of this
report and the report’s intended audience.
Patient safety: a major social problem of our time
Since the publication in 2000 of To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System,1 patient safety has
become recognised as a major social problem of our time. It now sits at the centre of global debates about
the quality, affordability and sustainability of health care.2–6 Since 2000, understandings of the prevention,
detection and mitigation of harm have improved.4,7–13 Crucially, from an earlier concentration on individual
factors, it is now recognised that the consistent delivery of high-quality, safe and effective health care is
complex and multidimensional.
Considered at higher system levels of analysis, it has been shown that patient safety is shaped by
government policy14–21 and demands a nuanced balance of health-care system design22,23 and resources to
create high-reliability organisations.24,25 At the organisational level of analysis, it has been demonstrated that
patient safety is moulded by culture, capacity, processes and governance systems,26–28 and that each is
enhanced by distributed (shared, see Glossary) leadership.28–36 At the level of health-care practice, it is known
that patient safety is informed by the beliefs and values of health-care professionals,37–41 and is ultimately
underpinned by their personal commitment to care.42,43
The extent and burden of the problem
Despite growing awareness of the challenges posed by patient safety,44–46 and concerted improvements
efforts within some health-care systems,47,48 considerable hospital patient safety problems persist. Global
estimates of the burden of harm vary. However, they are normally reported to be around 10% of all
inpatient admissions with a range of 3.8–16.6%,49 though such results are influenced by the means of
measurement employed.50–53 In the UK, it is estimated that 1 in 10 NHS hospital patients is harmed during
his or her care, and 1 in 300 dies as a result of adverse events such as acquired infection.54,55 Along with
these human costs, safety incidents are a drain on NHS resources, costing an estimated £3.5B per year in
additional bed-days and negligence claims.56
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1
Avoidable harm takes various forms. Errors occurring during drug prescribing, supply and administration
represent a significant and persistent burden.57–62 So, too, do those that arise as a consequence of
surgery.63,64 A more hidden cause is, quite simply, incorrect diagnosis.65–69 In addition, there is variation in
the delivery of medical and nursing care.70,71 Failure in the safety of care is a particular issue for high-risk
patient groups,72,73 but all patients may be at risk of harm, for instance, from communication deficits at
handover;74–77 from low staffing,78 especially at weekends; or because the delivery of care coincides with
the influx of a new cohort of junior doctors in training.79,80
Foundations of the problem
Rising concerns about patient safety have led, in recent years, to a number of public enquiries into highly
publicised failures of the health-care system, such as patient safety failings at the Mid Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust,81 events at the Bristol Royal Infirmary82 and the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital,83 and
the actions of Dr Harold Shipman.84 The major reports published following these enquiries have helped to
identify reasons for the failures85 and have sought ways of improving the safety of patients.86 Taken as a
whole, the findings of successive UK inquiries have emphasised five issues that can be seen as foundations
of the problem of patient safety: (1) deficits in cultures of care, (2) leadership inadequacies, (3) ineffective
team working, (4) problematic regulatory oversight and governance systems and (5) limited patient and
public engagement. We summarise these issues, and the recommendations made to address and eliminate
them, in Table 1, as a way of introducing what was known (by us), prior to our study, about the context of
patient safety.
TABLE 1 Patient safety: the foundations of the problem
Deficits in culture(s) of care
Recommended improvements
l We will make demonstrable progress towards reducing avoidable deaths in our hospitals, rather than debating what
mortality statistics can and cannot tell us about the quality of care hospitals are providing
l No hospital, however big, small or remote, will be an island unto itself. Professional, academic and managerial isolation
will be a thing of the past
l The NHS should continually and forever reduce patient harm by embracing wholeheartedly an ethic of learning.
l Mastery of quality and patient safety sciences and practices should be part of initial preparation and lifelong education
of all health-care professionals, including managers and executives
l The NHS should become a learning organisation. Its leaders should create and support the capability for learning, and
therefore change, at scale, within the NHS. It should be committed to:
¢ placing the quality of patient care, especially patient safety, above all other aims
¢ engaging, empowering, and hearing patients and carers throughout the entire system and at all times
¢ fostering whole-heartedly the growth and development of all staff, including their ability and support to improve
the processes in which they work




l The boards and leadership of provider and commissioning organisations will be confidently and competently using data
and other intelligence for the forensic pursuit of quality improvement. They, along with patients and the public, will
have rapid access to accurate, insightful and easy-to-use data about quality at service-line level
l Junior doctors in specialist training will not be seen just as the clinical leaders of tomorrow, but as the clinical leaders of
today. The NHS will join the best organisations in the world by harnessing the energy and creativity of its 50,000
young doctors
l All leaders concerned with NHS health care – political, regulatory, governance, executive, clinical and advocacy – should
place quality of care in general, and patient safety in particular, at the top of their priorities for investment, inquiry,
improvement, regular reporting, encouragement and support
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Culture(s) of care
Inquiries into the events at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust draw attention to ‘the culture of care in
the NHS’.5,87–89 Unfortunately, as noted by Professor Jon Glasby,81 ‘The trouble with culture is everyone blames
it when things go wrong but no-one really knows what it is or how to change it’. This issue is compounded
when viewing (as we do) health-care organisations as comprising multiple cultures/cultural frames, rather than
as a single culture of care. These points notwithstanding, research indicates that five aspects of culture are of
particular salience to patient safety: (1) the need for a culture of compassion in care;81 (2) the problematic
intra- and interprofessional hierarchies, which privilege a perceived elite at the expense of the broader
health-care team;41,90–92 (3) the culture of blame that retards the promotion of adverse incident reporting and
disclosure of harm to patients;42,93–95 (4) the culture of bullying96–98 that, regrettably, appears to be widespread
across the NHS;99–104 and (5) the culture of unrelenting pressure to attain government targets, which creates
a range of unintended and dysfunctional consequences.105–111
Leadership
It is well recognised that patient safety improvement requires ‘sustained investment in developing leadership
skills at all levels in the NHS’ and its aligned regulatory organisations.82 Failures in strategic leadership may
arise across the public sector,112 with such failures attributed to, for instance, the detrimental impact of
external pressures,113–115 structural change16 and the challenges posed by the global financial downturn.116
Ineffective team working
Recommended improvements
l Nurse staffing levels and skill mix will appropriately reflect the caseload and the severity of illness of the patients they
are caring for and be transparently reported by trust boards
l All NHS organisations will understand the positive impact that happy and engaged staff have on patient outcomes,
including mortality rates, and will be making this a key part of their quality improvement strategy
l Government, Health Education England and NHS England should assure that sufficient staff are available to meet the
NHS’s needs now and in the future. Health-care organisations should ensure that staff are present in appropriate
numbers to provide safe care at all times and that they are well supported
Problematic regulatory oversight and governance systems
Recommended improvements
l Patients and clinicians will have confidence in the quality assessments made by the Care Quality Commission, not least
because they will have been active participants in inspections
l Transparency should be complete, timely and unequivocal. All non-personal data on quality and safety, whether
assembled by government, organisations or professional societies, should be shared in a timely fashion with all parties
who want it, including, in accessible form, with the public
l Supervisory and regulatory systems should be simple and clear. They should avoid diffusion of responsibility. They
should be respectful of the goodwill and sound intention of the vast majority of staff. All incentives should point in the
same direction
l We support responsive regulation of organisations, with a hierarchy of responses. Recourse to criminal sanctions should
be extremely rare, and should function primarily as a deterrent to wilful or reckless neglect or mistreatment
Limited patient and public engagement
Recommended improvements
l Patients, carers and members of the public will increasingly feel like they are being treated as vital and equal partners in
the design and assessment of their local NHS. They should also be confident that their feedback is being listened to
and see how this is impacting on their own care and the care of others
l Patients and their carers should be present, powerful and involved at all levels of health-care organisations from wards
to the boards of trusts
l All organisations should seek out the patient and carer voice as an essential asset in monitoring the safety and quality
of care
TABLE 1 Patient safety: the foundations of the problem (continued)
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Nevertheless, such contextual constraints do not obviate the need for distributed leadership in health care
from board to ward.30,36,117 The detrimental impact on patient safety of a weak board and senior
management team, marred by professional disengagement, poor governance and a lack of focus on the
standards of care, has been illustrated in the Francis Inquiry.81 However, at the point of care, professional
leadership, especially medical, remains paramount118–121 and may function as catalyst for, or barrier to,
patient safety improvement.28,90,122–125
Team work
Research shows that, given the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of modern health care, effective
team working is an important element in patient safety,33,126,127 necessitating good communication and
co-ordination,119,128 particularly in high-pressure environments such as the operating theatre.74,75,129–133
It also requires a degree of consistency in the meanings, beliefs and values that frame different health-care
professionals’ commitment to care.39 Yet effective team working remains vulnerable to the adverse effects
of hierarchy,134 poor staffing,81 enmity and conflict30 and the human factors that give rise to team fragility.135
Greater understanding of such human factors, specifically with regard to (i) human error, (ii) the role of
health-care worker performance and (iii) the design of health-care technology, is increasingly recognised as
core to patient safety.136–138 But to be successful, this, too, necessitates careful consideration of the local
context and the informal culture of clinical practice.139
Regulatory oversight and governance systems
Public inquiries into failures in patient safety have consistently sought to enhance regulatory oversight81,82
and heighten both professional and organisational systems of governance.83,84,140 It has been argued that
these pressures have eroded professional self-regulation,141 replacing this traditional mode of control with
an increasingly legalised regulatory system.142 As a consequence, organisational, professional and work
group boundaries have shifted.143 This has the potential to foster defensive activity,144 which, as evidenced
in the Francis Inquiry,81 may prove detrimental to the safe provision of health care.
Patient and public engagement
A final foundation of the problem of patient safety that emerges from recent inquiries is the weak
representation of patients, their families and carers at all levels of the health-care system. Lauded as a
more bottom-up approach to service planning and provision,145 a robust patient-centred focus is
increasingly considered a core dimension of health-care quality.146 This involves providing opportunity for
patient, and broader lay, involvement in professional oversight bodies84 and health-care organisations’
formal governance structures,147–150 as well as active patient engagement in decisions about their care and
the ensuing evaluation of their experience.151–156
The patient safety agenda
In 2013, the Francis Inquiry81 was accompanied by two major reports into hospital patient safety. The first
was a review into the quality of care and treatment provided by 14 hospital trusts in England, led by
Sir Bruce Keogh, National Medical Director for the NHS in England.157 While this review acknowledged
(as other commentators did158–160) the difficulties in adopting mortality measures as an indicator of hospital
performance, it also set out core features of high-quality care for patients. The second, a report by the
National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England, led by Don Berwick, President Emeritus of
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI),161 also endorsed these goals. Each addresses the
foundations of the social problem of patient safety that are outlined in Table 1.
The improvement agenda proposed by these two recent reports is exacting. It demands changes in
policies, the education of health-care professionals and wider NHS workforce and further research into
the quality and safety of health care.5
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Patient safety improvement programmes
Recent reports and inquiries indicate that the global debate has progressed from the recognition and
acknowledgement of the foundations of the problem of patient safety to the quest for systemic solutions
to the challenges it poses.88,162–167 In England, a special health authority of the NHS, the National Patient
Safety Agency, was established in 2001 with the remit of monitoring patient safety. It identified the need
to introduce patient safety improvement programmes to help foster local capacity and progress from a
‘blame’ culture to one that was perceived to be ‘just’ and capable of facilitating the open reporting of
errors and near-misses.168 Informed by the work of the US-based IHI,162 and advances in safety within other
industries,22,169,170 NHS hospital patient safety programmes have typically sought to achieve improvements
by implementing evidence-based clinical practices and enhancing performance monitoring systems.171–173
Although the National Patient Safety Agency was dissolved in 2012, these policy goals continue to be
pursued, in England, through the NHS Commissioning Board and the Safer Patients initiative sponsored
by the Health Foundation, a charitable trust, and in Wales through the 1000 Lives campaign and its
successor, the 1000 Lives+ national programme, the focus of this study.
1000 Lives+ national programme in NHS Wales
Patient safety interventions range from isolated interventions within a discrete health-care setting, such as
the estimation of intraoperative blood loss174 or the validation of specific measures of harm,175 through to
national programmes of the type we are investigating in this study.176
In April 2008, the Welsh 1000 Lives+ campaign was launched by a collaborative involving the Welsh
Assembly Government’s Clinical Governance Support and Development Unit, the Wales Centre for Health,
the National Leadership and Innovation Agency for Healthcare, the National Public Health Service and the
National Patient Safety Agency. It had two distinct goals: (1) to reduce by 1000 the number of deaths
caused by suboptimal care and (2) to reduce by 50,000 the number of adverse incidents. All health-care
organisations in NHS Wales volunteered to participate in the programme. In 2010, the campaign was
superseded by the 1000 Lives+ national programme. This continued the ethos of high-quality person-centred
care and offered a broader range of patient safety interventions, and aligned resources, for NHS Wales’
health boards to implement. This ambitious and complex intervention built on the momentum of its
predecessor and now forms a core component of the Welsh Government’s delivery framework for the NHS
in Wales. As illustrated in Figure 1, 1000 Lives+ comprises a complex array of 11 core programme
improvement areas.
In this study, our attention is concentrated on three focal interventions: (1) ILQI, (2) RSC and (3) RHAI.
The 1000 Lives+ programme and its predecessor are adaptations of the IHI’s 100,000 Lives campaign.162,177 Both
are informed by the Model for Improvement (MI), developed by Langley et al.,178 depicted in Figure 2. This
model179,180 first directs attention to three questions: what are we trying to accomplish?; how will we know that a
change is an improvement?; and what changes can we make that will result in improvement? It then prescribes
the implementation of solutions through a Model for Improvement, Plan-Do-Study-Act (MI-PDSA) cycle.
Centred on Deming’s system of profound knowledge,178 the MI-PDSA approach is an acknowledged
cornerstone of the science of improvement,44,181 and is informed by a diverse array of theoretical perspectives.
The MI-PDSA cycle has been promoted by the IHI as the means to foster the transformation of patient
safety.172 The strength and success of this promotion is reflected in the way that the MI-PDSA approach has
been applied across a range of contexts, and to a variety of issues. Many of these themes are of direct
relevance to this study, including (i) the role of local champions in leading change;182–184 (ii) the education of
health-care professionals in evidence-based practice change;185–188 (iii) the implementation of the World
Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist (WHOSSC);169,189–191 (iv) the development and implementation
of anti-infective prescribing policies,192–194 including those for correct hand hygiene;195 and (v) the large-scale
transformation of health-care services through a heightened emphasis on patient safety.5,196
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Reducing Health-care-Associated Infections
– Reducing catheter-associated urinary 
   tract infections
– Reducing harm from peripheral venous 
   cannulae
– Hand hygiene compliance
– Compliance with local antimicrobial 
   use policy
Improving Medicines Management
– Reduction in INR > 5 and INR > 8 in hospital 
   and community settings 
Improving Acute Care
– Reducing harm from acute coronary 
   syndromes
– Rapid repose to acute illness learning sets 
   (RRAILS)
– Improving critical care − central line and 
   ventilator bundles
– Improving mouth care for adult patients 
   in hospital
Improving Surgical Care
– Enhances recovery after surgery
   – Elective colorectal surgery
   – Elective hip and knee arthroplasty
– Transforming theatres
– Reducing surgical complications
   – Normothermia
   – Appropriate pre-operative hair removal
– WHO surgical safety checklist
Improving Stroke Care
– Life after stroke
– Improving the reliability of acute stroke care
– Improving early rehabilitation following stroke
– Improving the reliability of transient ischaemic 
   attack services
Preventing Hospital-Acquired Thrombosis
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement





– Reducing hospital-acquired pressure ulcers
   (SKIN Bundle)
Transforming Maternity Services
– Reducing mortality and harm by improving the
   recognition and response to the acutely 
   deteriorating woman
– Reducing mortality and harm from venous
   thromboembolism in pregnancy and the 
   postnatal period
– Reducing preventable still birth in Wales
Improving Primary and Community Care
– Reducing chronic heart failure
– Improving care for patients with atrial fibrillation
– The primary care trigger tool
– Improving medicines management
– Improving care for patients with learning
   disabilities (Learning disabilities annual 
   health check)
– Reducing harm in dental care
– Reducing harm from falls in the community
Mental Health
– Identifying depression in hospital settings
– Improving dementia care
   – Prescribing of psychotropics
– Eating disorder
– First episode psychosis
http://www.1000livesplus.wales.nhs.uk/programme-areas
FIGURE 1 1000 Lives+ national patient safety programme areas.
INTRODUCTION
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
6
Design, implementation and evaluation
The 1000 Lives+ national programme incorporated a range of IHI-inspired patient safety interventions that
have been utilised worldwide.5 These include (i) the use of checklists; (ii) care bundles (checklists and
associated directive guidelines) for high-risk drugs197 and invasive practices;192,198,199 (iii) multicomponent
interventions, such as those advocated for the prevention and management of pressure ulcers, falls
and hospital-acquired infections;200–203 and (iv) various other forms of intervention, including staff
training,118,204–206 adverse event simulation,207,208 computer-assisted care management,62,209 national and/or
local alert systems and trigger tools.28,53,210,211
Hospital patient safety: a realist analysis
Context matters
Despite having a basic improvement approach in common, the differences in scale and scope of the
patient safety programmes impact on both the complexity of their implementation and the evaluation of
their outcomes5,168,212–215 and the reported outcomes of these interventions are marked by considerable
variation. However, although public inquiries and research evidence now concur that patient safety is,
in part, a matter of context,168 there has been very limited systematic and independent analysis of the
relationship between organisational factors which shape the local context of health care and the outcomes
of patient safety interventions.124,216–223
Prior to this study, relationships between the recently advocated ‘four high-priority’ features of organisational
context:5,223 (1) external factors such as regulatory requirements; (2) organisational structural characteristics;
(3) leadership, team work and patient safety culture; and (4) management priorities – and the outcomes of
safety programmes were both undertheorised and poorly understood in empirical terms.224 As a result, the
context of patient safety remained amorphous225 and ill defined.226 In contrast, this study is designed to address
the conceptual and empirical knowledge gaps involving the context of patient safety.
What are we trying to
accomplish?
How will we know that change is an
improvement?






FIGURE 2 Model for improvement.
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Aim and objectives
This study employs insights from institutional theory227 within a realist analysis framework228–235 to examine
the impact of context on the implementation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme across the Welsh
NHS. We present and explain our conceptual framework in Chapter 2.
Our approach arises from an appreciation that the influence of organisational features on hospital patient
safety programmes cannot be readily understood from traditional evaluation methods.236,274 Building on
findings from previous studies of the design237 implementation,21,220,238,239 and outcomes146,240 of patient
safety improvement programmes, we examine the implementation of three focal interventions in a
multisite comparative-intensive case study of hospitals in NHS Wales. We seek to reveal the complex
interplay of context and concerns,234,235 captured through the organisational factors and competing
institutional logics – belief systems – which guide acceptance of, or resistance to, the local adoption and
adaptation of patient safety programmes.3,240
This realist analysis of patient safety aims to ascertain which contextual factors matter, and how, why and
for whom they matter, in the hope that processes and outcomes of future improvement programmes
may be improved. Hence the unit of analysis in this study is the process of local implementation of the
1000 Lives+ programme, centred on the three focal interventions (rather than an evaluation of the
1000 Lives+ programme per se). The study has five main objectives:
1. to identify and analyse the organisational factors (e.g. structure, culture and managerial priorities)
pertinent to the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions
2. to identify and analyse the contextual mechanisms (logics or belief systems) that interact with
organisational factors to generate the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions
3. to develop and test hypotheses concerning relationships between organisational factors, mechanisms
and the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions
4. to produce a theoretically grounded and evidence-based model of which organisational factors matter,
how they matter and why they matter
5. to establish and disseminate lessons for a broad range of stakeholders concerned with patient safety
policy and management.
The achievement of these objectives should allow us to suggest how a particular configuration of
organisational factors may influence the mechanisms that lead to more or less successful health outcomes of
the three focal safety interventions considered. It is hoped that these findings will inform policy-makers,
managers and practitioners, locally, nationally and internationally; will empower stakeholders to develop
improvement interventions that are more likely to work in their local contingent circumstances; and may
serve as a diagnostic tool to be used as a precursor to the design of more differentiated and context-sensitive
interventions in future.
Report structure
The remainder of this report is presented in eight further chapters. Recognising the complexity of the
subject matter and the novelty of our conceptual framework, we have produced an innovative set of
explanatory schematics to accompany each chapter, in addition to our use of standard data tables and
figures. Below, we outline the structure of this report and the way in which we combine text, explanatory
schematics and other forms of data presentation to ensure the clarity of our reporting.
Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework developed in this study – realist analysis – and defines
our elaboration of established approaches to realist inquiry, centred on Archerian critical realism and
augmented by sociological institutionalism and neo-institutional theory (see Figures 3–6).
Chapter 3 presents the research design – comparative case study – and multimethod approach to data
collection and analysis (including our alignment to realist analysis) (see Figure 7 and Tables 2–5).
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Chapters 4 and 5 present our analysis of the implementation and institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+
programme in NHS Wales. Together, they form the foundation for our realist analysis of the three focal
interventions selected from the programme. Chapter 4 presents our analysis of the bureaucratisation of
1000 Lives+ programme across NHS Wales, defining our preliminary understanding of the local
implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme (see Figures 8–11 and Tables 6–9). Chapter 5 explores
interpersonal and individual engagement with 1000 Lives+ to offer an account of the normalisation of the
programme at the level of the functional team within each health board (see Figures 12–15 and Table 10).
Chapters 6–8 present our realist analysis of the three focal interventions – ILQI, RSC and RHAI – and our
understanding of the complex and dynamic relationships between organisational factors, generative
mechanisms and the outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions: Chapter 6, Improving Leadership
for Quality Improvement (see Figures 16 and 17, and Tables 11–21); Chapter 7, Reducing Surgical
Complications (see Figures 18–20 and Tables 22–27); and Chapter 8, Reducing Health-care Associated
Infection (see Figures 21 and 22, and Tables 28–33).
Chapter 9 presents the discussion and conclusion of our study, wherein we debate which contextual
factors appear to impact on the implementation of patient safety improvement programmes, promoting or
retarding their local success. In addition, we discuss the generalisability of our findings, the limitations of
our study and potential for future work in this important area.
Intended audience
Throughout this report we have been concerned to ensure that our findings are accessible to the public,
professionals, researchers and policy-makers wishing to (a) better understand existing improvement
programmes and (b) design more effective ones in the future. We hope that our innovative use of neat
description and summary graphics will assist in this objective, and the summaries presented in Chapters 1
and 9 are written for this extended audience in particular. In addition, we hope that much of the detailed
narrative in the report will be of relevance to social scientists and others with an academic interest in the
realist analysis of complex organisational phenomena.
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Chapter 2 Conceptual framework
Overview
This chapter presents the realist analysis framework that was developed and then used in this study.
It is presented in three main parts.
We begin by introducing the foundational realist philosophy of social science together with the approach
to realist inquiry that underpins our framework. We then define the manner through which intervention,
context, mechanism and outcome have traditionally been conceptualised and identify four challenges that
have emerged.
The second section of this chapter, guided by Pawson’s241 belief that methods gain their spurs by thoughtful
adaptation rather than mindless replication, introduces the conceptual resources from sociological
institutionalism and Archerian critical realism that we have employed to address the challenges of applying
realist inquiry.
In the final section, we draw from those resources and set out our innovative approach to the interplay of
intervention, context and mechanisms in realist analysis. Briefly, our elaborations to realist inquiry are as
follows. First, we include intervention as a separate analytical category in our realist analysis so that we
may understand precisely ‘what’ is working, for whom, how and in what circumstances. Second, we
forward a view of situated context as being stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic.
Next, we distinguish the conceptual elements of mechanism from its ensuing outcomes and demonstrate
the fundamental role of beliefs and values, institutional logics, on the propensity to act. Finally, in our
realist analysis framework, outcome is not perceived as a simple, single aspect of change, such as a
defined health outcome. Rather, we consider patterns of structural, political and ideational elaboration
and maintenance.
Foundations of realist inquiry
Realist inquiry has emerged at the forefront of theory-informed policy evaluation methodology in health
services and in other areas of social scientific enquiry.228,241–243 Orthodox strategies for marshalling evidence
in health-care research, epitomised by the Campbell and Cochrane Collaborations’ systematic reviews,
seek to produce answers to the question ‘what works?’. In contrast, realist inquiry seeks to better bridge
the gap between research, policy and practice244–246 by addressing the question ‘what works for whom,
why and in what circumstances?’.242,247 Within realist scholarship, two main approaches have gained
prominence. Realist evaluation is the mode of inquiry for primary research, in which new data are collected
from original sources. Its companion, realist review or synthesis, is the secondary research equivalent and
involves analysis and interpretation of existing data. Both realist modes place emphasis on explanation
of the interplay of contextual circumstances and mechanisms that foster the success or failure of an
intervention. The principal aim is to refine understanding of how and why the intervention operates
through the development of a more nuanced explication of what is termed programme theory, that is,
the implicit or explicit hypotheses about anticipated outcomes on which a series of interventions (such as
1000 Lives+) are based.247
Realist inquiry is rooted in the realist tradition in the philosophy of science. At base, realism steers a path
between empiricist/positivist and constructivist accounts of scientific explanation243 and is regarded as the
principal post-positivistic perspective.242
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The scholarship of Pawson and other realists is underpinned by a generative theory of causation. Hence
the aim of realist research, such as ours, is not to identify variables that associate with one another as
advocated by positivism. Instead, the research goal is to surface and explain how the association itself
came about.248 In this mode of inquiry, analysis is directed towards the identification and explanation of
the underlying generative mechanisms which shape structure, agency, social relations and ensuing
practices that are reproduced and/or transformed.249,250 The realist approach to reviewing the evidence
from complex interventions such as patient safety improvement programmes, therefore, assumes that
deterministic theories cannot always explain or predict outcomes in every context.251
The aim of realist inquiry is to further inform our understanding of the nuanced interplay between context,
mechanism and outcome for particular interventions.252–254 Its hallmark is, therefore, a quest to progress
from a presumptive definition through to an evidence-informed refinement of a causal explanation.247,255,256
Crucially, the conclusions of realist studies are recognised to be both provisional and fallible.257
Realist inquiry
In realist inquiry, testable propositions of how an intervention is perceived to work are depicted through
context–mechanism–outcome configurations (hereafter, CMO configurations).228 In essence, a CMO
configuration is a hypothesis that the programme outcome (O) emerges because of the action of some
underlying mechanisms (M), which come into operation only in particular contexts (C).256 Each CMO
configuration, therefore, explicates and progressively refines the scope of the original programme
theory.258–260 In this manner, a virtuous circle is completed, fostering deeper understanding of the
opportunities and challenges presented by an intervention, to inform future policy and practice.
Realist inquiry has gained increasing acceptance in health-care research, in part owing to its suitability for
examining the implementation of complex interventions in heterogeneous, multiprofessional social
systems.261–266 However, a number of challenges have emerged concerning the operationalisation of each
component of the CMO configuration. These challenges are discussed in the following four sections.
Intervention
Following Pawson, we recognise that while interventions designed to foster individual, organisational or
system change (e.g. patient safety improvement programmes) are complex and diverse,260,267,268 they often
depict consistent features. However, each intervention is dependent on collaborative human agency
(motivated action) to achieve their effects. Consequently, the implementation chain of an intervention will
be shaped by inconsistencies, as individuals and collectives, each differently enabled or constrained by
the social system, engage with, adopt and adapt or ultimately reject the resources and reasoning provided
by the programme.251 The operationalisation of an intervention is, therefore, contextually dependent,
influenced by the social system into which it is introduced and apt to mutate in situ.251,269
There have been a number of realist approaches to analysing interventions in health-care organisations.
For instance, an early application of realist inquiry into intervention in health care was research undertaken
by Greenhalgh et al. into a major reorganisation of four inner-London health-care organisations176,261,270
They present an inclusive analysis of the interwoven components of an intervention, together with a
postulated theory for each facet.176,261,270,271 Similarly holistic approaches are illustrated in Byng et al.’s
evaluation of a complex health services intervention targeted towards people with long-term mental
illness,264,272 Manzano-Santaella’s realist evaluation of financial incentives in English hospital discharge
policy,273 and other causal explanations of interventions targeted at various stakeholder groups, including
(i) patients;274–276 (ii) specific groups of health-care and aligned workers,277–284 and (iii) the standardisation of
evidence-based practice through protocol-based care.285–287
Alongside realist approaches that have been applied to consider ‘whole interventions’, more selective
analyses of the discrete components of an intervention are depicted in studies such as Leone’s evaluation
of an illicit drug deterrence programme.288 This sanctions-based intervention is considered only with regard
to the effects of its mandatory interview component. Similar approaches are demonstrated in other realist
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
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studies of health-care settings, such as (i) Blaise and Kegels’ evaluation of the development of the quality
management movement in health-care systems in Europe and Africa;263 (ii) Ogrinc and Batalden’s
evaluation of teaching about improvement of care in a clinical setting;289 and (iii) Pittam et al.’s evaluation
of employment advice provided to help people with mental health problems gain work.290
Thus, it may be argued that previous applications of realist inquiry in health care have applied the concept
of intervention inconsistently. Moreover, in our view, intervention is regularly underspecified and is too
often conflated with context. As will be described later (see Intervention: a distinct analytical category), in
this study we have tried to address these problems by treating intervention as a separate analytical category.
Context
In realist inquiry, four concentric layers of context are typically defined: (1) the broader infrastructural
system, the outermost layer; (2) the institutional setting, encompassing the cultural aspects of a given
contextual domain; (3) the interpersonal relationships which constitute the relational structure within which
actors are embedded; and (4) the individual capacities of the key actors.242 However, with rare exceptions
(e.g. the work of Greenhalgh et al.270 and of Byng et al.264), realist studies in health care have, typically,
been limited to a domain-specific notion of context. For example, focus may be directed towards the
broader infrastructural system and associated aspects of the institutional setting as illustrated in Evans and
Killoran’s realist evaluation of tackling health inequalities through partnership working291 or Pommier et al.’s
analysis of health promotion activities within the French education system.292
Alternatively, realist inquiries have focused on discrete organisational sites293 as in Oroviogoicoechea et al.’s
evaluation of the impact of a computerised hospital information system on nurses’ clinical practice,294,295
Pittam et al.’s evaluation of employment advice for those with mental health issues,290,296 and Tolson et al.’s
study of managed clinical networks in the care of individuals with cancer-related pain.297
More recently, other aspects of context have been considered within realist studies in health care. These
typically encompass the notion of organisational culture and influences emerging from wider interorganisational
alignment.3,298–300 Key contextual features include leadership, both by corporate management and by clinical
health-care professionals,81,181,301 and governance systems, including performance monitoring, evaluation and
feedback, which is increasingly patient informed.28,146,302
Overall, as noted by Shekelle et al,223 many previous applications of realist inquiry have failed to agree on
what elements of context are most influential and how context should be conceptualised.27,303,304 We have
tried to avoid this problem by using a multilevel approach to this issue (see Context: structural conditioning).
Mechanism
As originally described by Pawson, the mechanisms of a programme describe what it is about programmes
and interventions that bring about any effects and are the processes by which subjects interpret and act on
the intervention stratagem.228,241,242 Thus, it is not programmes that work per se. Rather, it is the underlying
reasons or resources that they offer subjects that generate change.305 In this view, mechanisms explain
causal relations by describing the powers, propensity or particular ways of acting inherent to a system and
are linked to, but not synonymous with, the underlying programme theory.306,307
Further insight into the nature of mechanisms is contributed by the work of Hedström and Ylikoski,308 who
contend that a mechanism is a causal process that produces an effect or phenomenon. In addition, they
posit that a mechanism has structure and operates in hierarchical sequence. This conceptualisation parallels
that of Fleetwood,306 who sees mechanisms as consisting of a cluster of causal factors or components
comprising social structures, practices, relations, rules and resources, with each cluster possessing the
powers, capacities and potentials to do certain things. It is also important to appreciate that mechanisms
produce contextually modulated effects according to their spatiotemporal relations with other objects, and
have their own causal powers and liabilities, which may trigger, block or modify their action.309,310
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In realist inquiries, mechanisms are typically presented as part of a CMO configuration.311,312 Indeed, some
studies extend this explanatory analysis to expose the specific roles of different components of the
intervention. This is exemplified in Mazzocato et al.’s study,313 where candidate mechanisms, attributed to
the operationalisation of service improvement methods, are used to define multiple CMO configurations.
However, in studies where CMO configurations are not developed, merely disconnected mechanisms or
outcomes, as opposed to a causal explanation, may be reported, as in Harris et al.’s314 realist review of
journal clubs and Gunawardena’s315 review of the effectiveness of geriatric day hospitals.
It is acknowledged in realist inquiry that one CMO configuration may be embedded in another or
configured in a series (in which the outcome of one CMO becomes the context for the next in the chain of
implementation steps).307 This aspect of realist inquiry remains underdeveloped, as it demands a highly
complex formulation of CMO configurations.316–318
In addition, although it is acknowledged that mechanisms encompass the reasoning of its participants, this
aspect of realist inquiry is also little explored,256 with few studies reporting participants’ thoughts about
why they chose to change, or indeed adhere to, their established practice (for two exceptions, see
Dieleman et al.319 and Jackson et al.320). The relative neglect of this aspect of mechanism may not be
surprising as, as noted in Vassilev et al.’s realist review of the role of social networks in the management of
chronic illness,321 unpacking and conceptualising reasoning is fraught with difficulty as justifications for
choices can operate within different, and often contradictory, stances.
Outcome
In realist inquiry, an outcome cannot be perceived as a simple, single aspect of change. The multifaceted
nature of an intervention, particularly when implemented within different organisations, each shaped by
their own contextual constraints and enablements, leads to different patterns of social transformation.243,269
Many applications of realist inquiry in health care attempt to present the health outcomes of interventions.
However, as noted by Floyd et al.,322 the specification and measurement of outcomes poses challenges.
For example, health outcomes may be obscured, merged with context and mechanism and depicted as
factors,323 or simply framed in terms of the intervention’s effectiveness.324 Outcomes supported by CMO
configurations, and thus setting out a clear explanatory argument, such as Tilley’s325 realist evaluation of a
British crime reduction programme, do something to tackle this problem. However, few studies explicitly
address more subtle and aligned outcomes arising from the intervention.
To summarise, the above section has suggested that, despite the contributions made by realist inquiries in
health care, four issues have consistently challenged researchers who have sought to apply existing models:
(1) the tendency to conflate intervention with context; (2) the limited conceptualisation of context and
mechanism, thereby inhibiting rigorous analysis of their boundaries; (3) the preoccupation with health
outcomes, as opposed to wider organisational and systemic gains or losses; and (4) the limited capacity to
frame the dynamic, temporal, interplay of intervention, context, mechanisms and outcomes. We now move
on to explain how we sought to address these issues through an elaborated model of realist analysis.
Addressing the challenges of realist inquiry
In our realist analysis framework, we employ resources from sociological institutionalism and Archerian
critical realism to help better specify context and mechanism and hence to address the challenges outlined
above. In the next two sections we introduce the key concepts that inform the revised CMO model we
present in Realist analysis: an elaborated intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome model.
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Sociological institutionalism
Within organisation studies, there has been a ‘growing disenchantment’ with analytical perspectives that
emphasise the influence of managerial rationality within organisational life.326 Rejecting the tenets of
strategic management and classical economic theory, sociological institutionalists examine the significance
of institutions, the ‘regulative, normative and cognitive [see Glossary] structures that provide stability and
meaning to social behaviour’.327
Some of the main contributions to understanding institutional change and inertia in health care have
emerged from analyses conducted at the level of organisational fields, defined as communities of
organisations that ‘partake of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field’.328 In a seminal example, DiMaggio
and Powell329 suggest that within organisational fields, three forces – mimetic (copying those perceived to
be successful), coercive (e.g. regulation) and normative (e.g. stemming from professional norms) – combine
to produce powerful templates of what constitutes legitimate organisational structure and action, and we
use these terms in our analyses of the data from our study.
In common with critical realism, sociological institutionalism depicts a world of virtual depth,330 stratified
and organised through different levels of institutional structures, along with their logics, or commonly held
sets of beliefs and values. There are higher, or macro-level, structures; these include societal systems such
as the bureaucratic state, capitalist markets, democracy and religion. Then come meso-level structures
characterised as organisation sectors or fields; these are composed of those organisations that are involved
in a particular issue or policy community. The concept incorporates field-level structures, participating
organisations and the people working within and between these organisations. For instance, the field of
health-care organisations comprises distinctive actors, diverse institutional logics and distinct governance
structures. Finally, there is the micro-level of the individual organisation, together with further
intraorganisational levels or groups.
Typically, the multiplicity of logics in a given domain is represented as some combinations of (i) higher-
order societal logics,331 (ii) field-level logics332 and (iii) institutional or ‘cultural’ logics.333 At the societal level,
heterogeneous higher-order logics sculpt the social world, conveying the core organising principles of
different sectors.331 Institutional logics orchestrate lower-level institutional strata and ensuing practices.
They shape organisational interests, individual preferences, define actors’ expectations about each other’s
behaviour and organise their enduring relations with each other.330,334
Previous studies of UK health-care fields have concentrated on the role of, and dynamics among, three
logics: professionalism, bureaucracy and market. Professional logic was dominant for much of the
twentieth century and gave workers with specialised knowledge (e.g. doctors) cultural and material
privileges, including the power to organise and control their own work and that of others.335,336 The
primary justification for these arrangements was that service delivery is optimised when it is under the
control of experts acting with the altruism they are assumed to develop during prolonged training and
socialisation. During the latter part of the twentieth century, successive governments promoted
combinations of two alternative logics in health care: (1) bureaucratic logic, which holds that service
delivery is improved under the administrative control of work using techniques of performance
management, and (2) market logic, which holds that improved service delivery arises from conditions of
competition among providers and choice among clients.
In our framework, multiple layers of logics constitute and provide the inherent structure to context.
However, organisational actors (or agents) may go along with or actively resist these social prescriptions,337
thus inhibiting or supporting change. The process of institutional change is, therefore, both enabled and
constrained by (i) the array of institutions, which compose and condition the substructure of the health-care
field, and (ii) agential theorisation, reflexivity and ensuing modes of institutional work.338–340 Accordingly,
even though institutions provide meaning to social life, such conditioning is non-deterministic.229,341
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Realist social theory
To further elaborate realist inquiry, we turn to Margaret Archer’s seminal work on critical realism.229–235
As in Herepath’s study,342 our approach employs Archer’s conceptual approach to structure,229 culture230
and agency,231 together with her later work on reflexivity.232–235 Our reasons for incorporating Archer’s
realist social theory are threefold.
First, Archer’s ontological stance holds structure (context) and agency (mechanism) as separate entities.
Consequently, Archer offers help to researchers who struggle over this distinction when analysing the
complex interplay of context and mechanism during the development of CMO configurations.
Second, an Archerian approach resonates with sociological institutionalism.343,344 Hence by harnessing
institutional theory within an Archerian approach, institutions are given their due recognition and temporal
role as both symbolic constructions and a set of material practices which guide actors’ behaviours.345
This helps to reveal the multiple logics which shape adherence to, or disregard for, the components of an
improvement programme and its underlying ethos.
Third, an Archerian approach offers a robust methodological framework composed of three phases,229
which parallel the context, mechanism and outcome components of a CMO configuration. Therefore,
methodologically, the researcher is guided by an aligned approach that helps to distinguish the boundaries
between context and mechanism and to reveal possible causal links between them.
Realist analysis: an elaborated
intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome model
This section explains how our model of realist analysis draws from the resources outlined above to address
the challenges of realist inquiry.
Intervention: a distinct analytical category
Our first elaboration to realist inquiry is to include intervention as a separate analytical category in our
realist analysis model. This stems from our recognition that although realist studies have adopted similar
Pawsonian conceptions of intervention, the absence of intervention as an analytical component has
encouraged its underspecification and conflation within context.286
We therefore consider that there is an imperative within realist inquiry to (i) explicitly define the
intervention ‘I’ and (ii) add this to Pawson’s original CMO formula to produce intervention–context–
mechanism–agency–outcome (I-CMAO) configurations. This allows us to understand precisely ‘what’ is
working in a situated context, for whom, how and in what broader circumstances. This refinement is
depicted in Figures 3 and 4, and this method of representation forms the basis of all the translational
schematics for the realist analysis presented in Chapters 6–8.
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FIGURE 4 Translation from a CMO configuration to an I-CMAO configuration.
Figure 3: key point summary
In Figure 3 we depict a schematic representation of an I-CMAO configuration. Point 1 highlights the
introduction of an intervention into a given context. Point 2 highlights the activation of a mechanism. Point 3










FIGURE 3 Basic I-CMAO schematic.
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Context: structural conditioning
As noted earlier, both realist inquiry and sociological institutionalism not only stress the importance of
context228 but also warn that to enable meaningful explanatory analysis, context cannot be reduced to the
spatial, geographical or institutional location into which a social programme is introduced and that a more
nuanced understanding of the multiple layers that compose a given context must be established.236,244,257
Guided by the approach to realist inquiry adopted by Pawson,228 we address the need to develop a more
subtle analysis of context by specifying four main levels of contextual hierarchy (infrastructural system,
institutional setting, interpersonal relations and individual) with all but the individual level divided into
substrata (see Figure 5).
Figure 4: key point summary
In the upper graphic of Figure 4 we depict a schematic representation of a CMO configuration. As asserted in
Realist inquiry, a CMO configuration is a hypothesis that the programme outcome (O) emerges because of the
action of some underlying mechanisms (M), which only come into operation in particular contexts (C).
Point 1 highlights the absence of intervention as a separate aspect of the analysis.
Point 2 highlights the difficulty that may arise in distinguishing context from mechanism in realist inquiry due,
in part, to the lack of clarity and consistency with which context is conceptualised and operated.
Point 3 draws attention to outcome in realist inquiry. An outcome cannot be perceived as a simple, single
aspect of change; however, few studies explicitly address more subtle and aligned outcomes, which arise
consequential to the intervention, impacting social elaboration or reproduction.
To address these issues, in the lower graphic of Figure 4, we depict a schematic representation of our I-CMAO
configuration and set out our four elaborations.
First, as indicated by point 4, we include intervention as a separate analytical category embedded with the
context under consideration.
Second, at point 5 we forward a view of context as stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic,
as expanded in Figure 5. In doing so, we seek to define the ‘situated context’, through the dominant structural
and cultural emergent properties in play, their attendant mechanisms and, thus, the impact on lower
contextual strata.
Third, at point 6 we apportion mediation and reflexive theorisation to mechanism. In this manner, we
distinguish the conceptual elements of mechanism from its ensuing outcome (this is expanded in Figure 6).
Point 7 highlights our goal of examining the ensuing process of institutional change, as opposed to that which
ultimately manifests as an outcome, thereby recognising that such change unfolds through time, may be
contested and may be at different stages of maturation in different situational contexts.
Finally, as depicted in point 8, outcome is not perceived as a simple, single aspect of change. Rather, we seek
to reveal structural and ideational differentiation.
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At the highest hierarchical level, we see the infrastructural system of the Welsh health-care state as
comprising three strata: (1) the higher-order societal logics which mould this contextual arena; (2) the
Welsh Government, as a devolved substate nation, and (3) the public sector partner agencies with
regulatory oversight of health-care quality and patient safety, which operate in close liaison with, but
distinct from, the Welsh Government and NHS Wales. The second highest hierarchical level of context, the
institutional setting, is conceptualised through two strata: (4) NHS Wales, as a corporate whole, and (5) its
seven constituent health boards as distinct multisite organisations. The third level, interpersonal
relationships, which constitute the relational structure within which actors are embedded, is captured
across two further strata: (6) a hospital site-based ward or multisite department and (7) the functional
team (the group of people who carry out the tasks involved in running a ward or department). Our final
stratum (8) describes the capacities of the individual actors.
However, a stratified model of context provides only the basic architecture of our argument, as it lacks the
means to consider context as ‘situated’, meaning dynamic, conditioned, relational and temporally fluid.
In essence, we see the dynamism of context as contoured by emergent structural, cultural and agential
powers across time. Our recourse to Archerian critical realism, together with the work of Herepath,342
therefore offers a more complex yet nuanced means to develop I-CMAO configurations.
An underlying premise of realist theory and research is that context affects or mediates ensuing agential
actions346 and hence the structural constraints and enablements of context are mediated to the agent as
first-order emergents. First-order emergents encompass agents’ placement within their broader social
context and roles, their vested interests, the opportunity costs associated with different courses of action
and, thus, their perceived interpretive freedom. Such first-order emergents impact differently on each
agent, enabling or frustrating the attainment of their desired goals depending on their social bargaining
power, both as individuals and as members of groups. Consequently, our analysis of how context impinges
on agents is stratified across three levels: social position, how their roles relate to others and the cultural
logics of the institutional domain within which they are situated. In this way we expose the contextual
constraints and enablements imposed on the agent.
The second stage by which the constraints and enablements of context are mediated addresses how
agents, conditioned by their contexts, think about and influence the formulation of their desired projects,
both individually and collectively.232 These influences give rise to potential second-order emergents (i.e ‘the
results of the results’ of the first-order emergent properties346), which in their turn affect the ways in which
an intervention is implemented.
Accordingly, in our realist analysis, we separate context from its mediation (or the effects of the context on the
intervention). As depicted in Figure 5, we first specify the explicit stratum concerned, so that hierarchical and
heterarchical influences may be more readily appreciated within a situated context. Second, we identify
dominant structural and cultural emergent properties within that context to define the structural conditioning
in play. Third, we apportion its mediation to mechanism, as expanded inMechanism: sociocultural interaction.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science



































Public sector partner agencies
(e.g. Community Health Councils)
NHS Wales as a corporate whole













FIGURE 5 Contextual strata: structural conditioning, hierarchical and heterarchical metamechanisms.
Figure 5: key point summary
In Figure 5, we illustrate our view of context as stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic
through the ‘steps’ of the contextual strata. This shows how the outcome of one I-CMAO becomes the context
for the next in the chain of implementation steps.
In point 1, we depict the collective weight of structural conditioning impacting across contextual strata. This
notion, as expanded in Context: structural conditioning, is an underlying premise of realist inquiry and
Archerian realist social theory.
In addition, we highlight the notion of a ‘meta mechanism’ that functions as a ‘carrier’ for the 1000 Lives+
national programme across NHS Wales. Point 2, therefore, depicts a hierarchical meta mechanism emergent
from the bureaucratisation of the programme across the policy/practice gap in NHS Wales.
Furthermore, point 3 depicts a heterarchical metamechanism inherent to normalisation of the programme at
the level of the functional team across linked strata.
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Mechanism: sociocultural interaction
In her later work, Archer has refined her conceptualisation of the mediation of contextual influences,
which, she contends, is undertaken via two mechanisms: habituation, guiding routine action, and
reflexivity, guiding those actions which demand a more creative response.338 Critically, Archer asserts that
such reflexive theorisation occurs through three stages: (1) discernment, the preliminary review stage of
an issue of concern, where reflective retrospective and prospective thought informs practical action;
(2) deliberation, involving the ranking of such concerns against others; and (3) dedication, entailing their
prioritisation and alignment to foster a fallible yet correctable commitment to a chosen path. Reflexive
theorisation thus represents the explicit interplay of social context and personal concerns that lies at the
heart of Pawson’s notion of mechanism.
Following this approach, in our realist analysis we allocate contextual mediation to mechanism, and to
this we add reflexive theorisation. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 6, we distinguish the conceptual
elements of mechanism from its ensuing outcome, illuminating the fundamental role of beliefs and
values – institutional logics – on the propensity to act, and revealing the contested nature of institutional
change and practice evolution.
In this study of the 1000 Lives+ programme, we examine the demarcation between context and mechanism,
focusing on mediation, reflexive theorisation, ensuing agency via negotiation and the mode of institutional
work enacted during two fundamental institutional processes: bureaucratisation and normalisation. These,
we contend, operate as sociocultural and organisational meta mechanisms, the underpinning carriers347
of the processes of health-care change desired by 1000 Lives+. In essence, it is through successful embedding
within these fundamental meta-mechanisms that the patient safety programme becomes institutionalised.
Bureaucratisation
Given that the logic of the bureaucratic state is predominantly that of command and control, we envisaged
bureaucratisation as a vertical, top-down meta mechanism. In this manner, the Welsh Government has
enacted state-centric control over NHS Wales. This is exemplified by the gradual bureaucratisation of the
1000 Lives+ national patient safety programme; specifically, the shift from optional engagement to mandatory
engagement as defined in the Welsh Government’s tier 1 performance targets for NHS Wales. Such
bureaucratisation now composes and conditions the substructure of the health-care field, creating a context
of politicised force majeure. We therefore examine the consequences of adherence to the 1000 Lives+
programme and describe the mechanisms which foster institutional coupling to, and decoupling from, patient
safety governance processes.85,348,349
Drawing on the work of Greenwood et al.,227 as well as terminology used by Lewin and Schein,350,351
we frame such institutional change through six stages – disconfirmation, deinstitutionalisation,
preinstitutionalisation, theorisation, diffusion and reinstitutionalisation – and use these to develop our
understanding of the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme, as set out in Chapter 4.
Normalisation
We envisaged normalisation as a heterarchical metamechanism operating (i) horizontally across discrete
functional teams, such as policy, health-care management or health-care clinical professionals; and
(ii) hierarchically, bottom-up and top-down, across conceptual strata. Hence, to provide deeper insight into
the implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme, we use normalisation process theory, as developed by
May et al.,352–355 to refine our understanding of how agency embedded this patient safety improvement
programme in a local context. The concept of normalisation acknowledges that those involved in the
process of institutional change have to undertake institutional work – and thus theorise in a reflexive
manner338,356– to reconfigure ensuing practices to meet local conditions.357
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This mid-range theory presented four possible generative mechanisms – coherence, cognitive participation,
collective action and reflexive monitoring – which are viewed to be central to the embedding and integration
of institutionally refined practices. As May and Finch353 point out, such mechanisms are subject to the power
play of social actors. Therefore, by focusing on normalisation, our examination of the implementation of
the 1000 Lives+ national programme was sensitised to the dynamic interplay of multiple logics.
Agency and ensuing outcomes: structural and cultural elaboration
or reproduction
In our realist analysis framework, outcome is not perceived as a simple, single aspect of change such
as a defined health outcome. Instead, it is recognised that the multifaceted nature of an intervention,
particularly when implemented within different organisations, each shaped by their own contextual
constraints and enablements, gives rise to discordant mechanisms which trigger different patterns of
social transformation.243,269 Moreover, such outcome patterns are contingent on all the tiny process and
positioning issues that occur on the way to the goal.244
Our framework is, therefore, concerned with the explication of these unfolding actions over time.
Specifically, we seek to examine the means through which the health-care practice change advocated by
the 1000 Lives+ programme, and the three focal interventions we consider in depth, are negotiated by the
functional teams positioned within the contextual strata depicted in Figure 5. We thus seek to illuminate
how health-care practice evolves (or not) over time, by considering the third-order emergents impacting
within the contextual arena.
Third-order emergents arise from the effects of first- and second-order influences on the outcomes of the
intervention.229 This concept, therefore, captures structural and ideational differentiation, together with
the regrouping inherent to the power play of a diverse array of agents.
Figure 6: key point summary
Figure 6 shows a preliminary outline of the key components of a mechanism. As noted in Figure 3, we
apportion mediation and reflexive theorisation to mechanism. We thus distinguish the conceptual elements of
mechanism from its ensuing outcome: the agential emergent properties, expressed through the unfolding
strategic negotiation of change, and the mode of institutional work enacted, to deliver sustainable outcomes,
be they elaborative or reproductive.
In point 1, we depict Archer’s refinement of her notion of contextual conditioning via the mediation of
structure by agency. This, Archer contends, is undertaken via two mechanisms: habituation, guiding routine
action, and reflexivity, guiding those actions that demand a more creative response. This manifests through
three stages: discernment, the preliminary review stage of an issue of concern, where reflective retrospective
and prospective thought informs practical action; deliberation, the ranking of such concerns against others; and
dedication, their prioritisation and alignment to foster a ‘fallible yet corrigible’ commitment to a chosen path.
Such reflexive agency thus represents the explicit interplay of social context and personal concerns.
In point 2 we assert that this three-stage process is modulated by the alignment of institutional logics.
Complementarity, co-existence or contradistinction via a countervailing stance thus impact first- and
second-order emergents to shape the individual’s situation logic and the ensuing stance that emerges from
their deliberation and dedication to a chosen path.
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Summary
We argue in this chapter that, as an established methodological complement to the critical realism of
which Pawson is a key advocate, and as an innovative lens for realist inquiry, an Archerian approach
provides both an explanatory framework for examining the interplay between structure (context) and
agency (mechanism) and a viable means for developing and refining emergent I-CMAO configurations.
In seeking to demarcate context from mechanism and intervention, our stratified model of context depicts
strata as hierarchical and interconnected. This purposely deviates from the notion of context bifurcated
into external and internal domains,216,358 and echoes the broader realist literature in terms of a sociology
divided into levels.359,360 Moreover, by revealing the mechanisms that operate within and between these
conceptual strata,316–318 as each action-level or arena is, simultaneously, a framework for action and a
product of action,330 we carry forward these generative threads into our realist analysis to define the web
of mechanisms operating within the focal context.
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Chapter 3 Research design
Overview
This chapter sets out our research design and approach to data collection and analysis. First, acknowledging
recent changes to research ethics and access permissions in NHS Wales, we provide a step-by-step account
of our actions in the start-up stage to the study. Second, our comparative case study research design is
presented, explaining our approach to realist analysis, case site selection and sampling strategy, and to data
collection, coding and analysis. Finally, we reflect on the challenges encountered during our research across
NHS Wales and discuss their impact on our realist analysis of hospital patient safety.
Research ethics and access permissions in NHS Wales
In February 2011, following notification of the award from the National Institute for Health Research Health
Services and Delivery Research programme, an Integrated Research Application System project data set
was developed prior to the formal start of the study in October 2011. Over the next 4 months, working in
collaboration with the National Institute for Social Care and Health Research (NISCHR) Patient Safety and
Healthcare Quality Registered Research Group, hosted by the School of Medicine, Cardiff University, and in
close liaison with the Director General, Health and Social Services and NHS Wales Chief Executive, the ‘in
principle’ engagement of all NHS Wales’ seven local health boards [Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University
Health Board; Aneurin Bevan University Health Board; Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board; Cardiff and
Vale University Health Board; Cwm Taf University Health Board; Hywel Dda University Health Board; and
Powys (Teaching) Health Board] was secured. In each health board, study contacts with delegated strategic
oversight for patient safety were recruited at medical director or associate medical director level.
Having gained NHS Wales’ ‘in principle’ engagement, sponsorship of the study was secured from Cardiff
University and the required documents were submitted to the Main Research Ethics Committee (MREC) for
Wales. MREC approval was granted in August 2011 and site-specific NHS research and development forms
were submitted to the newly established NISCHR Permissions Co-ordinating Unit. Following this, full ethical
and research governance permissions were obtained from Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, and
research passports were obtained for Herepath and Kitchener. Research validation and global governance
approval was obtained in September 2011. The research and development committees of the seven health
boards granted site-specific research permission and researcher access by December 2011, and Herepath
and Kitchener received either honorary research contracts or letters of access.
Anonymisation
All seven health boards in NHS Wales participated in the study. Summary data describing each
organisation are presented in Appendix 1. To ensure anonymity from this stage of the report onwards,
participant health boards are identified via a randomly assigned code letter from A to G. Numeric
subscripts are then used to identify a constituent major hospital (X1), a constituent district general hospital
(X2) or a constituent small local community hospital (X3).
Comparative case study approach
The study set out to examine which contextual factors matter and how they matter, and to explain why
they matter in the hope that this may lead to improvement in the design, processes and outcomes of
patient safety programmes. A comparative case study research design is appropriate for research of this
nature361 and was therefore adopted and aligned to realist analysis as discussed below.
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Comparative case studies in realist informed research are shaped by five methodological principles:
(1) explication of structure and context; (2) explication of events; (3) abduction and retroduction362–364
(see Ontological andepistemological alignment to realist analysis, below); (4) empirical corroboration
(ensuring that proposed mechanisms have causal power and better explanatory power than alternatives365);
and (5) triangulation and multimethods (using multiple approaches to support causal analysis based on a
variety of data types and sources, analytical methods, investigators and theories365). Each of these features
are employed throughout Chapters 4–8.
Ontological and epistemological alignment to realist analysis
The basic premise, or ontology, of critical realist informed research is that the world may be viewed as stratified
into three domains in which are apparent structures, mechanisms, powers and relations; events and actions;
and experiences and perceptions.362,363 Research in this tradition focuses on the identification and explanation
of the underlying generative mechanisms that shape structure, agency and the social relations that are
reproduced and/or transformed.252
The nature of the approach taken by realist research does impose limitations on what may be revealed
through a comparative case study research design. However, it is a viable means for discerning structures
and mechanisms, conveyed through our understanding of the social world and, thus, subject to revision as
our collective knowledge is refined.363,365 Nevertheless, one cannot connect powers or causal mechanisms
to events and perceptions easily or securely by simple inspection.366 This is because, once set in motion,
they continue to have an influence even if other countervailing powers and mechanisms prevent this
influence manifesting itself. The act of drawing conclusions from a comparative case study is, therefore,
a complex matter. It is informed by epistemology (what we think is known), the nature of the comparisons
made between cases and the mode of inference employed.
Comparative case study research designs using a critical realist approach must, therefore, seek to define
constraining and enabling social structures, encompassing organisations, groups and individuals, together
with the rules, practices, technological artefacts, discourse and culture which they manifest.365 In addition,
social actors’ interpretations of such structures, and their beliefs, values and theories, require detailed
consideration. The comparisons made between cases draw on abductive and retroductive modes of
inference as opposed to inductive and deductive.363,364 Abduction involves the production of an elementary
account of a basic process or mechanism.363 Retroduction builds on this analytical stage to reconstruct the
basic conditions for such phenomena to be what they are, so fostering knowledge of the conditions,
structures and mechanisms in play.362,363 Abstraction forms the basis of both abduction and retroduction.
As empirically demonstrated by Herepath,342 abstraction draws out the various components within the
situated context so that the researcher may gain new insight into the way they combine and interact.
Case site selection and sampling strategy
Case site selection was based on a two-stage sampling strategy. In phase 1, four clear and readily operable
criteria – corporate parent, complexity, function and geographical coverage – were employed to define the
purposive sample of case-site hospitals within each health board (see Appendix 1), and three within-case
comparators were selected from each health board: (1) a major hospital, (2) a district general hospital and
(3) a small community hospital. This approach ensured theoretical variation in I-CMAO configurations by
optimising the scope for description, interpretation and explanatory analysis, while reducing chance
associations.367–369 In contrast, in phase 2, the focus of the study was narrowed to four local health boards,
and centred on deeper examination of the most promising I-CMAO configurations for the three focal
interventions examined from the 1000 Lives+ programme.
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Data collection, coding and analysis
In adopting an overarching approach that combined realist inquiry with regard to the explication of
I-CMAO configurations, this study sought to examine the contextual conditioning which predated the
launch of the 1000 Lives+ programme, together with the mechanisms which emerged from the social
interaction of different groups of health-care workers engaged in its implementation, and the subsequent
outcome on the embedded practices of day-to-day health-care practice. As illustrated by the schedule of
data methods and sources illustrated in Figure 7, and expanded in the following four sections, a wide






































































FIGURE 7 Schedule of data methods and sources.
Figure 7: key point summary
In Figure 7 we set out a schematic of data methods and sources, expanded below.
As set out in point 1, a series of data searches were undertaken. These included one that centred on public
inquiries (see Table 5) as a means of gaining rapid awareness of significant systemic health-care delivery and
patient safety failures. The literature review, policy and document analysis was maintained throughout the
duration of the study. Points 2 and 3 depict the preliminary identification of candidate I-CMAO configurations
and their progressive refinement throughout the study.
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Welsh health-care policy context data
To build a coherent explanatory analysis of the context and events that led to the development and
implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme, our research commenced with an analysis of UK and
devolved Welsh health-care policy spanning the period from 1997 to 2013. As indicated in Table 2, the UK
coalition government’s White and Green Papers, together with other key legislative proposals, were
accessed and downloaded from the Department of Health’s website. Those of the former UK New Labour
government were sourced via the National Archives. Relevant Welsh Government documents, together with
those from the National Assembly for Wales, were accessed from site-specific policy archives. In addition,
Welsh health circulars and ministerial letters spanning the period 1997–2012 were accessed via the Health
of Wales Information Service (HOWIS) intranet. A repository in excess of 1700 documents was established
and archived in an electronic database to facilitate the exploration of the structural conditioning of the
Welsh health-care system.
Three analytical frameworks informed the coding of these data: (1) Friedland and Alford’s depiction of
higher-order societal logics;331 (2) Barber’s three paradigms of public sector reform;370 and (3) Hood’s
doctrinal components of new public management.371,372 Collectively, these focused our approach to
contextual conditioning and set out the requisite ‘vocabulary’373 through which the infrastructural system –
specifically, the organisational and professional governance processes structuring health-care quality and
patient safety – could be abstracted from the policy archive. As illustrated in Chapter 4, this centred on
the interplay of the higher-order societal logic of the bureaucratic state with the field-level logics of the
market, professionalism and democracy in health policy.
Analysis of these data revealed the systemic, paradigmatic, dominant and subordinate institutional logics,
which condition NHS Wales structurally and culturally, and impact on infrastructural systems underpinning
hospital patient safety. In addition, our consideration of bureaucratisation and normalisation sensitised
us to the generative mechanisms which foster institutional coupling to and decoupling from patient safety
governance processes, as well as the complex web of constraints and enablements which impact on
differently positioned social actors and condition their response to the development and implementation of
the 1000 Lives+ programme.
TABLE 2 Policy analysis: data sources
UK government policy
l Current White and Green Papers (UK coalition government from 2010) were accessed via the Department of Health
(www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/DH_4122399)




l Welsh Government (http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/nhswales/healthstrategy/?lang = en)
l National Assembly for Wales (legislation) (www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-legislation.htm)
l HOWIS intranet site (http://howis.wales.nhs.uk). Access to this third site was granted to the authors through the receipt
of honorary research contracts or letters of access from NHS Wales’ constituent health boards
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Semistructured realist interviews
To refine our explanatory analysis of the context and events that led to the development and implementation
of the 1000 Lives+ programme, we sought empirical corroboration from participants in the seven Welsh health
boards. In each health board, an initial section of potential research participants was identified in close liaison
with the study’s local contact. As summarised in Table 3, individuals were purposively drawn from a wide
range of organisational roles. These encompassed the corporate management structure, clinical professionals
and those occupying hybrid positions such as health-care clinical professionals in managerial roles.
Following confirmation of individuals’ consent to participate in the study, realist interviews were
undertaken,228 guided by the questionnaire defined in Appendix 2. In addition, during each interview,
respondents were asked to suggest further potential research participants. This ‘snowball’ approach helped
to secure access to staff across NHS Wales with relevant knowledge and expertise in the three focal patient
safety interventions examined. It also provided the opportunity to gain permission to observe meetings
and the established practices of health-care delivery.
Additional research participants for the study were drawn from the research team’s extensive network of
contacts across the Welsh public service, comprising (i) the Welsh Government’s Department of Health and
Social Services; (ii) external organisations tasked with the strategic oversight of patient safety in NHS Wales;
and (iii) health-care professional bodies.
Finally, to help refine the study’s emergent findings, world-leading academics with research interests in
health-care quality and patient safety were also interviewed. Therefore, as summarised in Table 3, a total
of 160 interviews, face to face or by telephone, digitally recorded and professionally transcribed, were
undertaken across phases 1 and 2 of the study. Interviews ranged in duration from 30 minutes to
90 minutes, with a mean time of 40 minutes.




NHS Wales, board-level executive directors 20
l Chair, Chief Executive, Director of Medicine, Director of Nursing, Director of Therapies and Health Science,
Director of Workforce and Organisational Development
l Non-executive directors, health board stakeholder representatives
NHS Wales, sub-board-level associate directors 20
l Associate Director of Medicine, Associate Director of Nursing, Associate Director of Therapies and Health
Science, Associate Director of Workforce and Organisational Development, Associate Director
Corporate Performance
NHS Wales, medical and surgical staff 20
l Consultant-grade staff, 1000 Lives+ local leads, junior doctors in training
NHS Wales, nursing staff 40
l Ward managers, ward sisters, band 6 through to band 2
NHS Wales, pharmacy staff 20
l Departmental managers, clinical pharmacists−antibiotic medicines management, clinical pharmacists−
surgical/theatre department management, 1000 Lives+ leads
1000 Lives+ national programme 10
l Team members
External stakeholders 20
l Public sector partner agencies with external oversight of patient safety
l Advocacy groups
l Academics with expertise in patient safety
Total 160
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The transcript of each interview was validated by (i) correcting errors, predominantly typographical, that
arose most typically from the use of complex medical terminology; and (ii) correcting queries, annotated and
time-marked by the transcriber, that arose from the use of medical and health policy acronyms (e.g. ‘VTE’
meaning venous thromboembolism; ‘AQF’ meaning ‘annual quality framework’). These data were then
coded in a two-stage process.
First, a central registry data file was created on an external hard drive, including (i) the interviewee’s
assigned anonymisation code; (ii) their name; (iii) their gender; (iv) their profession; (v) their role; (vi) their
hybrid status; (vii) the anonymisation codes for their employing health board (or other organisation) and,
if relevant, (viii) the anonymisation codes for their base site hospital. Access to this data file was password
protected and restricted to Herepath and Kitchener. Second, transcripts were coded in accordance with
the framework defined in Table 4, and records linked to the central registry data file.
TABLE 4 Data coding: preliminary and supplementary frameworks
Theme Subtheme
Preliminary coding framework: NHS inquiries recommendations impacting health-care quality
Regulation l Acts of Parliament
l Health-care quality standards
l Higher education
l Regulatory oversight via external public sector agency
l Regulatory oversight via NHS organisation
l Regulatory oversight via professional body
Corporate governance l Financial management




Clinical governance l Clinical audit
l Continuous professional development
l Professional standards management:
¢ revalidation
¢ relicensure
Patient engagement l Consumer
l Citizen
l Patient
Supplementary coding framework: infrastructural system – Welsh Government
Health-care policy and patient safety l Political advocacy for health-care quality and patient safety
l Policy commitment to 1000 Lives+ national programme






l Policy commitment to patient safety
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TABLE 4 Data coding: preliminary and supplementary frameworks (continued )
Theme Subtheme
Developing an ethos of patient safety l Leadership of patient safety
l Political advocacy for health-care quality and patient safety
l Policy commitment to 1000 Lives+ national programme
l Policy commitment to patient safety
Internal oversight of patient safety l Health-care quality standards
l Performance management frameworks:
¢ constraints and enablements
External oversight of patient safety l Patient complaints procedures
l Relationship with external bodies tasked with external oversight of
patient safety




l Relationship with professional bodies via policy leads
Supplementary coding framework: institutional setting – NHS Wales as a corporate whole/NHS Wales’
health boards




¢ team work and distributed leadership
¢ role of local champions for 1000 Lives+ focal interventions




Developing an ethos of patient safety l Education and patient safety
l Leadership of patient safety
l Political advocacy for health-care quality and patient safety
l Organisational commitment to 1000 Lives+ national programme
l Organisational commitment to patient safety
l Organisational learning and patient safety
External oversight of patient safety l Patient complaints procedures
l Relationship with external bodies tasked with external oversight of
patient safety
l Relationship with professional bodies
l Relationship with Welsh Government, Department of Health and
Social Care
Internal oversight of patient safety l Governance structures
l Measuring and monitoring patient safety
l Patient complaints procedures (Putting Things Right)
l Risk assessment (Welsh Risk Pool)
Impact of reconfiguration of patient safety l Organisational reconfiguration
l Clinical services reconfiguration
l System and process realignment across health board
continued
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TABLE 4 Data coding: preliminary and supplementary frameworks (continued )
Theme Subtheme
Supplementary coding framework: institutional setting and interpersonal relations – hospital multisite
department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
1000 Lives+ national programme l Engagement with 1000 Lives+ national programme:
¢ local leadership and followership
¢ role of champions
¢ constraints and enablements
l Engagement with 1000 Lives+ national programme team and
associated resources:
¢ resources employed within focal intervention
¢ networking events
¢ site-specific engagement
l Adoption of MI-PDSA approach:
¢ constraints and enablements
Context of health-care delivery l Perception of context:
¢ perception of strata − sense of enablements and constraints from
‘above’ and ‘below’
¢ perception of links and permeability
l Team work:
¢ distributed leadership − heterarchical/hierarchical authority
¢ relational structure







Supplementary coding framework: mechanism
Institutionalisation l Coercive institutional isomorphism
l Mimetic institutional isomorphism








Supplementary coding framework: agency




l Beliefs and values
l Knowledge, practical skills
l Micro-competence development
Supplementary coding framework: outcome
Perception of outcome l Structural elaboration, reproduction or focal invariance
l Cultural elaboration, reproduction or focal invariance
l Agential elaboration, reproduction or focal invariance
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Initially, as described in Chapter 2, our data were analysed to examine the bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+
programme (see Chapter 4), and its ensuing normalisation at the level of the functional team within each
health board (see Chapter 5). This stage of our analysis drew on two institutional theories. First, as noted
in Chapter 2, we utilised the work of Greenwood et al.227 and their six linked institutional mechanisms:
disconfirmation, deinstitutionalisation, preinstitutionalisation, theorisation, diffusion and reinstitutionalisation.
Second, guided by the work of May et al.,352,353 the process of local implementation was framed through the
mechanisms that foster the normalisation of complex interventions in daily health-care practice. These stages
shaped our deliberation and explication of the 1000 Lives+ programme’s I-CMAO configuration spanning the
Welsh health-care institutional field.
These data were further interrogated through our innovative approach to realist analysis, as illustrated in
Chapters 6–8. Drawing on the work of Herepath,342 interview transcripts were analysed to identify first-,
second- and third-order emergents. In this manner, interviewees’ perceptions of their situated context
were ascertained, together with the power play inherent to strategic negotiation of change, and ensuing
outcome. These latter stages involved abstraction to draw out various components of the focal intervention
and so facilitate the conceptualisation of their interplay, through combination and interaction, in the
situated context. This was then supplemented by retroduction. Therefore, the generative mechanisms that
operated through an emergent causal configuration were surfaced through a combination of theory and
experimental observation.228
Given the number of interview data collected, the selection of excerpts for inclusion in the report had
to be constrained. To respond to this requirement we adopted the following format for references to
transcription data in Chapters 4–8. First, succinct statements, which captured interviewees’ perceptions
of context and their beliefs, values and reflections – and, thus, the reflexive theorisation inherent to
mechanisms – together with ensuing actions, and outcomes, were prioritised. Throughout Chapters 4–8,
such data excerpts are identified by a chapter code and number. For example, ‘transcription 4:01, below’,
indicates the first transcription excerpt included in Chapter 4. Where data from interviews are used to
make a point but excerpts are not included in the text, this is indicated in a similar way, but without
‘below’. Full transcripts of all interview data, including those discussed but not illustrated in the report
owing to editorial word constraints, are archived in a supplementary data file. These may be obtained for
personal research use only from the corresponding author of this report.
In contrast to the wealth of interview data included, limited observational data are alluded to in this report.
This deliberate restriction is a result of the marked disparity between overt observation of practice
undertaken during the study and inherently opportunistic covert observation of practice that arose across
multiple case sites.
Supplementary organisational data
Six supplementary forms of case site-specific data were also collected. These encompassed (i) Executive
Board papers; (ii) health board mortality data; (iii) Welsh health-care-associated infection programme data;
(iv) external inspection reports from Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (HIW), Community Health Councils
(CHCs) across Wales, the Wales Audit Office and the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (PSOW);
(v) 50 hours’ observation of established day-to-day health-care practice undertaken to discern embedded
leadership, theatre and infection prevention and control (IPAC) practices; and (vi) feedback sessions to
NHS Wales and the 1000 Lives+ team, during which our posited I-CMAO configurations were tested
and refined.
Supplementary secondary data
To gain an in-depth appreciation of the contextual issues impacting on hospital patient safety, and
sensitise our subsequent analysis, the reports generated by six public inquiries into safety failures in the
NHS, listed in Table 5, were collected.
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For the purposes of this study, data in the form of 954 reported recommendations – the espoused lessons
to be learned for the future – to improve the design, delivery and sustainability of safe health-care services
were collected and archived in an electronic database. This provided further rich insight into the
infrastructural system underpinning hospital patient safety, its complex nature and embedded institutions.
Acknowledging that the notion of comparing the reports and recommendations from different public
inquiries is somewhat ‘contestable’,378 we therefore coded the abstracted recommendations descriptively,
across (i) regulatory oversight, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) clinical governance and (iv) patient
engagement. These data were then coded once more in accordance with the nature of the ‘problems/
issues’ identified, as depicted in Table 4.
The analysis of these data with respect to extant NHS governance processes helped to identify institutional
decoupling – the creation and maintenance of gaps between symbolically adopted formal policies and
actual organisational practices379 – which foster institutionalisation of aberrant practice.346 In this manner,
we identified the common vulnerabilities which impact adversely on patient safety, and their advocated
remedies. This analysis informed both the development of our interview tool and the selection of our
preliminary I-CMAO configurations.
Patient and public involvement
Current hospital patients were not involved in the design, development or operationalisation of this study.
However, a broader lay (and patient) perspective was actively sought. Working in close liaison with the
NISCHR Clinical Research Centre’s Involving People Programme, two lay representatives were appointed to
the study’s advisory board. Each provided insight into the patient experience of health care. Moreover, this
was augmented by their collective insight into (i) patient advocacy, (ii) participation in health-board-level
stakeholder reference groups and (iii) prior experience of advisory board roles in other health-care studies
implemented in NHS Wales.
Challenges encountered in the operationalisation of the study
Two issues arose during the operation of our study that required deviation from the original
research protocol.
Access to patient stories and organisational culture survey data
During the design and development of the grant application for this study, the research team was assured
of access to an archive of patient stories and organisational culture survey data held by the 1000 Lives+
programme team. Following the commencement of the study, working in close liaison with the
TABLE 5 Public inquiries into patient safety failures: data sources
1. Inquiry into quality and practice within the National Health Service arising from the actions of Rodney Ledward
(published June 2000)374
2. The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry (published July 2005)375
3. The Shipman Inquiry (published January 2002 to January 2005):84
i. Third Report: Death Certification and the Investigation of Deaths by Coroners (published July 2003)
ii. Fourth Report: The Regulation of Controlled Drugs in the Community (published July 2004)
iii. Fifth Report: Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past – Proposals for the Future (published December 2004)
4. Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital Inquiry (Alder Hey) (published January 2001)376
5. Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (published July 2001)82
6. Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry (published February 2010)377
7. Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (published February 2013)81
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1000 Lives+ programme team, three critical issues emerged on review of these data. First, and most
importantly, these data lacked ethical approval and informed patient consent for use for research purposes.
Second, the patient stories data had been collected via inconsistent means and lacked the requisite
information to verify or contact data sources. Given such issues, these data were, therefore, used in a
restricted manner to inform the phase 1 interview guide. Third, with respect to the organisational culture
survey data, that archive reflected the organisational boundaries prior to the reconfiguration of NHS Wales.
The research teams therefore considered that such historical data provide limited insight into NHS Wales’
evolving cultural composition post reconfiguration. These data were, therefore, used only to inform the
research team’s understanding of organisational context, and the organisational legacy effect that it
imparts, within each reconfigured health board.
Supplementary quantitative data quality
During phases 1 and 2 of the study, data from interviews and documentary analysis indicated that, with
respect to the focal interventions ILQI and RSC, the desired supplementary quantitative data were of
inconsistent quality. This issue did not impact RHAI because mandatory surveillance data were available via
the Welsh Healthcare Associated Infection Programme (WHAIP) led by Public Health Wales. The research
team discussed this issue at length with the study’s advisory board and commissioners, who advocated the
continued investigation of the three focal interventions adjusted to reflect the broader organisational
outcomes of the 1000 Lives+ programme and focal interventions.
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Chapter 4 Institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+
national programme in NHS Wales: bureaucratisation,
health-care policy and patient safety
Overview
Chapters 4 and 5 present our analysis of the implementation and institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+
programme in NHS Wales. Together, they form the foundation for our analyses of the three focal
interventions – ILQI, RSC and RHAI – that are presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, respectively. This chapter
presents our analysis of the bureaucratisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme at the higher, infrastructural
system level of the Welsh health-care field. In contrast, Chapter 5 is focused at lower contextual levels
and explores interpersonal and individual engagement with 1000 Lives+ to offer an account of the
normalisation of the programme at the level of the functional team.
In this chapter, we first explore the institutional logics moulding the Welsh health-care field and explain
how these conditioning influences have framed the implementation and ensuing bureaucratisation of the
1000 Lives+ programme. Second, to penetrate beyond the rhetoric of policy and espoused best practice,
we examine actors’ perceptions of the manner in which the 1000 Lives+ programme has become an
integral part of Welsh health-care policy. Specifically, we consider its integration with organisational and
professional patient safety governance processes operating across the Welsh health-care field. In doing so,
we gain further insight into the bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+ and set out our understanding of the
pragmatic issues which foster institutional coupling to, or decoupling from, these governance processes.
This chapter, therefore, serves to sensitise our subsequent analyses to the development of patient
safety practices in NHS Wales. Finally, we set out our understanding of the local implementation of
the 1000 Lives+ programme, anchored to the underpinning MI-PDSA approach.
Institutional logics framing the bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+
At a systemic level, the post-devolution Welsh health-care field parallels that of the UK – English – NHS
and is characterised by the central role of government in overseeing the collective production, provision and
consumption of health care.380 The underlying principles and values underpinning the NHS in Wales remain
grounded in the traditional social democratic communitarian ethos apparent at the inception of the
NHS in the 1940s381 and access to its operational service infrastructure remains based on the principle
of citizenship.382
When considering the provision of public services at the infrastructural level, Barber370 suggests three
paradigms – bureaucratic command and control, quasi-markets, and devolution and transparency370,383 –
which may be deployed within a government system if it is to balance equity and diversity with support for
high quality.
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The classical notion of bureaucratic command and control is forwarded as the means of pursuing change
to address public service failure, policy or program priorities, and to demonstrate this response to a
wider public and political audience. The alternative formation of a quasi-market logic is supported by
governments that wish to introduce market forces within a public service system to provide the individual
with choice across a range of providers to improve performance. Finally, the devolution of responsibility to
frontline units, augmented by the overt communication of performance measures to patients and staff to
enable informed comparisons to be made (transparency), stems from a logic of choice. This is deemed
necessary to reform a service where the conditions for the success of quasi-markets are not present.
In practice, according to Barber,370 all of these paradigms are likely to co-exist within large-scale systems,
such as health care, although the precise balance of paradigmatic institutional logics within a given
health-care field positions one into dominance while the remainder function in a subordinate capacity.
Hence we would argue that, while the UK remains emblematic of new public management,384 our data
suggest that NHS Wales is far more representative of a new public service logic with the paradigmatic logic
of bureaucratic command and control occupying a dominant position, tempering the logics of the market,
professionalism and democracy in health policy. Patient safety and associated governance processes
appear, therefore, to be primarily structured and directed by the regulatory agency of the
Welsh Government.
Bureaucratic state logic
As illustrated in Figure 8, the logic of the bureaucratic state is expressed through an array of structural
features that inculcate a pervasive performance measurement and management ethos across the Welsh
health-care field.385,386 Much of this was introduced under the UK New Labour government, such as
new systems for clinical governance, a statutory duty of quality and evidence-based national service
frameworks. That government also laid the foundations for an array of arm’s-length bodies that retain the
scope for direct intervention in the NHS in England and Wales.387 Some have even seen this as a precursor
to the legitimisation of the role of the state as the guarantor of social provision, rather than as the sole
provider,388 a stance which resonated with the policy approach of the 2010 UK Conservative–Liberal
Democrat coalition government. However, while the logic of the bureaucratic state imposes a sense of
control, the efficient use of resources resides largely within the control of discrete professionals.389 This
logic is, therefore, tempered by the wielding of professional power at the individual and group level,390
as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9.
In Wales, the bureaucratic state logic of the Welsh Government orchestrates the top-down performance
measurement and management of the 1000 Lives campaign and the successor 1000 Lives+ programme.
For example, under the mantle of 1000 Lives+, NHS Wales’ constituent organisations are tasked to
(i) set appropriate local targets for the reduction of harm and hospital mortality, initially by employing
the Trigger Tool for hospitals; (ii) demonstrate participation in 1000 Lives+ through the appointment of
executive leads; and (iii) collect robust data so that local variation in service provision may be identified,
analysed and understood, resulting in the development of intelligent targets for service improvement and
patient safety.391 Strategic oversight of such actions rests with the National Quality and Safety Forum
instituted in 2012.
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Religion Capitalist market Democracy
Bureaucratic state
Dominant logic: top-down performance management
Subordinate logic:
Collaboration
• Health board integration
   of primary, secondary and
   tertiary health care
• Partnership frameworks
• Multiagency development 
   of patient care pathways
• 1000 Lives+ 
   mini-collaboratives
Subordinate logic:
Professionalism
• Leadership and aligned
   professional development
   frameworks
• Agenda for change – 
   workforce development, 
   role redesign
• Organisational development
• Service improvement
   (e.g. 1000 Lives+ Model




   services – patient- and
   family-centred health care
• Users shaping services
   from below
• Voice and coproduction
• Broader stakeholder
   engagement (e.g. Putting
   Things Right)
• National Service Frameworks
• Annual Quality Framework
• Performance assessment and inspection by







Paradigmatic logic: command and control
FIGURE 8 Institutional logics in the Welsh health-care institutional field.
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Figure 8: key point summary
In Figure 8 we depict a schematic representation of the Welsh health-care institutional field. As indicated in
Chapter 2 (see Sociological institutionalism), the multiplicity of logics in this domain are represented as some
combinations of (i) higher-order societal logics; (ii) field-level logics; and (iii) institutions or ‘cultural logics’, each
composed of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars.
Point 1 illustrates the heterogeneous higher-order logics (the bureaucratic state, capitalist market, democracy,
nuclear family and religion) that sculpt the social world, conveying the core organising principles of these
different sectors. In both connection and contention with each other, they are held in dynamic tension due to
their inherent complementarities and contradictions. Such institutional logics, therefore, orchestrate lower-level
institutional strata and ensuing practices: shaping organisational interests; individual preferences; and the
ensuing repertoire of anticipated behaviours which define actors’ expectations about each other’s behaviour
and organise their enduring relations with each other.
Point 2 depicts the expression of this interplay at the level of the Welsh health-care field. Here, the higher-order
societal logic of the bureaucratic state is dominant. Accordingly, the paradigmatic logic of bureaucratic
command and control predominates.
Point 3 of our explanatory schematic illustrates the field-level expression of the dominant logic of the
bureaucratic state, expressed through an array of structural features that inculcate a pervasive performance
measurement and management ethos across the Welsh health-care field.
Point 4 depicts the field-level expression of the subordinate logics of collaboration, professionalism
and democracy.
BUREAUCRATISATION, HEALTH-CARE POLICY AND PATIENT SAFETY




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
41
Capitalist market logic replaced by collaboration
The UK New Labour government followed the Conservative adherence to new public management,
aiming to increase the efficiency and quality of service provision through the logic of the capitalist
market. For the UK health-care field this approach could be seen in the encouragement of aspects of
competition, contestability and practice-based commissioning, and the same stance lingered on in the
2010 UK Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government’s health-care policy. However, in the
post-devolution Welsh health-care field, this logic has been opposed and replaced by collaboration.392
Importantly, the Government of Wales Act (2006) requires the Welsh Government to work in formal
partnership with the voluntary sector, local government and businesses. This constitutes a set of
operational requirements not paralleled elsewhere in the UK.393
The NHS reforms in Wales have, therefore, sought to inculcate a new set of behaviours – replacing
competition with collaboration, joint working and whole-systems thinking – to foster a greater emphasis
on quality and patient safety outcomes. This collaborative logic is interwoven throughout the 1000 Lives+
programme, as evidenced by its integral mini-collaboratives, and national learning and networking events,
which foster co-operation, knowledge sharing and peer challenge. Furthermore, strategic oversight of
health-care standards and patient safety performance in Wales requires collaboration across the National
Quality and Safety Forum, Welsh Government, HIW, PSOW, CHCs and health-care providers, including
those in the independent sector.
Figure 9: key point summary
In Figure 9, informed by the findings of our realist analysis in Overview, we illustrate how the dominance of
one logic vs. another is influenced by contextual strata.
Point 1 depicts the logic of the bureaucratic state as dominant across the infrastructural and institutional setting
of our study.
However, as indicated at point 2, the logic of democracy is dominant for public sector partner agencies with
strategic oversight of patient safety.
In addition, as indicated at point 3, at lower contextual strata – specifically, a hospital multisite department or
site-based ward – the functional team is orchestrated by a dominant professional logic.
As indicated in point 4, this therefore draws different professional logics into contention and potential conflict
with that of the bureaucratic state.
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Professional logic
Despite Wales’ adoption of a collaborative approach, the ideological approach to public management
reform adopted by the UK government still impacts on Wales through its reserved powers. Thus, at the
field level, professional logic – be that corporate management or the array of hierarchically positioned
health-care professionals394 – remains constrained. Indeed, what can be seen is an explicit focus on
workforce development (and, thus, organisational development) through a managerialist variant of
transformational leadership,395 role redesign and adherence to prescriptive standards that seek to build
staff capacity and capability while reducing service variation.396 This logic is inescapably interwoven with
performance management. As asserted in the current quality delivery plan for NHS Wales,391 the
operationalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme is central to the building of staff capacity and capability
across NHS Wales:
1000 Lives+ will continue to be the core NHS improvement programme, ensuring a common and
consistent language and approach to improvement.
Health Boards and Trusts will agree a plan to train 25 per cent of their directly employed and
contractor workforce in quality improvement methodology (at basic, expert or leadership level) by the
end of March 2014, supported by 1000 Lives+.
Achieving Excellence: The Quality Delivery Plan for the NHS in Wales 2012–2016 (2012)391
Democratic logic
Although the logic of democracy, expressed in policy through the desire for heightened user participation,
engagement and control over public services, appeared in the Conservative Party’s general election
manifesto of 1979, it reached new heights during the first term of the New Labour government. Beginning
with the promotion of openness and public involvement in the NHS,397 it progressed to the heightened
legitimacy and authority of lay voices398 and the later adoption of a Scandinavian model of explicit patient
choice which evolved into individualisation and coproduction. However, it is uncertain if this approach can
or will be fully realised, as its implementation is dependent on many factors, not least that appropriate
program design is essential if engagement with the citizen-consumer is to be effective.399,400
In the Welsh health-care field, given the overt rejection of market logic, the policy levers for provider
pluralism and ensuing choice were not available. Wales has, therefore, embraced a citizen-centred
model,392 adhering to notions of collectivism and standardisation as in the traditional socialist values of
equality, social justice and social inclusion in policy.401 The 1000 Lives+ programme explicitly seeks to
actively engage patients in the coproduction of their health care. Indeed, as expanded in Chapter 6,
patient stories represent an important means of gaining feedback. In addition, an aligned programme,
Putting Things Right, launched in April 2011 (www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/home.cfm?orgid=932), facilitates
the communication of what are collectively termed ‘concerns’ (complaints, claims and incidents reports)
into the standards of health-care delivery and patient safety in NHS Wales. This operates in parallel with
NHS Wales’ governance framework.
1000 Lives+, health policy and patient safety
The 1000 Lives+ programme is a complex, multicomponent patient safety intervention and is an integral
part of the Welsh Government’s policy framework for NHS Wales.391,402 All health boards and trusts are
involved in its operation. The Welsh Government and Public Health Wales host its codirectors and core
team of improvement facilitators. Strategic oversight is provided by a dedicated programme board.
1000 Lives+ is supported by a faculty comprising a small group of senior clinical and managerial leaders
who are tasked to ensure the rigour and clinical credibility of the evidence-based interventions promoted.
In addition, the faculty builds capacity and capability at local and national levels by providing mentorship
within clinical arenas, and through its contribution to the design and delivery of resources and training
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materials. The 1000 Lives+ core team and faculty are augmented by an active network of students and
academics committed to quality improvement and patient safety in NHS Wales.
As outlined in Chapter 1, the 1000 Lives+ programme seeks to support organisations and individuals to deliver
health care of the highest quality for the people of Wales. Composed of an array of aligned improvement
programmes, summarised in Figure 1, it adheres to an internationally recognised MI-PDSA178 approach. This
supports the use of small tests of change to establish new ways of working that can be replicated and
adapted across NHS Wales. The broader infrastructure of 1000 Lives+ includes a website (www.1000livesplus.
wales.nhs.uk) that enables access to publications and resources. These provide tailored support for each
improvement area, together with notification of national events, opportunities for networking, knowledge
mobilisation and collective learning. These resources are aligned to a web-based national learning
programme for all NHS Wales staff and contractors (Improving Quality Together: www.iqt.wales.nhs.uk/
home) together with the resources offered by Patient Safety Wales (www.patientsafetywales.org.uk).
Our discussions with policy leads, drawn from the upper echelons of the Welsh Government, highlighted
the manner in which the 1000 Lives+ programme has become established in the Welsh health-care field
and a core policy lever for health-care transformation in NHS Wales, as expressed in the excerpt from
transcription 4:01, below (N.B. the full text of all transcriptions can be found in a supplementary data file;
see Chapter 3, Data collection, coding and analysis, Semistructured realist interviews).
1000 Lives+ has become institutionalised – it’s become part of the fabric – it’s part of the way in which
policy is being delivered and therefore all of the mechanisms that report progress on policy are by
proxy reporting 1000 Lives+ progress; albeit I don’t think it’s quite that explicit. But I think the
bureaucracy that sits behind the politics of policy have become enmeshed with 1000 Lives+.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 4:01
The 1000 Lives+ programme was widely viewed to have been built around the Welsh Government’s tier 1
performance targets for NHS Wales (transcriptions 4:02 and 4:03). Indeed, the relative success of
1000 Lives+ had enabled other policy programmes to be associated with and linked to this complex
intervention (transcription 4:04, below).
1000 Lives+ is something that people are using in order to be able to engage NHS staff in
improvement work – it’s a badge, a brand – and, what has happened here is that things have ended
up being tagged onto 1000 Lives+. Through its own relative success 1000 Lives+ has become a magnet
for lots of other things that people want to get in on the back of; it’s almost become a Trojan horse
way of getting something in the policy system! But it’s mandated now, it’s how we do change.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (150); transcription 4:04
Respondents also saw ministerial advocacy as important to the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+
programme (transcription 4:05, below).
[T]hey stuck their head out, well above the political parapet by coming out and publically endorsing, or
at least acknowledging that, in health care, things can go wrong – we can cause harm, be it through
variation, misjudgement, error or malpractice: we damage patients.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (081); transcription 4:05
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Such advocacy was augmented by elite engagement across NHS Wales (transcription 4:06). Isomorphic
institutionalism (increased similarity over time), vectored through the work of the IHI, was also perceived to
have played a central role in brokering ministerial and wider elite engagement (transcriptions 4:07 and
4:08, below).
There was an awareness, back in 2006 and 2007, that we should be doing better in terms of patient
safety. I think that awareness was raised by the work of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement to
some extent – some of the key protagonists in the original campaign were closely involved with the
IHI – but it was a bold commitment by the minister, the decision to actually launch the 1000 Lives
Campaign. The label – 1000 Lives – that label, it implied that there were 1000 avoidable deaths,
which is quite a brave thing to say. I’m not sure that we’re still that brave.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (145); transcription 4:08
However, such elite engagement had also given rise to a context marred by coercive isomorphism329
(enforced similarity), one in which it was difficult to criticise the 1000 Lives+ national programme for fear of
jeopardising relationships with future leaders of the Welsh NHS (transcription 4:09, below).
Wearing my naive yet political hat, the one thing you do not do is tell 1000 Lives+ it’s failing – that is
like insulting their firstborn and saying it’s ugly – too many people high up the food chain – politicians,
chief executive, medical directors – have signed up to this, and to publicly say it’s not working is
dangerous, not just for getting the process done but dangerous for individuals. So you need to be a
bit more savvy about that!
Wales is a very small community – everyone knows everyone – so I am very mindful that if I pissed off
someone here: you piss off today’s medical director, you are enemies with tomorrow’s chief exec of
NHS Wales!
Policy lead, Welsh Government (144); transcription 4:09
Indeed, the human factors inherent to policy development – the barriers created through personal enmity
and petty jealousies – compounded this note of discord (transcription 4:10, below).
The 1000 Lives+ national programme is a source of hostility. [Why do you think it is a source of
hostility?] There’re a number of elements in play but, to be frank, it comes down to personalities and
personal jealousies. It’s about how, and with whom, it all started. In the beginning, we had [Name 1]
and [Name 2] – both strong, charismatic personality types, who have their advocates and detractors, and
who were, especially [Name 1], closely tied to the minister [Minister for Health and Social Services].
Now, these were the key figures, and some people across the service are advocates of them – not the
1000 Lives+ national programme – whilst others are not: but that’s just the way it is, in all walks of life,
some people reject what you’re saying, not because they’ve thought about it, or hold a contrary view
but just because you’re saying it: so it’s personal enmity. There’re a number of ****ed-up relationships
out there! God, you know how bloody parochial it can be. So, these personal tensions and jealousies –
because that’s what they are, jealousies about who’s standing in the ministerial limelight; who is flavour
of the month – these cause significant barriers to programme uptake, buy-in, and implementation.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (081); transcription 4:10
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Patient safety governance processes in NHS Wales
The 1000 Lives+ programme has now become integrated within organisational and professional patient
safety governance processes operating across the Welsh health-care field and this complex patient
safety intervention was perceived to symbolise and be part of the language of working together
(transcription 4:11, below).
I think 1000 Lives+, certainly, because by its very nature it’s a collaborative approach, it gives you a
way of getting people in a room. Also, because it’s badged 1000 Lives+ it probably doesn’t feel as
threatening to some board-level stakeholders – it’s a convenient badge that’s become a metaphor for
working together – the terminology, it’s become part of the patient safety language of NHS Wales.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 4:11
Strategic oversight of patient safety
The 1000 Lives+ programme functions under the auspices of the statutory Quality and Safety Committee in
each health board. The programme was typically supported by a local steering group at hospital level
(transcription 4:12, below, and transcriptions 4:13 and 4:14).
We have a structure that, I think, is pretty much standard for health boards in Wales. Our main
committee is the Quality and Safety Committee – every organisation has statutory duty to have a
Quality and Safety Committee or something termed along those lines – but we also have a subgroup
of the Quality and Safety Committee called the Clinical Effectiveness Committee, which is a group led
by the Medical Director, and, as the name implies, that receives the reports of the 1000 Lives+ work as
well as internal, external audits, research and development, and stuff like that.
Associate Director, case site G1 (011); transcription 4:12
Within this organisational structure, delegated strategic oversight routinely rested with three core
board-level roles (transcription 4:15, below).
We have a 1000 Lives+ implementation group that’s chaired by the medical director, the director of
nursing and the director of therapies and health sciences – the three with the clinical portfolio – but
it’s also supported and attended by the director of public health.
Associate Director, case site D1 (049); transcription 4:15
The strategic oversight of patient safety was supported by other board-level and non-executive positions,
and this had impacted the culture of the organisations (transcription 4:16, below, and transcription 4:17).
My view is that everything that’s in the portfolio of the Workforce and Organisation Development
Director is about safety. It’s about quality and safety because that is the ultimate aim. The quality and
the safety of the services provided are as high as they can be achieved within the resources available.
So, that’s at the heart of everything that’s in the portfolio – from recruitment, job design, right away
through to performance management and ongoing development, CPD [continuous professional
development] and leadership development – I think that all of those elements, which are central to
human resource management, are around systems and processes that build or undermine the culture
of patient safety. They are all core planks of my role, I think, and the role of my team.
Executive Director, Workforce and Organisation Development, case site G1 (012); transcription 4:16
Sub-board-level managers also played a role in supporting the operation of 1000 Lives+. This was typically
centred on data collation and reporting to the Quality and Safety Committee (transcriptions 4:18 and 4:19).
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Patient safety practices and the burden of proof
The 1000 Lives+ programme was perceived to have improved front-line practitioners’ awareness of the
safety of their patients. However, this was dependent on the successful embedding of the underpinning
MI-PDSA methodology178 (transcriptions 4:20 and 4:21). The programme was also associated with
increased paperwork and audit processes (transcriptions 4:22 and 4:26, below).
1000 Lives+ generates a lot of paperwork but it’s not just 1000 Lives+ that generates paperwork.
I think, with nursing, it’s just that, you know, we have to keep records – it’s proof, proof, proof
all the time; prove that you’ve done it, prove that you’ve done it – and now there is just so much
documentation just to admit a patient takes an awfully long time. But the government want proof,
they want us to know that yes we’ve got 1000 Lives+ in place. But there’s so much paperwork and
some of it doesn’t always follow the patient because we share notes now, sometimes, and that almost
muddies the water in some respect. It’s a huge amount on notes and things! Plus there’s the amount
of audits we do – we get audited to death – [What do you get audited on?] We get audited on use of
sharps bins; we get audited on the environment and whether we’re using the correct bins; we get
audited on infection control; documentation audits, you know, it just seems that there’s so much
auditing. Mattresses get audited: there’s just heaps of audits that go on.
Ward manager, case site G3 (086); transcription 4:24
There’s an awful lot of paperwork involved in patient care today. With 1000 Lives+ for every bundle
that is developed you think: ‘oh boy, here we go!’ The delivery of care has got to be the paramount
importance to us, it’s no good thinking: ‘yes, I can tick all the boxes but not actually doing the care’.
So, you give the care, and then you have to find the time to do the assessments, the evaluations, and
tick the boxes and everything. Also, you have to have the care plans that go with the bundle or care
pathway, and they have to be linked and cross-referenced. Those have to be updated every week,
sometimes more than that, depending on the stability of the patient because obviously that can vary.
It would be nice if the documentation could be streamlined in such a way that, instead of having so
many new documents, perhaps we could have one document that encompasses many things.
Ward manager, case site B2 (056); transcription 4:26
The burden of data collection in order to document adherence to prescribed care practices, together with
the growth of nursing metrics (transcription 4:27, below), may pose a fundamental risk to 1000 Lives+,
as it may foster disengagement from the purpose of the programme and threaten reducing adherence to
a tick-box exercise. One respondent commented that it could become simply ‘a massive bureaucracy to
feed the minister’ (transcription 4:28).
[What performance indicators and nursing metrics are collected at ward level to monitor patient
safety?] Bloody hell, what are the performance indicators? Everything! There’s a whole set – they go
through to the Welsh Government – there’s a whole section on patient safety, infection control,
workload, sickness absence, 1000 Lives+! It’s just measures: it’s a way of auditing us at a ward level.
It’s split into different sections but the one section you’d be interested in with 1000 Lives+ is the one
with patient safety. [What issues do they monitor?] They look at things like, well there’s quite a few
parts which would relate to it, like you audit how many patients have had their armbands on. So you
say, choose 12 patients, go round the 12, how many of the 12 have got armbands on, and it gives
you a percentage figure. Once you’ve clicked that button and it’s gone in, you can’t change anything.
So it does help, at the ward level, it gives me an indication, it gives me an indication if things
are lacking.
Ward manager, case site B1 (060); transcription 4:27
In addition, decoupling of practice from the intent of policy was fostered through the failure to validate
data and to enforce adherence to guidelines (transcriptions 4:29 and 4:30).
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External oversight of health-care quality and patient safety
In Wales, HIW, CHCs and the PSOW provide external oversight of health-care quality and patient safety.
Such audit processes were seen as helping to validate the delivery of appropriate health-care standards,
promoting change through identifying service failings (transcription 4:31, below).
Healthcare Inspectorate Wales did a spot audit here, last October I think it was, and on the particular
morning they came in – I wasn’t here, I wasn’t on duty, and the sister wasn’t here and there were a
couple of staff off – it was absolutely bedlam! There were two patients dying, so two lots of family in
and there were doctors everywhere, because it was after 9 o’clock and a load of medical students
came to the ward. The linen trolley with the fresh linen for the day had been thrown in. People were
doing breakfast; they were still doing breakfast! It looked like an absolute bombsite apparently. And in
the audit they completely floored us . . . but, since then, I think it did us a favour because there were
some things that we’d been fighting to get done because, as you know, this is an old ward. So there
are things that we’ve managed to get changed on the back of this audit. So it’s done us little favours.
Ward manager, case site B1 (060); transcription 4:31
Furthermore, audits provided an important external source of data, countering parochialism and
strengthening democratic challenge across NHS Wales (transcription 4:32, below).
[Do you report back to the Welsh Government?] For Welsh Government – well, there’s a firewall
between them and us [a CHC in Wales] – but we are an agent of government. However, having said
that, we are a pain in their side – we say things they don’t want to hear – the political view is
obviously very different. But it’s my duty to tell the truth to government, to tell them: ‘actually you’re
not providing sufficient care, or your health boards with sufficient money to provide that care, and
patients are struggling. Ultimately, you’re to blame guys – don’t blame the health boards – you’re to
blame’. Basically, we’re seeing the NHS being removed by stealth. The government are going to be
very cross with me, but I have a duty to speak on behalf of patients, so there you go!
[Does the politicisation of health care make it difficult for you to expose problems?] Yes, if it lands in
the minister’s lap and the minister doesn’t like it! There’ll be a level of ‘ball bouncing’ between
government civil servants and the CHCs simply because they don’t want that to land on the Minister’s
desk. I can’t say I blame them. But it is my job to speak honestly on behalf of patients. Patients are
David to the NHS’ Goliath and how on earth can they possibly fight that giant?
Chief Executive, CHC in Wales (073); transcription 4:32
The role of ‘critical friend’, working in creative tension with a partner health board, is central to the
scrutiny of local health services and advocacy support to complainants (transcription 4:33). However, for
some health boards, these vital relationships may be fraught (transcription 4:34). Moreover, in discussions
with such external organisations, though awareness of the 1000 Lives+ programme was evident,
monitoring of adherence to its practices was overshadowed by the use of competing performance
measures. Health boards were also concerned with this issue (transcription 4:35, below).
The Healthcare Standard we’ve just got used to, well, for me, it’s now much more of a narrative – you
tell your story – it’s like we’ve gone from a series of MOTs and driving tests and garage inspections to
a sticker on the back of the car saying: ‘How’s my driving?’. It’s a bit like: ‘here’s the standards for
health care, how do you think you are doing?’. Not one of them is a genuine standard, which really
confuses staff; they’re basically a list of aspirational statements and we’re left essentially to our own
devices about how we decide whether we meet them or not. My joke was that they could have saved
a lot of time and money by just printing a lot of mouse-mats with the standards on because it’s an
aide memoire – it’s basically a wish list. So that’s a different approach to quality improvement. We’re
now encouraged to be more self-reflective and self-reliant but it is difficult because people always get
things wrong and screw up and how do you legislate for that?
Executive Director, case site G1 (011); transcription 4:35
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Patient safety and competing contextual challenges
The 1000 Lives+ programme, and the predecessor 1000 Lives campaign, have been implemented during a
major structural reconfiguration of NHS Wales. This has created a contextual challenge, specifically for the
leadership and communication of the patient safety agenda (transcription 4:36, below) adding to the
potential for distraction (transcriptions 4:37 and 4:38).
Post reconfiguration, I suppose, the size of the organisation brings its own challenges – it’s a huge
challenge – how do you communicate things effectively when you’re that big? For 1000 Lives+ and
other health board strategies, my biggest challenge is keeping in touch with what the organisation’s
priorities are – what is [name] chief priority as chief executive, how is he driving that forward – if we’re
going to make things change in line with his strategy, you’ve got to know what it is. If you don’t
know what it is, how on earth are we going to do that? There’re so many tiers to go through now.
I don’t want to harp back all the time but it’s a valid comparison because before I could talk directly to
the chief executive because I’d see him in the corridor, and the medical director; those relationships
were direct then, weren’t they? Before you had the key people in your organisation – that physical
proximity, almost a direct route on a formal and informal basis – you would be kept up to speed when
things were going on. But now, it’s lost.
Associate Director, case site B2 (009); transcription 4:36
However, the greatest challenge arises, unsurprisingly, from unstinting financial pressures. All areas of NHS
Wales are expected to do more with less and this confronts the 1000 Lives+ programme with a stark
challenge (transcriptions 4:39 and 4:40, below).
If we are to keep up the momentum on 1000 Lives+ the area that we need to keep pushing is the
business case for quality – to have the evidence from all of the 1000 Lives+ improvement programmes
to show where the cost savings are – to build that bank of evidence for cost savings through quality
improvement; that’s where we need to get to.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (065); transcription 4:40
1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: preliminary understanding of
local implementation
Our study focused on the complex interplay of the 1000 Lives+ national programme in the context of the
Welsh health-care institutional field. The unit of analysis in this study was the process of local implementation
of 1000 Lives+ and the three focal interventions selected for detailed consideration: ILQI, RSC and RHAI.
The first stage of our analysis sought to examine the process of institutional change as it emerged during
the progressive bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+ programme, in order to understand the manner in which the
programme has become part of the context of the Welsh health-care institutional field. Drawing on the
work of Greenwood et al.,227 as well as terminology used by Lewin350 and Schein,351 we framed such
institutional change through six linked stages: disconfirmation (Greenwood et al.227 see this stage as
triggered by ‘precipitating jolts’, in this instance recognition that patient safety is a continuing problem),
deinstitutionalisation, preinstitutionalisation, theorisation, diffusion and reinstitutionalisation. We also
reflect on the impact and interplay of institutional logics in the Welsh health-care field and, as illustrated
in Figures 8 and 9, consider the relationships between dominant and subordinate logics, be they
complementary, co-existent or countervailing.
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Disconfirmation
The overarching goals of 1000 Lives+ signal the need for institutional change through an admission that
patients are not being cared for as well as they should be: what Schein, building on Lewin’s theories of
planned change, calls an act of disconfirmation350,351 (Figures 10 and 11 and Tables 6–9). Thus, the process
of institutional change in the Welsh health-care field begins with the transmission of the IHI’s influential
MI-PDSA approach via elite institutional carriers,403,404 such as ministers and government officials, who, by
conveying their political advocacy for such change – ‘sticking their heads above the political parapet’, as
one respondent put it – promote the concept, encouraging others to introduce its ethos and practices by
processes of imitation (mimetic institutional isomorphism329) and/or official directive (coercive institutional
isomorphism329). In this context, the logic of the bureaucratic state is dominant, rendering the logics of
collaboration, profession and democracy into a complementary stance under the influence of ministerial
authorisation. However, it should be noted that implementation may be undermined when actors find it
difficult to meet the organisational goals by using the explicit policies and procedures, and proceed to
modify them, a process known as ‘gaming’405 (see Figure 11, point 2, and Chapter 7, Realist analysis and
comparative case study, Sociocultural interaction: agency and strategic negotiation).
At the level of the infrastructural system (see Table 6), the systemic legitimisation of the IHI’s MI-PDSA
approach is signalled by the aligned names: 1000 Lives campaign and 1000 Lives+ national programme.
Meanwhile, its formalisation is marked through the embedding of these patient safety interventions in
Welsh health-care policy and governance systems.
As expanded in Table 7, both added democracy and authentication come from public sector partner
agencies tasked with the external oversight of health-care quality and patient safety, with their inspection
regimens encouraging adherence to 1000 Lives+ standards, beliefs and norms. Indeed, during the
transition from the campaign to the national programme, the use of the 1000 Lives+ and associated
MI-PDSA approach became embedded in the Welsh Government’s health-care policy, notably in its tier 1
targets and aligned performance metrics.
Deinstitutionalisation
At the level of NHS Wales and its constituent health boards, deinstitutionalisation, the second facet of
the 1000 Lives+ local implementation, can be seen as the 1000 Lives+ programme’s mandate is legitimised
via the Welsh Government’s Department of Health and Social Care (see Table 8). Formalisation then
ensues as the programme is placed under the statutory oversight of local Quality and Safety Committees
(see Figure 11). Through local acts of co-optation in each health board, leaders are assigned to each focal
intervention. They are tasked to identify potential systemic failures, anticipate adverse events and reframe
such issues as a social problem to be addressed through collaboration with health-care professionals across
NHS Wales’ constituent health boards.
A wider range of health-care actors are gradually co-opted into 1000 Lives+ contributing to the
multiprofessional and multisite co-ordination of patient safety. This generates internal challenge through
which previously accepted standards of quality and safety – for example, the nature and frequency of
adverse outcomes in theatre169,191,406 or for central venous catheter-related bloodstream infections407 – are
viewed in a pejorative light. Practitioners, acting as institutional entrepreneurs,41 now collectively adopt a
new normative standard leading to practice-based change181 and the rejection of old habits. This leads to
institutional change and strengthens the collective will to create an organisational culture attuned to
quality improvement.408
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Figure 10: key point summary
In Figure 10 we depict the bureaucratisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme across the infrastructural
system and institutional setting of the Welsh health-care field.
In point 1 the process of institutional change begins with the transmission of the IHI’s hegemonic MI-PDSA
approach via elite institutional carriers, who enact mimetic institutional isomorphism to introduce its practices
within the Welsh health-care field.
In point 2 elite institutional agents, through acts of co-optation and negotiation, spread and legitimise the
MI-PDSA approach, gradually co-opt others through mimetic and coercive institutional isomorphism. The
legitimisation of the IHI’s MI-PDSA approach is signalled by the aligned names – 1000 Lives+ campaign and
1000 Lives+ national programme.
In point 3 the formalisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme is marked by the embedding of its patient
safety interventions in Welsh health-care policy – notably tier 1 performance targets – and associated internal
and external governance systems. In this manner, the context is conditioned for NHS Wales, its constituent
health boards and their employees at the departmental level or that of the ward-based functional team.
In point 4 following the legitimisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme’s mandate, adverse events are reframed
as a social problem to be addressed through the collaborative engagement and the ensuing agency of
health-care professionals in NHS Wales’ constituent health boards. Localised formalisation is seen, catalysing
multiprofessional and multisite co-ordination of patient safety via the statutory Quality and Safety Committee
and aligned governance structures, augmented by distributed leadership of the patient safety agenda across
the managerial strata.
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Figure 11: key point summary
In Figure 11 we extend our depiction of the bureaucratisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme to
consider the interpersonal level.
In point 1 innovation is seen to be brokered through the pragmatic evidence-based learning of the 1000 Lives+
embedded MI-PDSA approach. This is driven by coercive, mimetic and normative institutional isomorphism.
Importantly, at this juncture, as illustrated in Figure 9, professional logic asserts dominance, thereby generating
the potential for discord.
In point 2 identification and awareness of systemic patient safety failings, fostered through the testing of a
rapid cycle of change with the MI-PDSA approach, heightens collaboration and communication across the
multidisciplinary team, giving rise to knowledge mobilisation and greater understanding of variation in
health-care service delivery. Yet the burden of data collection and demands of validation may retard meaningful
engagement and give rise to the situated practice of gaming. This increased knowledge and understanding of
the unfolding change reveals common areas of failing – systemic and human – so that the conceptualisation
of the desired institutional change is further refined. In this manner, the moral and pragmatic legitimisation of
1000 Lives+ arises, helping to overcome reluctance and resistance to engage and its institutionalisation across
NHS Wales.
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TABLE 6 Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration: infrastructural system –
Welsh Government
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Context Welsh Government
Mechanism Institutional isomorphism: mimetic, coercive and normative
Agency and
institutional work
l Agency – transmission – elite institutional carriers enact
mimetic institutional isomorphism, adopting the IHI’s
hegemonic MI-PDSA approach to patient safety
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional actors
reconfigure key actors’ belief systems
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:05 (T145) – coupling
l 4:07 (T081) – coupling
l Agency – co-optation – elite institutional actors employ
their political advocacy and social position to foster the
co-optation of others across their managerial and
professional networks
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional actors
reconfigure key actors’ belief systems
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:06 (T054) – coupling
l 4:09 (T054) – decoupling
l 4:10 (T081) – coupling
l Agency – negotiation – elite institutional actors and
co-opted others set the strategic direction
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional actors enact
political work to reconstruct rules, rights and access to
resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme
to tier 1 performance targets
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:02 (T145) – coupling
l 4:07 (T081) – coupling
l Agency – legitimisation – elite institutional actors and
co-opted others embrace 1000 Lives+ and MI-PDSA
approach and embed in health-care policy and
performance frameworks
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional actors enact
political work to reconstruct rules, rights and access to
resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme
to tier 1 performance targets
l Institutional work – disruption – elite institutional actors
dissociate from 1000 Lives+, fostering decoupling
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:01 (T146) – coupling
l 4:02 (T145) – coupling
l Agency – formalisation – mandated engagement with
1000 Lives+ and the MI-PDSA approach to address NHS
Wales’ organisational failings and attain national health-care
standards
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional carriers
enact political work to reconstruct rules, rights and access to
resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme
to tier 1 performance targets
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:03 (T124) – coupling
l 4:04 (T150) – coupling
l 4:08 (T143) – coupling
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme institutionalised into policy processes
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TABLE 7 Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration: infrastructural system – public sector
partner agencies
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Context Public sector partner agencies
Mechanism Institutional isomorphism: predominantly normative
Agency and
institutional work
l Agency – formalisation – mandated engagement with
1000 Lives+ and the MI-PDSA informs the inspection regimens
adopted by public sector partner agencies
l Institutional work – maintenance – public sector partner
agencies’ inspection regimens foster adherence to 1000 Lives+
standards, espoused beliefs and norms
l Agency – democratisation – patient and public voice harnessed
providing democratic challenge to improve patient safety
l Institutional work – maintenance – public sector partner
agencies’ inspection regimens foster adherence to
1000 Lives+ standards, espoused beliefs and norms
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:32 (T073) – coupling
l 4:33 (T087) – coupling
l Agency – verification – level of attainment of 1000 Lives+
standards informs the external oversight of patient safety and
further informs internal NHS and Welsh Government monitoring
of health-care standards
l Institutional work – maintenance – public sector partner
agencies’ inspection regimens foster adherence to 1000 Lives+
standards, espoused beliefs and norms
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:31 (T060) – coupling
l 4:34 (T075) – coupling
l 4:35 (T011) – decoupling
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme institutionalised within existing processes supporting the external
oversight of patient safety
TABLE 8 Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales and
constituent health boards
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Context NHS Wales as a corporate whole/NHS Wales’ health boards
Mechanism Institutional isomorphism: coercive
Agency and
institutional work
l Agency – legitimisation – 1000 Lives+ becomes part of the
language and practice of patient safety in NHS Wales.
Institutional entrepreneurs reassert a normative standard to
hasten practice-based change
l Institutional work – creation – elite board-level institutional
actors undertake political work to reconstruct rules, rights and
access to resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national
programme to the attainment of the Welsh Government’s tier
1 performance targets
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:11 (T146) – coupling
l Agency – formalisation – multiprofessional and multisite
co-ordination of patient safety via the statutory Quality and
Safety Committee and aligned governance structures
l Institutional work – creation – elite board-level institutional actors
undertake political work to reconstruct rules, rights and access to
resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme to the
attainment of the Welsh Government’s tier 1 performance targets
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:12 (T011) – coupling
l 4:13 (T074) – coupling
l 4:14 (T026) – coupling
l 4:15 (T049) – coupling
l Agency – co-optation – distributed leadership of the patient
safety agenda across the managerial strata
l Institutional work – creation – elite board-level institutional actors
undertake political work to reconstruct rules, rights and access to
resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme to the
attainment of the Welsh Government’s tier 1 performance targets
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:16 (T012) – coupling
l 4:17 (T043) – coupling
l 4:18 (T022 – coupling
l 4:19 (T025) – coupling
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme institutionalised within existing processes supporting the internal
oversight of patient safety
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TABLE 9 Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration: interpersonal relations – hospital
multisite department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Context Hospital multisite department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
Mechanism Institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, progressing to normative
Agency and
institutional work
l Agency – innovation – individual and organisational
pragmatic evidence-based learning is demonstrated
through adherence to the MI-PDSA approach
l Institutional work – creation – functional team’s belief
and meaning systems reconfigured
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:20 (T070) – coupling
l Agency – identification – performance measurement and
monitoring of patient safety heighten awareness of failings
l Institutional work – creation – functional team’s belief and
meaning systems reconfigured
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:18 (T022) – coupling
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation – collaboration and
heightened communication across the multidisciplinary
team promotes individual, team and organisational learning
l Institutional work – creation – functional team’s belief and
meaning systems reconfigured
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:21 (T052) – coupling
l Agency – validation – data collection for formalised
patient safety governance monitoring demonstrates
attainment of tier 1 targets
l Institutional work – maintenance – functional team’s
performance supports adherence to existing internal
and external governance systems
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:22 (T060) – coupling
l 4:26 (T056) – coupling
l 4:29 (T060) – coupling
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic) – 1000 Lives+
moral and pragmatic legitimacy fosters mainstreaming
of the intervention across NHS Wales
l Institutional work – creation – functional team’s belief and
meaning systems reconfigured
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:40 (T065) – coupling
l Agency – emancipation – 1000 Lives+ and the MI-PDSA
approach facilitate informed challenge and change of the
status quo
l Institutional work – disruptive – functional team’s
underpinning core assumptions and beliefs adapted to
new health-care role-position practices
Exemplar transcriptions:
l 4:20 (T070) – coupling
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme institutionalised in daily health-care practice
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Preinstitutionalisation
This constitutes the third facet of the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme and is
demonstrated at the interpersonal level, impacting functional teams, be they the executive board or
ward-based clinicians. Importantly, as illustrated in Figure 9, in the context of the hospital department
or ward-based functional team, professional logic (re)gains dominance. This creates the potential for
discord between the different professional logics of health-care management, medicine, nursing and other
allied professional groups, although Table 9 depicts this in a benign manner.
As illustrated in Figure 11, innovation can emerge from the evidence-based learning of the MI-PDSA
approach.172,409,410 The use of data to inform practice heightens the identification and awareness of systemic
patient safety failings.24,181,411 Furthermore, collaboration and communication across the multidisciplinary
team is increased through testing of a rapid cycle of change.172,180,187,412 This gives rise to knowledge
mobilisation and greater understanding of variation in health-care service delivery.187 However, the burden
of data collection and demands of validation may retard meaningful engagement and give rise to the
practice of gaming.405 In addition, because performance measurement and monitoring systems are
mandatory, the logic of the bureaucratic state again asserts dominance. This again creates the potential for
discord among logics as illustrated by the decoupling expressed in the exemplar transcriptions.
Theorisation
This is central to the conceptual framework employed in our study. Greenwood et al.227 contend that this
manifests through the (i) specification of general organisational failings; (ii) justification of abstract possible
solutions; and (iii) assertions of moral and pragmatic legitimacy. Hence, in refining perceptions of cause
and effect, reflexive theorisation represents a key stage in individual and collective social actors’ adaptive
response to institutional change.413 It underpins the notion of mechanism, set out in Chapter 2, as the
embodiment of an agent’s reasoning and their selective attention to the disparate resources offered
through the 1000 Lives+ national programme.
As depicted in Figure 11, the implementation and bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+ increases knowledge
and understanding of the unfolding change, revealing common areas of failing and enabling refinements
to be made. Such legitimisation helps to overcome reluctance and resistance to engage,127,414,415 and so aids
its institutionalisation across NHS Wales. This end may be achieved through multidisciplinary team-based
discussion,169,189,219 including focus groups with patients151,416 and health-care professionals,417 together with
dedicated support for interorganisational learning.261,418 Such processes aid emancipation of staff, giving
them the authority, whatever their rank, to insist on correct safety procedures being followed. However,
should this theorisation stage fail to change people’s values and attitudes appropriately, this may precipitate
institutional decoupling,348,349 giving rise to the emergence of a legitimacy façade85 and the failure of
the intervention.
Diffusion
Diffusion through wider adoption constitutes the fifth facet of the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+
programme. However, as noted by Berwick,419 continuous effort is required to maintain and spread the
gain associated with such practice change. As illustrated in Table 7, at this interface the logic of democracy
assumes dominance, fostering the external oversight of patient safety via public sector partner agencies’
inspection regimens to support this goal.
Reinstitutionalisation
This is the final facet of the 1000 Lives+ local implementation, reflecting widespread organisational
acceptance of and adherence to the new programme. However, this, too, in acknowledging an ongoing
commitment to the embedded MI-PDSA approach, must evolve with the shifting dynamic of the
evidence-base3–5 and progressive rehabitualisation.222
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Summary
In Chapter 4, we analyse the structural change inherent to bureaucratisation of the 1000 Lives+
programme at the higher, infrastructural system level of the Welsh health-care field. This analysis defines
our preliminary understanding of the programme’s local implementation and how the 1000 Lives+
programme becomes part of the context of the Welsh health-care institutional field.
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Chapter 5 Institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+
programme in NHS Wales: normalisation, health-care
practices and patient safety
Overview
This chapter continues our examination of the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ patient safety
programme in NHS Wales. Presented in three main parts, it is focused at contextual levels below the
field level and explores interpersonal and individual engagement with 1000 Lives+ to gain a deeper
understanding of its progressive normalisation across NHS Wales.
First, guided by the model proposed by May et al.,352,353 we analyse the patient safety literature to consider
mechanisms that may foster the normalisation of complex interventions in daily health-care practice.
Second, we enrich this explanatory analysis through consideration of in-depth discussions held with a wide
range of health-care practitioners concerning their perceptions of the normalisation of 1000 Lives+ and the
development of patient safety practices in NHS Wales. Specifically, we examine the 1000 Lives+ MI-PDSA
approach, the distributed leadership and the teamwork inherent to its operationalisation. We then
illustrate the nuanced impact of pride and shame in building the ethos of patient safety and examine the
pragmatic issues that foster institutional coupling to, or decoupling from, such activities. Finally, we
elaborate our understanding of the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme. This forms the
foundation for our analyses of the three focal interventions presented in Chapters 6–8.
Possible mechanisms fostering the normalisation of 1000 Lives+
As discussed in Chapter 2, we draw on institutional theory to inform our understanding of the generative
mechanisms, specifically the roles of contextual constraints and enablements, and ensuing reflexive
theorisation; and May’s352,353 modulating roles of coherence, cognitive participation, collective action and
reflexive monitoring, thought to foster the normalisation of 1000 Lives+ in NHS Wales.
Coherence
As expressed in May’s normalisation process theory,352,353 coherence means that a practice – an ensemble
of beliefs, behaviours and acts that manipulate or organise objects and others – is made possible by a set
of ideas about its meaning, uses and utility and by socially defined and organised competencies.353 In this
regard, the 1000 Lives+ programme may be seen as a material object which facilitates the improvement
of the patient safety in NHS Wales through the way in which the health-care team, both individually and
collectively, think about and understand its meaning and carry out the practices involved.
As evident from patient safety studies undertaken in NHS Wales,210 the coherence and foundational
competence of the 1000 Lives+ programme is clearly linked to the underpinning MI-PDSA approach.178,219
This method of service improvement has been advocated in health care for many years420–423 and its
widespread adoption in developed health-care systems promotes health-care actors’ awareness of the
MI-PDSA approach as accepted practice,353 so aiding its embedding into day-to-day working.186
Cognitive participation
The 1000 Lives+ programme is normalised through ongoing cognitive participation, defined by May and
Finch353 as ‘the symbolic and real enrolments and engagements of human actors that position them for the
interactional and material work of collective action’.
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Although cognitive participation in the 1000 Lives+ programme is underpinned by the MI-PDSA
approach, specifically with regard to the promotion of a consistent approach across its multicomponent
improvement programmes,424 other resources make valuable contributions. For example, the 1000 Lives+
programme team, improvement guides and local and national learning events each facilitate cognitive
participation through education and practice-based skill development. Such learning, whether at an
individual,187,421,425–427 an organisational12,411 or a system-wide level,24,428 is fundamental to health-care
practice change, as is the need for senior organisational leaders to develop a comparable level of
awareness of 1000 Lives+, the MI-PDSA approach and associated drivers.429 Cognitive participation thus
helps to ensure that systemic and organisational factors giving rise to patient neglect are addressed,430
while knowledge sharing and trust are enhanced.431
Collective action
The cognitive participation of social actors gives rise to collective purposive action aimed at some goal.
However, with respect to the 1000 Lives+ programme, such goal-orientation may include resistance,
subversion or reinvention, as well as affirmation and compliance with the core features of this patient
safety programme. The normalisation of 1000 Lives+ is, therefore, dependent on institutional and
professional work that defines and operationalises the desired features of 1000 Lives+, aligned factors
which promote or inhibit social actors’ enacting of 1000 Lives+ and social actors’ collective investment of
effort in such practices.353
For the 1000 Lives+ programme, two processes which facilitate collective action are interactional
workability and relational integration.352 These involve cross-team co-operation,432 notably via enhanced
communication;433,434 the development of shared goals, meanings and expectations;435 and accountability
and confidence in the internal and external credibility fostered by mandated local and national monitoring
of 1000 Lives+. Furthermore, given the explicit steps defined in each discrete patient safety intervention,
1000 Lives+ represents a valid and recognised practical aide memoire. In this way, the programme helps to
increase awareness of patient-related issues, procedures and anticipated risks across functional health-care
teams,436 including both public and population health care.437
Other processes which facilitate collective action are skill-set workability and contextual integration.352
Skill-set workability describes how work is divided up among practitioners with different but complementary
skills.353 For example, empirical investigation of the WHOSSC, the focal intervention discussed in Chapter 7,
supports the view that defined allocation of work, where the assessment of intraoperative blood loss is
apportioned to surgeons, patient-specific airways management to the anaesthesia team and sterility and
equipment issues to nurses,438 enhances the performance of the operating theatre team. However, such
task definition does remain susceptible to entrenched role boundaries and perceived surgical autonomy,
which may impact adversely on safety culture.439 Contextual integration, as the term suggests, refers to the
integration of 1000 Lives+ within a social context and its interplay with extant structures and organisational
procedures. As May and Finch353 point out, integration may not be easy to achieve in some contexts and will
require collective effort from those involved.
Reflexive monitoring
Practices, even when established, demand reflexive monitoring to ensure appropriate performance.338,353,440
Patterns of collective action, and their outcomes, are therefore continuously evaluated by participants
in implementation processes, both formally and informally, and with a greater or lesser degree of intensity
depending on their interest and involvement.353 The normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme
in day-to-day practice is, therefore, dependent on institutional and professional work that defines and
organises the everyday understanding of 1000 Lives+, aligned factors which promote or inhibit social
actors’ appraisal of 1000 Lives+ and social actors’ collective investment in its ongoing theorisation and
refined understanding.353
NORMALISATION, HEALTH-CARE PRACTICES AND PATIENT SAFETY
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
62
Individual and collective reflection of actual practice against explicit and more tacit norms, while central to
the embedding of a practice,356,441–444 may differ markedly from formal governance procedures and
standards, in some cases giving rise to a façade of legitimacy.85 Empirical studies of patient safety have also
highlighted the human barriers to incident reporting, despite its central role in organisational learning and
the establishment of a stronger safety culture.412 In the following section, we seek to examine the views
and experiences of individuals and groups during the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme,
and so to understand the processes involved in the operationalisation, subversion or reconstruction of its
associated practices.
1000 Lives+, health-care practice and patient safety
During in-depth discussions with a wide range of health-care practitioners across NHS Wales, we asked
each participant to reflect on the notion of context. As set out below, transcription 5:01 succinctly
expresses the sense of context as situated, demarcated by relational ties and distinct from that of the
wider organisation.
I think what is key, when you consider the way in which 1000 Lives+ is implemented, is consideration
of context. [What do mean by context?] The immediate area of its implementation and the people
involved. Look, you can work with one ward to implement it. They do it there, and you can then
spread it; but when you do spread it you have to customise it to make it work for the people who are
there – in that new context. You can’t just pick up something developed in one area of your
organisation and assume it will fit into another without you, at least, considering where they’re
coming from! So, you can’t really define organisational context – to implement, context has to be kept
really small – you work within that area, have a testing period, and then spread and renew. That’s
how it’s done. I think that is key to a lot of what we can manage.
Associate Director, case site C2 (014); transcription 5:01
This perception is replicated throughout our discussions and subsequent analysis of the implementation
and operationalisation of 1000 Lives+. As one respondent described, 1000 Lives+ has normalised in
discrete pockets. This has created disparity between adjacent wards within a given hospital case site
(transcription 5:02, below).
What I see is pockets of interests in 1000 Lives+. It’s led by individuals who have cultivated a team
around them and given them work to do, so it’s being led by people who are enthusiastic or buy into
certain areas where their interests lie. But it’s not systemic: there are good pockets in the organisation
and areas that aren’t reached – you can have wards on opposite sides of a corridor where one’s
engaged and the other isn’t. As a consequence, it’s relying on enthusiasm rather than a systematic
approach. Sustainability at an organisational, corporate level is needed, so that everything is aligned
toward patient safety.
Executive Director, Workforce and Organisation Development, case site G1 (012);
transcription 5:02
Normalisation is, thus, restricted to those who perceive meaning in 1000 Lives+ owing to alignment with
their beliefs, and whose cognitive participation and commitment builds and co-ordinates the engagement
of others. This finding offers explanatory insight into the perceived failure of such complex patient safety
interventions168 and underscores Pawson’s iron law of evaluation: the expected value of any net impact
assessment of any large scale social program is zero.241
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Acknowledgement of the fragmented nature of its normalisation does not, however, detract from the
undeniable focus that 1000 Lives+ offers health-care practitioners in NHS Wales. Those who value the
initiative consider it as something real and visible that they can use to help them to forward the cause of
patient safety (transcription 5.03, below).
Before 1000 Lives and 1000 Lives+ – before SPI [Safer Patients Initiative] – people were saying: ‘we
want to keep patients safe, we don’t want to do them harm’. Well, of course, that’s what we want to
do, I mean, that’s a given. But with patient safety now, we have the 1000 Lives+ logo, we have
information at the front of the hospital; there’s something you can hang your hat on! It has real
organisation! It’s not just some nebulous patient safety concept. There’s somebody leading it, there
were newsletters, there are graphs so that you can see, you can see the improvements that have been
made. 1000 Lives+ is making it real, I would say – not that it wasn’t real before – but, you know, now
it has something; it’s tangible, it’s all coordinated, it’s centralised. So, say if somebody had a good idea
for improving patient safety, rather than saying: ‘shall I go to my line manager? Well, they’re never any
good, they’ll nod but they won’t do anything, who else can I go to?’. They’ve got someone you can
go to! You’ve got the 1000 Lives+ patient safety group, and you just go on the intranet and find out
the relevant person, and you know they will take it seriously. They may or may not be managing it but
you know they will take it seriously because that’s what they do – that’s the hat that they wear – so
they’re not trying to juggle between clinical effectiveness, patient safety, and saving money. Patient
safety isn’t just something competing for their time, their skills and resources. That is what 1000 Lives+
is: it starts and finishes with patient safety.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site D2 (020); transcription 5:03
Such coherence appears to resonate equally with patients and with the public (transcription 5:04).
On the other hand, there is a sense that bureaucratic impatience may be hampering the successful
implementation of 1000 Lives+ across NHS Wales, leaving some staff in its wake (transcription
5:05, below).
I think with 1000 Lives+ we have been pushed on to get on to the next ones [improvement
programmes] before it’s sort of embedded. For example, the NEWS Score [National Early Warning
Score] is not embedded, it’s embedding.
Ward manager, case site C3 (T080); transcription 5:05
For instance, although aware of the 1000 Lives+ programme, some key medical staff remain disengaged
(transcriptions 5:06 and 5:07, below).
I’ve had doctors telling me that it’s, you know, not nonsense but it’s one of those fads. So they’ve
obviously made up their mind they’re not going to pay any attention to 1000 Lives+ and it’s of no
relevance to them. I think, as with anything, you have people just being bloody minded for
whatever reason!
Associate Director, case site F1 (026); transcription 5:06
I think some consultants aren’t aware of 1000 Lives+. They have it in their peripheral field. They are
aware that it exists but it doesn’t impact on their lives, and some think it’s probably a good thing but
it still doesn’t impact on their lives.
Consultant gastroenterologist, case site F1 (027); transcription 5:07
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The policy pacing and positioning of the 1000 Lives+ programme across NHS Wales is, therefore,
contributing to the fragmentation of its normalisation. Unequal engagement with the resources offered by
this patient safety intervention further stymies progress, as its main adherents are those who are involved
in, and already agree with, the aspirations of the programme (transcription 5:09, below).
I think with 1000 Lives+ they’re selling it to those who’ve bought in – you know, the people who are
designing the programmes and delivering them – I think it’s important to them. But whether staff in the
NHS are really engaged, I don’t know. I mean, here, and this is a small hospital, we don’t get all doctors
following the sticker initiative [antibiotic prescribing guidelines]. Some do, some don’t: there’s always an
excuse not to do it, whether it’s too much work, too time-consuming, whatever, they always have excuses.
Another aspect to this, though, is the rate of turnover. FP1–2s [junior doctors undertaking foundation
training] rotate so quickly, and they may not be within the same health board, let alone hospital, so there’s
little time for them to learn the system before they’re off again. On the whole, it’s the staff that don’t
rotate that maintain the system against, or despite, those who are just passing through.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site B2 (001); transcription 5:09
The meaningful engagement of wider NHS staff is undeniably key to the normalisation and sustainability
1000 Lives+. Specifically, non-rotating staff are central, as they provide the contextual and relational
continuity necessary for coherence. This is the foundation the programme must return to, and reinforce,
to prevent the dissipation of its goals (transcription 5:10).
Model for Improvement, Plan-Do-Study-Act approach
The central role of the MI-PDSA approach, asserted in Putative mechanisms fostering the normalisation of
1000 Lives+, is clearly evident in the study’s participant health boards. This approach provides a recognised
framework for health-care practice change and feedback that, through the Improving Quality Together
website, benefits from institutional work via the ongoing support of the 1000 Lives+ national programme
(transcription 5:11, below, and transcription 5:12).
The PDSA approach provides a framework for improvement but you still need leadership, you need
ideas and execution, so you’ve still got to generate the will in the people that you’re working with
first. Then you’ve got to have change ideas that are based on evidence and not just plucked out of the
air – you actually have things that have to be tested – and then you test them; you don’t just assume
they’ll work in practice. But the approach gives people the freedom to test them, measure and learn
from the process. So, I think, if I was to say anything, it’s a framework, and its helped teams to focus
on a name, on a measure, that will tell them whether or not they’re getting towards their aim, and on
a change that will hopefully help them to achieve that aim.
Welsh Government, policy lead (033); transcription 5:11
Transcription 5:13, below, describes the role of PDSA in building coherence, cognitive participation and
collective action to enable health-care staff to design and deliver practice change.
The model for improvement [MI-PDSA], well it’s, it’s a tried and tested approach, part of improvement
science. Look, traditionally we’ve gone: ‘here’s a problem; here’s the solution’, and we’ve tried to fit
the problem to the solution even if it involves putting a square peg in a round hole just get on and do
it! And, for all sorts of reasons, people don’t just get on and do it because, because things aren’t fit
for purpose. So the issue of using the model for improvement is you enable people. You start from the
very beginning, you know – you expose the need – you properly measure and identify the problem
and enable people to understand that the problem lies with them and that they can do something
about it, which is quite empowering. And then, obviously, you guide a solution, and some of those
solutions are their own, though most of the time we take an evidence-based practice approach.
We introduce them to the evidence-based practice and the methodology – the improvement
methodology – so that they can go out and they can get started straight away by having an idea,
testing it on one patient one time, one nurse, one doctor! It’s quick and easy, it doesn’t require whole
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engagement of masses of staff, they can just go out and gradually, gradually build and learn from
those very small tests of change and they can adapt existing material to make it fit for purpose. We’ve
got the methodology – it’s simple, it’s safe – it requires little or no investment at the beginning in
terms of staff resource. There is strong leadership over supporting all of these programmes, so that
there is an accountability route, so you can’t just go away and do nothing, there are lines of
accountability through local working, through direct and divisional quality and safety meetings, and
then through to the steering – the 1000 Lives+ steering group – and the quality and safety committee.
But it’s simple, the methodology is simple, it’s intuitive, logical, and it’s really enabling people to
develop and make the system do what is right to do, easy to do.
Associate Director, case site D1 (049); transcription 5:13
The inherent simplicity of the approach is viewed to aid its adoption and the sense of local ownership
and engagement that underpin its normalisation across NHS Wales (transcriptions 5:14, 5:15 and 5:16).
Moreover, as illustrated in transcription 5:17, below, the MI-PDSA approach helps in surfacing the need
for improvement, and confidence in the efficacy of its structured processes gives a sense of security that
facilitates positive small steps towards change.
Well, I think, fundamentally, it provides us with a focal point to get around the table – to actually
acknowledge there’s a problem in the first place – and that we’ve got a structure to follow that’s
going to take us in the direction towards solving it. That we might not necessarily solve it in the first
place – it might take a couple of times of going through the process to resolve it – but it gives us that
format to be able to: it’s a building block to start to look at what the problem is, within a structured
way. And I think it’s something, it’s almost like a baby’s dummy, I think it’s something that we just,
it’s almost a comfort blanket for us.
Ward manager, case site G3 (084); transcription 5:17
This markedly positive stance places emphasis on the MI-PDSA’s incremental approach to service
development and the empowerment of staff (transcription 5:18). However, two issues countervail: the
potential for misuse as an instrument of control (transcription 5:19), and disagreement over the validity of
the evidence base for the efficacy of the 1000 Lives+ programme (transcription 5:20, below).
1000 Lives+ programme team are, in the main, focused on achieving practical, pragmatic activities
across NHS Wales which seek to generate service improvements and change. But in NHS Wales,
on the other side, you’ve got medical and other professionals – and academics – who work to a
completely different standard of evidence in terms of rigorous knowledge-based scientific work: you
know how explicit medical or epidemiological statistical modelling is! So, for them, the introduction of
1000 Lives+ is, well, it’s completely counter-cultural. The reports that the 1000 Lives programme team
were stating were the outcomes of the initial programme, in terms of mortality statistics, well some
view it all as some political conspiracy that’s being sold to the NHS, and the public – it’s spin, fluff,
crap – it’s not valid data, it’s not collected in a robust manner, it’s flawed. Oh God: please save me
from the tyranny of evidence! [What do you mean by the tyranny of evidence?] It’s a killer phrase,
isn’t it, in fact it’s the killer phrase. [What do you mean?] It’s used by professionals in health care to
stop action, to destroy the potential for change: ‘Oh, we can’t do that, the evidence-base is too weak;
their argument is flawed, the data’s mismanaged’. [Anything to maintain the status quo?] Status quo
ante! The evidence-based for the 1000 Lives+ national programme has been systematically attacked by
the other factions – for one side, it’s evidence and truth; for the other, it’s spin and fluff – and reality
is caught in the middle.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (081); transcription 5:20
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Board leadership, followership and change
Executive-level leadership of patient safety augments the normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme in
NHS Wales (transcription 5:21, below).
If the job of the Executive Team is not about patient safety – organisational fitness, systems, processes,
governance structures – then I don’t understand the job!
Executive Director, Workforce and Organisation Development, case site G1 (012);
transcription 5:21
Beyond the board, there is acknowledgement of the need for leaders with expertise in quality
improvement methodology to support staff and maintain their commitment to patient safety (transcription
5:22, below). Such roles are, therefore, pivotal for the successful transition of the ownership of the patient
safety agenda from the 1000 Lives+ programme team to the health board.
My reflection on the PDSA process and instruction is, as a methodology, it’s a very good one.
The problem with regards to its application is that you need somebody who is a PDSA expert within
the organisation – a leader and change management mentor who can support the various
mini-collaboratives with quality improvement methodology – to harness what people are doing.
Associate Director, case site F1 (026); transcription 5:22
However, some respondents indicated a degree of resentment about the obligatory nature of the 1000 Lives+
programme and suggested that such commands to engage may be left unheeded (transcriptions 5:23, and
5:24 below).
The 1000 Lives+ national programme and the campaign – it’s command and control rather than a
grass-roots culture change – it hasn’t been created by the people. It’s not of the people. It’s an
imposition. It’s control. It’s from Cardiff. It’s very much a Cardiff thing that is being pushed to everyone
else because: ‘we know better’. Outside Cardiff, it feels remote and distant and not part of us, it’s
something that we all recognise as important, clearly, but we don’t necessarily own it.
Consultant gastroenterologist, case site F1 (T027); transcription 5:24
There was a widespread belief that effective board leadership of patient safety is paramount (transcriptions
5:25 and 5:26) but the importance of clinical leadership of patient safety throughout the organisation, so
directing teamwork, communication and collaboration to deliver the desired practice change, was also
emphasised (transcription 5:27, below).
Clinical leadership is key – credible clinical leadership – and that’s all about empowerment of band
7 nurses. When we’re in escalation, when beds are crazy, that’s when it’s hard. It’s then you need
your band 7 nurses to turn around and tell you what isn’t safe. That’s something we’re working really
hard at but that’s a whole culture change. But the 1000 Lives+ PDSA cycles did give them a feeling of
empowerment that they could make and own changes, they could take chances in the way that suited
their ward or theatre or wherever they were doing it: it wasn’t that we were telling them how to do it,
it was about them trying it and seeing how it worked, and changing it until it did work in their area.
So, I think that they, the areas that did feel empowered through 1000 Lives+, combined with the data
that they were collecting, well they knew whether they were doing something good or not, and those
two things would motivate change.
Associate Director, case site A2 (T069); transcription 5:27
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Teamwork, collaboration and emancipation
For health-care practitioners who have invested meaning in the 1000 Lives+ programme, and who adhere to
its practices, the programme functions as a rallying point, building collective action and ensuing teamwork.
This aids collaboration and communication across different areas of the employing health board and
represents an important aspect of the institutional maintenance work that helps to reproduce the norms
and beliefs inherent to 1000 Lives+ (transcription 5:28, below, and transcription 5:29).
There are other nurse managers and practice development nurses within the organisation that I tend
to work with quite closely. For example, with my colleague in surgery, we delivery similar sort of
teaching about 1000 Lives+, so we link up and deliver sessions together. That way we could pull staff
from both of our Directorates, increase numbers, and it’s easier when you’ve got someone else there.
We also meet as a group four times a year, so any development and training needs, and that kind of
thing, can be discussed and we can agree how things may be taken forward. I know certain of my
colleagues were very heavily involved with the SPI [Safer Patients Initiative] work and the first phase of
1000 Lives – they delivered all the corporate training around the PDSA methodology and that type
of thing. They’re good contacts to have!
Ward manager, case site D1 (T010); transcription 5:28
In teamwork situations, the 1000 Lives+ programme is perceived to empower health-care staff in roles
traditionally subordinate to the profession of medicine. The emancipation of these staff helps to break
down the entrenched barriers that prohibit challenge and scope for change (transcription 5:30, below).
1000 Lives+ gives them [nursing staff] the freedom to question, which they might not previously
have had the confidence to do, as it gives them a format to do it and it’s standardised. Also, you get
less challenge back when you are questioning something because everybody here’s been exposed to
1000 Lives+.
Theatre manager, case site A1 (T008); transcription 5:30
Empowerment and engagement with others similarly motivated by 1000 Lives+ is seen to have led to
patient safety improvements (transcription 5:31). However, there is a view that the latent potential of staff
is yet to be realised in NHS Wales (transcription 5:32, below).
I think the key to the next step is, if you like, taking the stabilisers off the bike. 1000 Lives+ has
supported staff to do specific projects and that has enabled them to have the confidence to say: ‘this
is why, and this is how we’re going to do it’. The next step is: ‘this is my idea, and this is what I want
to do’. But how is that picked up and supported by the organisation when it’s not an external prompt
is the question. I think the NHS is quite bad at thinking about change normally because we’re reeling
from it being imposed.
Associate Director, case site G1 (T011); transcription 5:32
Building the ethos of patient safety: pride and shame in health-care practice
During discussions with the wide range of health-care practitioners interviewed across NHS Wales, the
1000 Lives+ programme appeared to be aligned with feelings of both pride and shame in health-care practice.
On the one hand, a strong sense of achievement is depicted in transcriptions 5:33 and 5:34 (below) and
highlights the reinforcing role of individual reflexive monitoring – and objective success – in fostering
meaningful engagement.
Our last pressure ulcer was approximately – we’ve had two in the last three and a half years – we’ve
got a very good record. I’m so proud of our record on pressure ulcer prevention. We have nurses,
now, who’ve never seen pressure ulcers. I’m really proud of it. I have this massive thing about pressure
ulcers; I have a zero tolerance of them!
Nurse manager, case site A2 (T058); transcription 5:33
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If you’ve had 300 days free of MRSA [meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus], C. diff. [Clostridium
difficile] or pressure ulcers in this organisation, it is celebrated with cake! I think, maybe a few years
ago, I might have been: ‘that’s a bit gimmicky’ but, actually, the feedback from staff and patients is
really positive, and we make sure that patients are involved in that celebration. So, we’ll do media,
some publicity around it as well, there’s always features in our local press about a team, ward or
department that’s working particularly well. I think that’s positive for our organisation but actually it’s
positive from a public perspective because it gives some confidence in the service. Too often bad news
is good news, isn’t it?
Associate Director, case site A1 (T025); transcription 5:34
Indeed, receiving praise for their efforts is seen as central to staff’s continued motivation and commitment
to 1000 Lives+ (transcription 5:35).
This positive stance is, however, balanced by the use of blame and shame, prompted via the reporting
mechanisms inherent to its governance structures across NHS Wales (transcription 5:36).
Another respondent spoke of the ‘desensitising’ effect of being perceived to fail, suggesting that this
led to an exaggerated determination not to go beyond the strict parameters of their current task
(transcription 5:37, below).
Rather than bad practice being done, there are less opportunities for good practice. People are
becoming desensitised by public perceptions of failure. It is normal, now, to sit next to a phone and
not answer it because it isn’t going to be for you, and you’re going to be interrupted from your job.
The nurse is in a tabard saying do not disturb me on my drug round; that’s wonderful, but you’ve got
three consultants doing their ward round too! In the good old days, a sister or staff nurse would come
round with me. Now, I’ve got to try and find a nurse and all you get is: ‘it’s not my bay, I’m sorry, I’m
on Bay B’, so they don’t know the patient – how many nurses does it take to change a light bulb?
Oh sorry, that light bulb isn’t in my bay – it’s that compartmentalised. The sisters have got an awful
time; they’ve got, they’re getting kind of beaten at all ends. The number of staff you have on the
wards – the ratio of nurses to patients has gone down – apparently, there’s some paper which says
that’s safe but then there’s all the other things as well. I think that’s, you know, that’s the concern.
Consultant, palliative medicine, case site A1 (T052); transcription 5:37
In addition, for those who welcome the new emphasis on patient safety and take a pride in adhering to
the precepts of 1000 Lives+, there may be a deep sense of shame when failures in patient safety do occur
(transcription 5:38, below).
So, with 1000 Lives+ we thought we’ve cracked it, it’s done! But I was walking out of the ward one
evening at about 9 o’clock at night, and we have, always on our ward, we have a policy of putting
our safety crosses in the public area. So, I was walking out of the ward and I saw this red square on
the pressure ulcer monitoring, and I said to myself: ‘some idiot’s made a mistake on the safety cross’.
I went back into the ward and they said: ‘no, actually, we’ve had a pressure ulcer’, and we all wanted
to cut our wrists, really, it was a very depressing moment.
Consultant surgeon, case site B1 (T062); transcription 5:38
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The ethos of care stimulated by the 1000 Lives+ programme is, therefore, constrained by the fragmented
nature of its normalisation. As expressed in transcription 5:39, and more so in transcription 5:40 below,
there is a profound disjuncture. For some, 1000 Lives+ and its associated MI-PDSA approach have been
actively embraced, resulting in its progressive normalisation: 1000 Lives+ is, therefore, absorbed into daily
practice. Yet for others, although its mandated nature enforces engagement, this has been resisted:
1000 Lives+ is, therefore, only adsorbed onto (i.e. there is token commitment only and it is not properly
integrated) daily practice – and, in this transitional state, it may fail to institutionalise across NHS Wales.
Sometimes it can feel we’re doing 1000 Lives+ for the sake of 1000 Lives+! Well because, you know,
people don’t necessarily see their mini-collaborative within the context of the overall quality
improvement, patient safety improvement – reducing waste, variation, and harm from the policy
perspective – and I don’t think as an organisation we’ve been very good at placing those
mini-collaboratives within the context of the overall quality improvement and patient safety
improvement agenda. I think that’s why – it just sometimes feels like one of those stand alone things
that people do – and, I think, we’ve lost a trick.
Associate Director, case site F1 (T026); transcription 5:40
1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: elaborated understanding of
local implementation
Previously, in Chapter 4, we set out our analysis of the bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+ programme across
the higher levels of context, thereby defining our preliminary understanding of the local implementation of
1000 Lives+. Building on the findings presented in this chapter, we now seek to integrate the role of the
mechanisms that appear to be involved in the normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme at lower levels
of context.
Figure 12 demonstrates three ways in which existing institutional logics, or the collective beliefs and value
systems of those involved, may affect the outcomes of an intervention. First, where logics are not aligned,
the intervention may be opposed, with people deliberately seeking to maintain existing and habitual
practices, and actively challenging attempts to impose new ways of working. Second, where institutional
logics co-exist, while they may not actively reject, people may nonetheless ignore or give little thought or
attention to the imposed changes. While this may lead to apparent revision of practice, because people’s
values and belief systems have not been changed it is likely that if the coercive element is removed practice
will revert to the status quo ante. Hence implementation of an intervention can be effective only when
beliefs and value systems are aligned within a particular context, as shown in the third element of Figure 12.
In these circumstances, coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring of the desired
institutional change are fostered and new procedures are absorbed into daily practice and become
routinised over time.
It is from such environments, which function as foci for change, that areas initially less receptive to the
proposed changes may be gradually recruited through processes of imitation and normalisation.
Table 10 sets out aligned transcription dyads showing divergent stances to normalisation. These reveal
the impact of coherence, cognitive participation, collective action and reflexive monitoring in a situated
health-care context.
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Figure 12: key point summary
In Figure 12 we depict the mechanisms that foster normalisation – coherence, cognitive participation and
reflexive monitoring – and set out the impact on the alignment of institutional logics, as expanded below.
In point 1, institutional logics are not aligned, limiting the potential for coherence. In such a scenario the
desired institutional change is resisted, habituated practices continue and attempts to impose change
are challenged.
l Under these situated contextual conditions, mechanisms to generate change, although operational,
are ineffectual.
In point 2, institutional logics co-exist without fostering contradistinction and conflict. However, in this scenario,
the potential for coherence to manifest is limited owing to inattention. Accordingly, cognitive participation and
reflexive monitoring do not occur and people’s beliefs and values are not revised. A fragile normalisation
occurs, through which the mandated institutional change is compulsorily imposed onto, but not into, daily
practice. However, if such forces are removed, the desired institutional change may revert to the status
quo ante.
l Under these situated contextual conditions, such generative mechanisms, though operational, are limited.
In contrast, in point 3, the alignment of institutional logics is complementary. This, we assert, fosters coherence,
cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring of the desired institutional change, and new practices are
absorbed into daily practice.
l Under these situated contextual conditions such generative mechanisms catalyse the desired institutional
change and facilitate the evolution of health-care practice. Furthermore, such sites act as foci for change
through normative and mimetic isomorphic institutionalism (processes of imitation and normalisation) and
will gradually influence change in initially less receptive areas (see points 4 and 5).
Importantly, as explored in later figures, such generative mechanisms are modulated by the relational structures
within the situated context, specifically by the interplay of local leadership, team working and encultured values.
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TABLE 10 Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration: interpersonal relations
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component MI-PDSA
Context Hospital multisite department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation, reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
MI-PDSA approach
Habituation: decoupling from 1000 Lives+ and
MI-PDSA approach
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed leadership of
evidence guided, practice-based
change promoted
l Team work: centred on practice-based
learning to develop micro-competences
across the clinical micro work system
l Encultured values: creativity and
accountability of evidence guided,
practice-based change
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: disparaging notions of the
quality and rigor of practice-based evidence
hinders innovation potential
l Team work: the rejection of practice-based
evidence impairs team working and
innovation across the clinical micro
work system
l Encultured values: potential of change
stymied by contested notion of evidence
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed leadership of
evidence guided, practice-based change
supports identification of patient
safety failings
l Team work: action oriented to address
identified failings
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and
confidence in the MI-PDSA approach
gives a sense of security, facilitating
challenge to suboptimal practices
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: limited leadership of evidence
guided, practice-based change
l Team work: isolated, inward focused, with
failure to connect to health-board-wide
change agenda
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and
MI-PDSA function as ‘standalone things
that people do’, limiting organisational
learning from the identification of
suboptimal practices
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: continuous challenge to learn
from poor practice that results in
untoward patient harm
l Team work: cohesive with a high value
placed on learning and feedback to
promote patient safety
l Encultured values: reflexive, open,
low-blame approach, responsive and
receptive to learning opportunities
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: limited challenge to learn from
poor practice that results in untoward
patient harm
l Team work: low value placed on learning
and feedback to promote patient safety
l Encultured values: failure in patient safety is
par for the course, to be expected, and
matters only if ‘people actually make a big
deal about it’
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: distributed leadership of
evidence guided, practice-based
change promoted
l Team work: heightened focus on
measurement and management of
practice-based change
l Encultured values: ownership of change
agenda within situated context,
augmented by sense of ‘doing
something good’
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: failure to adequately manage
clinical team’s perceptions of impact of
1000 Lives+
l Team work: demotivated by failure to
engender positive change
l Encultured values: failure to ensure
feedback to staff that the practice-based
change has resulted in the attainment of
patient benefit erodes 1000 Lives+
value
continued
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TABLE 10 Intervention–context–mechanism–agency–outcome configuration: interpersonal relations (continued)
Agency and
institutional work
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: heightened awareness of
patient safety
l Team work: 1000 Lives+ resonates with
staff and functions as a focal point for
patient safety
l Encultured values: saving lives through
high-quality, safe and effective
health care
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: dismissive clinical leadership
l Team work: stymied by
fragmented legitimacy
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ is a
‘management fad’ not owned by
clinical team
l Institutional work – disruptive
l Leadership: development of leadership
roles in roles traditionally subordinate
to medicine
l Team work: heightened distributed
leadership across health-care team,
specifically band 7 nurses
l Encultured values: nurse-led, evidence
guided, practice-based change
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: traditional leadership role
position-practices unchallenged and
opposed to 1000 Lives+
l Team work: distributed leadership across
health-care team unchanged
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ is a
‘management fad’ not owned by
clinical team
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national programme
and MI-PDSA approach embraced and
absorbed into daily practice
l Decoupling 1000 Lives+ national
programme and MI-PDSA approach resisted
and adsorbed into daily practice
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l 5:13 (T049) – Coupling
l 5:20 (T081) – Decoupling
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l 5:17 (T084) – Coupling
l 5:40 (T026) – Decoupling
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 5:38 (T062) – Coupling
l 5:39 (T062) – Decoupling
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l 5:18 (T069) – Coupling
l 5:12 (T046) – Decoupling
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l 5:04 (T025) – Coupling
l 5:06 (T026) – Decoupling
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l 5:27 (T069) – Coupling
l 5:24 (T027) – Decoupling
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Figures 13–15 portray the institutional change driven by the bureaucratisation of 1000 Lives+. Our discussion
considers three examples of processes involved in the normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme:
(1) legitimisation, (2) formalisation and (3) innovation.
1. Legitimisation: Table 10, transcriptions 5:02 and 5:24 and Figure 13 show how legitimisation is
modulated. In transcription 5:02 (see 1000 Lives+, health-care practice and patient safety), complementarity
between bureaucratic state, professional and collaborative logics results in perceptions of coherence with
1000 Lives+. However, the ensuing cognitive participation of those who ‘buy into certain areas where their
interests lie’ promotes contained collective action, directed to deliver the aligned vested interests of those
who occupy the orchestrating leadership position in this situated context.
In contrast, transcription 5:24 (see Building the ethos of patient safety: pride and shame in health-care
practice) depicts the overt rejection of the dominant logic of the bureaucratic state. Professional logic is,
therefore, shifted from its subordinate role into an ascendant position. Given the contradiction between
these co-existent logics, theorisation prevents coherence from developing. This inhibits cognitive
participation and collective action. As a result, 1000 Lives+ is viewed as ‘not part of us’. In this context,
decoupling from the national programme arises.
2. Formalisation: Table 10, Figure 14 and transcription 5:29 (see reference in Teamwork, collaboration
and emancipation) suggest that formalisation is modulated by complementarity between bureaucratic
state, professional and collaborative logics. This promotes adherence to the governance structures which
support the 1000 Lives+ national programme. However, the subtleties of individuals’ reasoning and use of
the resources provided by 1000 Lives+ are exposed in transcription 5:36 (see reference in Building the
ethos of patient safety: pride and shame in health-care practice). Although no overt rejection of the
dominant logic of the bureaucratic state is expressed, professional logic and collaborative logic are not held
in a complementary stance. Instead, they occupy a co-existent stance that fosters professional protection
and a lack of collaboration. In this context, coupling to the governance structures that support 1000 Lives+
is fragile.
3. Innovation: Table 10, Figure 15 and transcriptions 5:13 and 5:20 demonstrate how innovation is
modulated, while transcription 5:13 (see Model for improvement and PDSA approach) illustrates the
nuances of normalisation. Once again, the logic of the bureaucratic state is embraced and held in close
alignment with professional and collaborative logics. This promotes strong coherence with the 1000 Lives+
national programme – ’The model for improvement [MI-PDSA], well it’s, it’s a tried and tested approach,
part of improvement science’ – resulting in the cognitive participation, collective action and reflexive
monitoring of health-care staff who ‘can go out and they can get started straight away by having an idea,
testing it on one patient one time, one nurse, one doctor!’. In contrast, transcription 5:20 (see Model for
improvement and PDSA approach) highlights a profound disjuncture between the logic of the bureaucratic
state and one facet of medical professional logic – the contestation between care and science373 – that
stymies engagement with 1000 Lives+ owing to disagreement over the validity of the evidence base: what
the respondent in this transcription calls the ‘tyranny of evidence’. This fundamental discord impacts on
theorisation. It limits coherence and erodes the means for meaningful engagement with 1000 Lives+. As a
result, normalisation and, thus, institutionalisation are hampered.
We suggest that the mechanisms that appear to foster normalisation modulate the processes of
bureaucratisation through amplification of the complementarity or contradiction between logics in the
institutional field. However, of those considered – coherence, cognitive participation, collective action and
reflexive monitoring – only three are seen as generative mechanisms (coherence, cognitive participation
and reflexive monitoring), while collective action is simply an outcome of such reflexive theorisation and,
thus, an expression of agency.
In the next chapter we examine and develop I-CMAO configurations for three focal interventions from the
1000 Lives+ programme using theories of structure, agency and social change.
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Figure 13: key point summary
In Figure 13 we depict the legitimisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme across the Welsh health-care
institutional field, centred on lower contextual strata at health board, hospital multisite department, hospital
site-based ward and individual levels.
In point 1, in situated contexts where logics are in alignment:
l Agency – legitimisation – elite institutional actors and co-opted others embrace 1000 Lives+ and MI-PDSA
approach and embed in health-care policy and performance frameworks.
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional actors enact political work to reconstruct rules, rights and
access to resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme to tier 1 performance targets.
In point 2, in situated contexts where logics are in alignment:
l Agency – legitimisation – 1000 Lives+ becomes part of the language and positioned-practices of patient
safety in NHS Wales, fostering collaboration and systemic challenge among institutional entrepreneurs who
reassert a new normative standard to precipitate practice-based change.
l Institutional work – creation – elite board-level institutional actors enact political work to reconstruct rules,
rights and access to resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme to the attainment of the
Welsh Government’s tier 1 performance targets.
In point 3, in situated contexts where logics are in alignment:
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic) – 1000 Lives+ moral and pragmatic legitimacy fosters
mainstreaming of the intervention across NHS Wales.
l Institutional work – creation – functional team’s belief and meaning systems reconfigured.
In point 4, the impact of co-existent or countervailing institutional logics is depicted as corrosive feedback that
challenges legitimisation and, therefore, normalisation.
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Figure 14: key point summary
In Figure 14 we depict the formalisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme across the Welsh health-care
institutional field, centred on lower contextual strata at health board, hospital multisite department, hospital
site-based ward and individual levels.
In point 1, in situated contexts where logics are in alignment:
l Agency – formalisation – mandated engagement with 1000 Lives+ and the MI-PDSA approach to address
NHS Wales’ organisational failings and attain national health-care standards.
l Institutional work – creation – elite institutional carriers enact political work to reconstruct rules, rights and
access to resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme to tier 1 performance targets.
In point 2, in situated contexts where logics are in alignment:
l Agency – formalisation – multiprofessional and multisite co-ordination of patient safety via the statutory
Quality and Safety Committee and aligned governance structures.
l Institutional work – creation – elite board-level institutional actors enact political work to reconstruct rules,
rights and access to resources, thereby linking 1000 Lives+ national programme to the attainment of the
Welsh Government’s tier 1 performance targets.
In point 3, the impact of co-existent or countervailing institutional logics is depicted as corrosive feedback.
However, this is insufficient to over-ride mandated performance management and governance processes.
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Summary
In Chapter 5, we analysed the cultural change inherent to normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme at
the level of the functional team. We explored the role of contextual constraints and enablements, and
ensuing reflexive theorisation, across the dynamic interplay of multiple logics, and considered the
modulating roles of coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring.
Figure 15: key point summary
In Figure 15 we depict innovation catalysed by the 1000 Lives+ national programme across the Welsh health-care
institutional field, centred on lower contextual strata at health board, hospital multisite department, hospital
site-based ward and individual levels.
In point 1, in situated contexts where logics are in alignment:
l Agency – innovation – individual and organisational pragmatic evidence-based learning manifests through
adherence to the MI-PDSA approach.
l Institutional work – creation – functional team’s belief and meaning systems reconfigured.
In point 2, the impact of complementary institutional logics is depicted as positive feedback that supports the
formalisation of evidence-based innovation across NHS Wales.
In point 3, the impact of co-existent or countervailing institutional logics is depicted as corrosive feedback.
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Chapter 6 Improving leadership for quality
improvement
Overview
Chapters 6–8 set out our realist analyses of the three focal interventions selected from the 1000 Lives+
programme in NHS Wales: ILQI, RSC and RHAI. To aid the explanation of our argument, each is structured
in the same manner, as set out below.
In this chapter we examine ILQI, a programme aimed at helping organisational leaders to take a systematic
approach to the implementation of practical interventions. We first consider three leadership activities
designed to build the will to make measurable systemic improvement, specifically (i) setting aims and
monitoring progress through local mortality reviews; (ii) demonstrating visible leadership via WalkRounds™;
and (iii) the use of patient stories at board level. We review such practices to highlight their acknowledged
benefits and the barriers that impede their normalisation into daily practice.
Second, we undertake a realist analysis of the progressive institutionalisation of ILQI, thereby setting out our
comparative case study of sites A, B, C and D. In doing so, we explain the structural conditioning, sociocultural
interaction and structural elaboration or reproduction fostered through the actions of three groups of key
actors – directors of medicine, nursing, and therapies and health science – together with their colleagues in
respective associate roles. We concentrate on these actors because they are formally tasked with the
implementation of the ILQI under the 1000 Lives+ programme. In addition, to aid our understanding of context
and mechanism, we examine the perspectives of policy leads, health board chairs, chief executive officers and
other managerial staff aligned to these professional groups. Finally, informed by the findings of our realist
analysis, we set out our understanding of the ILQI I-CMAO configuration.
Focal intervention, aim and drivers
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement is the first of the three focal interventions considered in this
study. This improvement programme aims to support board members and other organisational leaders to take
a systematic approach to the implementation of practical leadership interventions to promote transformational
quality improvement. ILQI has gradually become embedded in NHS Wales’ annual operating frameworks,445
quality frameworks446 and associated delivery plans.391,402 Furthermore, ILQI is supported by an aligned
organisational and workforce development strategy,447 a web-based national learning programme for all NHS
Wales staff and contractors – Improving Quality Together (www.iqt.wales.nhs.uk/home) – and associated
online resources offered by Patient Safety Wales (www.patientsafetywales.org.uk).
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement is centred on the appointment of executive level leads for
the different interventions within the 1000 Lives+ programme. It calls for the application of the
underpinning MI-PDSA approach to inform the development of intelligent targets for priority clinical
services. As illustrated in Figure 16, ILQI advocates three drivers for change. The first aims to build the will
to make measurable improvement as quickly as possible. This directs senior leaders to cultivate staff
engagement, enthusiasm and commitment at all levels of the organisation. The second aims to encourage
and spread ideas about alternatives to the status quo, which are robust enough to form the basis of new
working systems. This challenges senior leaders to support staff to implement such change. The third aims
to oversee the implementation of a range of improvement initiatives within the organisation. This tasks
senior leaders to develop a culture of health-care quality and patient safety. ILQI, as a core part of a Welsh
health-service-wide governance agenda, therefore assists health boards to set local targets to reduce harm
and mortality.
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FIGURE 16 Driver diagram: ILQI.
Figure 16: key point summary
Figure 16 depicts the driver diagram for the focal intervention, ILQI. Attention is directed to three leadership
activities designed to build the will to make measurable systemic improvement, as defined below:
l point 1, setting aims and monitoring progress through local mortality reviews
l point 2, demonstrating visible leadership via WalkRounds and
l point 3, the use of patient stories at board level.
To aid our understanding of the interplay of context and mechanism in the operationalisation of this focal
intervention, the perspectives of policy leads, health board chairpersons, chief executive officers and other
managerial staff aligned to these professional groups enrich our analysis.
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Acknowledging the interconnected features of this intervention, our attention focused on three leadership
activities designed to build the will to make measurable systemic improvement to patient safety, specifically
(i) setting aims and monitoring progress through local mortality reviews; (ii) demonstrating visible
leadership via WalkRounds; and (iii) the use of patient stories at board level.
Mortality reviews, WalkRounds and patient stories
As outlined in Chapter 1, health-care quality and patient safety demand effective and co-ordinated
leadership from politicians,448,449 executive-level managers81,450 and their subordinate staff – whether
corporate or clinical professionals451 – who interact with patients, directly or indirectly,4,88,204,452,453 in the
coproduction of their care.146,155,454 Health-care leadership is, therefore, inherently distributed30,36,455,456
and complex,457 and necessitates active followership.458 Furthermore, it is modulated by a range of
other factors which impact patient safety and the culture of care,459–461 most notably (i) organisational
governance processes, audit and monitoring systems;462–465 (ii) management processes and their reception
by staff;29,466–469 (iii) team-centred learning and local commitment to education;11,207,470–474 (iv) an individual
and collective focus on practice innovation;43,475 and (v) the development of an organisational culture of
care, wherein transparency, communication and mutual respect are valued.22,476–478
Mortality reviews
In the aftermath of the public inquiry into failings at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust,81 excess
mortality has been openly debated as a means to flag concerns with hospital patient care.479–482 Beyond
the NHS, this approach has been used in other developed health-care systems to monitor organisational
performance and to compare such performance between hospitals.483,484 However, the validity and
reliability of the Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR) and other means of measurement, such as
the risk-adjusted mortality index (RAMI), is dependent on comprehensive, accurate and consistently applied
clinical coding. Consequently, the use of such measures as HSMR as a screening tool for distinguishing
low-quality hospitals from high-quality hospitals remains in doubt158–160,485 because the link between HSMR
and organisational factors is ambiguous.160 In addition, it has not yet been proved that HSMR reporting
necessarily leads to worthwhile improvement in quality of care and patient outcomes.483
Given this unresolved debate, and wide variation in hospital mortality, the impact of leadership on
mortality, whether or not adjusted for case-based severity and cross-linked with resource measures,486,487
appears somewhat unclear. However, hospital-based monitoring of all-cause mortality through review
meetings constitutes an important board-level and medical governance resource and may provide deeper
insight into emergent patterns, thereby helping to identify trends to guide local improvement efforts488 and
to reveal their impact on the provision of care over time.489,490 In addition, they may provide assurance that
patients are not dying as a consequence of unsafe clinical practices.491
Other markers or proxy measures of leadership are associated with mortality. For example, a significant
and positive association has been found between a higher percentage of clinicians on boards, the quality
ratings of service providers and lower morbidity rates;32 Mortality rates have also been linked to greater use
of high-performance human resource practices;492 nursing staffing ratios and skill mix78,493 and hospital pay
for performance.494 Wright et al.495 also found that good leadership, organisational management practices
and information systems, supported by a quality improvement strategy based on robust local evidence,
training and a community-wide approach, may be effective in reducing hospital mortality. The evidence
suggests, therefore, that mortality measurement may assist boards in thinking strategically about what it
takes, from a systems perspective, to achieve patient safety.496
WalkRounds
Board engagement in the patient safety agenda can also be increased by enhancing their collective literacy
in health-care quality, governance processes and aligned service improvement methods.497 One means to
achieve this is WalkRounds.498–500 Perceived as a key leadership practice in health care, WalkRounds foster
situational awareness and help management to periodically assess new or unresolved vulnerabilities that
may affect safety and care quality. WalkRounds, therefore, potentially provide (i) a forum for front-line
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staff to report and discuss patient safety problems with local leaders, so that the voice of the caregiver
influences the ongoing board-level debate;501 (ii) an opportunity to improve teamwork and communication
within and across units; and (iii) a supportive environment in which staff and leaders help to develop
potential solutions for patient safety and service delivery issues502–505– all refined through the underpinning
MI-PDSA approach.506
Improvements in patient safety have been linked to the frequency of exposure to WalkRounds507 but their
sustained operation demands significant organisational will, project management and commitment from
board-level leaders.499 Research is now beginning to penetrate the complex social processes that underpin
WalkRounds so that their potential to foster executive-level learning is enhanced.508,509 However, the
development and maintenance of appropriate organisational feedback mechanisms is known to be a
significant challenge.510,511
Patient stories
These are a means for the patient and their family, advocate or carer to forward their personal narrative
of harm in order to actively contribute to the coproduction of safe care.512,513 Considering the notion of
harm from the perspective of the patient offers insight into alternative health-care priorities,514 including
(i) the psychological and emotional aspects of harm515 and (ii) the harm and distrust caused by delays in
communicating patient safety incidents to patients,516 compounded by (iii) that which arises owing to their
exclusion from the critical conversations which shape the provision of their individual care.132,153
By providing rich insight into the reality of health-care provision through description and dialogue,
patient stories can inform organisational governance processes517–519 and service redevelopment
through experience-based design.520 However, although patient stories may inform, equip and challenge
organisational leaders to improve the delivery of health care, they also expose them to the fear of
reputational and financial risk generated by the broader dissemination of harrowing narratives of harm.521
This presents a barrier to the development of a safety culture. Tasking board-level leaders to hear patient
stories as the first agenda item at every board meeting may reveal the human face of harm.522 However,
if rendered down to just another performance measure, amid an array of others, such narratives will do
little to foster appropriate remedial action.105 Indeed, dysfunctional consequences may arise owing to
entrenched historical and cultural precedents, specifically beliefs anchored to health-care performance
and autonomy.523–527 Cognitive psychological explanations of the way such individuals process patient
feedback of this type, together with the corresponding social rules which frame their ensuing action or
inaction,303,527–529 therefore constitute an important arena of patient safety research for social scientists.530
Realist analysis and comparative case study
To examine the dynamic interaction of the focal intervention and context, ascertaining emergent
mechanisms and ensuing outcomes, we now undertake a critical realist analysis of the progressive
institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme’s ILQI. Our case study considers sites A, B, C and D,
which, owing to high levels of access and wide-ranging staff engagement, offered rich insights into the
unfolding implementation of the ILQI. Our analysis focuses primarily on three groups of key actors –
directors of medicine, nursing, and therapies and health science, together with their colleagues in
respective associate roles – tasked with the implementation of the ILQI under the auspices of the 1000
Lives+ programme. However, we also use data from policy leads, health board chairpersons, chief executive
officers and other managerial staff aligned to these professional groups.
First, we consider the focal intervention in context and explore the dominant structural and cultural emergent
properties impacting board-level actors. Next, to reveal the generative mechanisms in play, we examine
mediation via first- and second-order emergents and the resultant situational logic. Then, to examine the
initiation of change, we explore the unfolding strategic negotiation of change and the mode of institutional
work enacted. Finally, we reflect on the nature of any sustained outcome, be that elaborative or reproductive.
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This analysis forms the foundation of our refinement of the I-CMAO configuration spanning the Welsh
health-care field in 1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: ILQI – local implementation of the focal intervention and
contribution to the I-CMAD configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field.
Structural conditioning: structural and cultural emergent properties in the
Welsh health-care field
Initially, we discussed the dominant structural and cultural influences impacting health board-level actors
during the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI with policy leads in the Welsh
Government. As commented in transcriptions 6:01 and 6:02 (below) – and as previously reflected in
transcription 4:01 – the 1000 Lives+ programme was deeply integrated with health-care policy
development in Wales.
The 1000 Lives+ national programme has been a vehicle to do lots and lots of things; it’s been very useful.
Now, for pretty much all projects – when we get to the stage where there’s some policy that we need to
do in Welsh Government and, I think, even more so following Francis – the implementation is designed
with the methodology that sits behind 1000 Lives+ in mind because it’s there, and people can understand
it, and so they can use it in order to be able to move stuff forward.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (145); transcription 6:01
What we’ve started to introduce this year – this new financial year just started – is we’ve tweaked the
tier 1 targets and we’ve created basically five domains of quality. So we’ve tried to reflect much more
broadly what boards are doing. We’ve piloted alongside it the principle of what I would call a bit of
improvement methodology. We’ve sort of laid out a series of matrixes or grids of competencies that
we expect boards to be able to display on a scale of 1 to 5 – a scale of maturity – so what we’re trying
to do is to move it away, a bit, from just target driven to being more about development. As I’m trying
to make it more developmental, it is starting to get closer to the 1000 Lives+ type approach.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 6:02
Such policy actors held robust views on the dominant structural emergent properties impacting
health boards: ‘it’s finance, reconfiguration, staffing, and health-care quality performance’
(transcription 6:03, below).
What are the structural constraints on the 1000 Lives+ national programme? That’s an interesting
question, we could probably spend the next hour just discussing that; but I’ll do my best to be
succinct. The first structural constraint is, obviously, the financial difficulties that all public services now
face in light of the global economic downturn. Second, for NHS Wales, it’s the major reconfiguration,
and that’s still ongoing, as we have to address the configuration of services and their provision across
Wales, so there’s a ripple effect across all health boards as they reconfigure. All that will create heated
political and public debate because, in Wales, as elsewhere, people are fiercely protective of their
health-care services – they still criticise them – but they don’t want services shifted to other sites away
from their locality. That creates staffing constraints for all health boards, especially those further off
the M4 corridor. As I’m sure you are aware, there are major difficulties in some areas of Wales, in
terms of the recruitment and retention of general practitioners, some acute specialisms, accident and
emergency, and others. And then, of course, we have the Francis Report, which, I believe, will
heighten governance and performance management systems, as we saw after the Kennedy Report
into Bristol Royal Infirmary. So, it’s finance, reconfiguration, staffing, and health-care quality
performance, they’re the main ones, at least!
Policy lead, Welsh Government (143); transcription 6:03
Financial constraints were also seen to have a specific adverse effect on patient safety (transcription 6:04).
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Beyond the goals of 1000 Lives+ and ILQI, these acknowledged structural constraints shaped the strategic
context to the delivery of the Welsh Governments’ tier 1 targets, and their active management and
mitigation was central to the bureaucratic control exerted over each health board (transcription 6:05, below).
[How do you hold NHS Wales’ health boards to account for their performance?] We have an
escalation framework – basically four levels of escalation, five if you include zero – we monitor health
boards, as they have to perform against the targets that they’re supposed to achieve, and if they’re
performing against all of the standards then they wouldn’t be escalated. Basically, they’re allowed to
get on with it and, to a degree, we actually pull away from the level of assurance that we seek. So we
could get to the stage where you might only, you know, touch them quarterly or half-yearly. But we’re
not at that point with anybody at the moment. Once things start to go wrong – somebody’s missing
their targets – we then escalate to level 1, 2, 3 and up to 4. At each of those levels there’s a slightly
higher level of intervention. Each of these would be just a bit more forceful: ‘you need to have got to
a recovery plan by this’; ‘we need you to be showing you’re doing a recovery plan’, if they don’t do
that they go up another level and that carries on and the frequency increases. Basically, by the time
we’ve got to level 4, the chair will probably be having conversations with the minister, and the chief
executive will be probably having conversations with the chief executive of NHS Wales. Throughout
this process what we’re looking at is, essentially, what have we got to do with this board; is there
something that’s needed in way of turning around behaviour, turning around attitude, turning around
performance? Does that mean we have to bring something or someone in? We can bring to bear
quite a lot of sanctions, in terms of alterations to their allocation of money. Now, we don’t normally
get to that stage but we’re very close with a few boards at the minute – we do have to recognise, as
is happening in NHS England, that performance is very difficult in the current financial environment –
so the whole system is just basically not quite as slick as it would have been even a year ago.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 6:05
Another respondent viewed the Francis Report to have been the main cultural impact on health boards
during the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI (transcription 6:06).
Other structural and cultural constraints arose from the institutionalised delegation of strategic oversight
of patient safety – and, thus, 1000 Lives+ and ILQI – to the leadership of directors and associate directors
of medicine, nursing, and therapies and health science (transcriptions 6:07 and 6:08, below, and
transcription 6:09).
Post Francis, I think that the cultural constraints which will impact on NHS Wales’ health boards and
1000 Lives+ national programme stem from driving forward a transparent culture of compassionate
care – we’ve set out our views on that – so, that is all about the professions, their traditional practices,
turfs and turf wars, recognising that errors do happen, and that we can make change to mitigate
some of them, though it will take real leadership and time to change the culture.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (145); transcription 6:07
The quality of our services and patient safety issues, though they fall within my remit as accountable
officer, are delegated to other board members. You’ll find this across NHS Wales. Certainly, for
1000 Lives+ it’ll be the medical director, nursing director, and the one for therapies and health
sciences – or whatever title is applied for this type of board-level role – that hold the strategic focus
for the patient safety agenda. Typically, it’ll be their associate directors who will be more involved,
operationally, in the roll-out of 1000 Lives+. This isn’t an abdication or abrogation of responsibility,
it’s delegation through to the clinical professionals who ultimately deliver care to patients and whose
practices 1000 Lives+ is attempting to transform. [What about your engagement in mortality
measurement, WalkRounds, and use of patient stories at board level?] Yes, we do those. But that is
only part of what we do, there’s more to managing this health board than addressing 1000 Lives+.
Chief Executive, case site A1 (078); transcription 6:08
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First-order emergents for board-level actors central to the
institutionalisation of ILQI
The dominant structure and culture described in the previous section shaped the context and conditioned
the actions of the board-level directors and associate directors central to the institutionalisation of the ILQI.
Below, we set out how actors in such professional role-positions reflected on first-order emergents such
as their delegated leadership of the ILQI, their vested interests and perceived opportunity costs associated
with various courses of action, and seek to discern how this shaped their interpretive freedom and scope
for purposive action to support patient safety.
Director of medicine and associates
The vested interests of directors of medicine and their associates, tasked with the strategic oversight of the
1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI, lay primarily in the successful development of a systematic locally agreed
approach to undertaking the mortality review in the aftermath of the structural reconfiguration of NHS
Wales (transcriptions 6:10 and 6:11, below, and transcriptions 6:12 and 6:13).
In terms of 1000 Lives+, my main focus is the mortality reviews, and reporting through the system that
has been established with the Welsh Government. We’ve done a board paper, two board papers in a
row, which address how do we measure harm, how do we measure our morbidity, our mortality. So
it’s a key role. With 1000 Lives+, the mortality reviews have been around a programme of work
looking at how we, how do we actually understand where the harm is occurring. It’s a systematic
process – one of the main things that [name, NHS Wales Chief Executive and Director General, Welsh
Government] asked the medical directors to do, probably in 2010, was to do systematic case notes
reviews – so we have a system whereby I was probably looking at 25% of the deaths, not all the
deaths, because we have 50 deaths a week! So we embarked upon learning through reviewing about
15 sets of notes a week with the senior governance adviser and with also one of the associate
directors of medicine. We tried various different ways, in terms of pro formas, and we did all the
PDSA-type work but in the end we’ve settled on a detailed notes review using the global trigger tool.
I have to say that we continued that right up until January when there was the debate about
publishing RAMI. Although we didn’t feel that we learnt in excess, we did learn above and beyond
what we knew about the organisation through that process.
Medical Director, case site D1 (117); transcription 6:10
[Prior to 1000 Lives+ was there any systematic process for reviewing mortality across the health board’s
hospital sites?] Well the kick-off, actually, was, you know, when this organisation came into being;
there had been chaos! There was the organisation, and predecessor organisation or organisations – as
you know, we’ve had to endure a lot of change – we had the interim trust with a completely different
executive team, and a completely different interim medical leadership and management structure,
that was just basically trying to keep the thing ticking over really. Then we were presented as a new
edition, [health board name], and more systematic scrutiny of our statistics started, and one them was
that our RAMI which was worrying. So, that was the situation when the health board came into being
and, obviously, as medical director, I was tasked to do something about it.
Certain parts of the organisation may well have been looking at quality initiatives before that but really
I think getting a grip on the mortality review and embracing 1000 Lives+, which we did as organisation
at that point, added coherence to the whole thing. So, when you asked me specifically what had
been done before, I would say that it was very hit and miss. Now, with 1000 Lives+, I have a clear
focus on mortality. I don’t want to harp on about it, but you’re asking about leadership and what we
do as an organisation, I think that’s a very good example how it’s been successful. I mean, at the
moment we’re into year 3, something like week 12 or 13, where every single week, every single death
in the organisation is looked at by a senior medical – a senior doctor – every single one, and a report
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goes to the chief executive. The information from that review – which, of course, when we get
concerns highlighted, concerns are investigated more deeply and reported back, hopefully through
auspices of medical director – the lessons learned, the themes, and so forth are communicated back,
right the way across the whole of the organisation, primary care and everything.
Medical Director, case site F1 (042); transcription 6:11
Moreover, such vested interests were closely aligned to those of policy leads with the Welsh Government.
Therefore, through the 1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI, the systematisation of mortality reviews brought
bureaucratic state logic, professional (medical) logic and a collaborative logic into a complementary stance
(transcription 6:14, below).
I think, in Wales, because we had a well-developed sort of collaborative approach, we were able to
engage clinicians in the audit of their local mortality levels, and what was going on. But we’re using
the national indicator in a very, very simplistic way, which I think is good, to just say: ‘hey look, this
will tell us if there is a problem’. But we then go into that audit work – that real work on the ground,
to say – well actually, are they doing all the things they should be doing to really understand and
make sure that this is right. [Long pause]
In a way, what we’ve avoided, so far, is getting dragged into this idea that’s going on in England
where you keep hauling out the top five and sort of having a public process about their mortality
levels. What we’ve tended to go for is: ‘well let’s get them working on it’. Now having done that, and
it being, at least so far, quite a successful approach, we’re now looking at how that set of principles
could be carried into other areas. So when we start looking at developing unscheduled care markers,
or planned care, or whatever it might be, we’re looking at whether we could underpin it with an audit
type approach, which says: these are all the good things you should be doing, how are you doing
against all of these; if you’re doing all these things, how are you monitoring your outcomes.
Actually, some of these higher-level measures are underpinned now with something that’s a bit more
substantial than just making sure you’re getting everybody through. So we’re trying to adopt almost a
two-tier approach – a set of national standard type measures – which we’ll try and keep as simple as
we can, but underpin it with a different approach around a more detailed understanding and audit.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 6:14
Director of nursing and associates
In contrast to the directors of medicine, the vested interests of directors of nursing and their associates
were aligned with the successful local co-ordination of the various patient safety interventions emergent
from 1000 Lives and 1000 Lives+. Though the formal remit of their roles was to be professionally
accountable for nursing practice, such roles typically absorbed a wide range of other ‘stuff’
(transcription 6:15, below).
As Director of Nursing, I’m professionally accountable for nurses and midwives across the health
board – about 5500 registrants and 3000 health-care support workers – so I advise the board on the
professional agenda. I’ve also hold joint executive responsibility with the medical director and director
of therapies and health scientist for clinical governance. In respect of 1000 Lives+ I’ve got some key
executive lead roles, for example infection prevent and control; but I also have executive lead roles for
the Transforming Care programme. Directors of nursing often label ourselves directors of nursing and
stuff because we tend to pick up a lot!
Director of Nursing, case site B1 (030); transcription 6:15
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Work associated with the 1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI was frequently co-ordinated with medical
leads, highlighting the complementary alignment of professional (nursing) and professional (medical) logics
(transcription 6:16, below).
I am one of the assistant directors of nursing – we’re each site based in a district general hospital –
and I work very closely with the site-based assistant medical director. We work together to ensure that
we undertake safety WalkRounds, and other features of the 1000 Lives+ national programme to build
leadership capacity, and to ensure that we provide that support and visibility for front-line staff. So it’s
very important that, between ourselves, that we undertake them jointly, preferably.
Assistant Director of nursing, case site C1 (093); transcription 6:16
Executive nurse leadership was viewed as pivotal for the successful institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+
intervention ‘bundles’ apportioned to nursing for their implementation (transcription 6:17, below).
The 1000 Lives+ skin bundle has got an executive lead – our assistant director of nursing – who’s very
active. They have study days are coordinated by her secretary, and they have three sessions that they
run for each area. In contrast, my experience with the catheter bundle has been difficult. I couldn’t
facilitate that for my area because I haven’t had an active executive lead. But the skin bundle, certainly
with their executive lead, has worked really well, and spread to areas from across the health board,
including private nursing homes and things! We’d love to do that with the catheters, but we just
haven’t been able to break down the barriers to get across and to access people who can make those
links for us.
Senior nurse, IPAC, case site D1 (034); transcription 6:17
Director of therapies and health science and associates
Directors of therapies and health science were newly established board-level roles (transcription 6:18).
Consequently, their vested interests centred on ‘coming up to speed’ with the demands of the role
as well as their executive leadership of 1000 Lives+ interventions associated with ILQI. In this regard,
the professional logic enacted was firmly aligned to professional (medical), professional (nursing) and
professional (management) logics in a complementary stance (transcription 6:18, below, and
transcription 6:19).
My learning curve with the original 1000 Lives campaign and now the 1000 Lives+ national
programme, you know, it’s been particularly steep over the last 3 or 4 years! Just coming into the
director role for therapies and health sciences – we didn’t have these director roles previously,
so we’re all new to boards in the first place – and so the medical and nursing directors’ portfolios
have shifted around.
But this definitely felt like quite a daunting prospect, I felt it needed a level of expertise; I’d need to
have an enormous amount of expertise. I have obviously been learning and asking questions, just the
same with any board role, we all need to have teams, support around us, people who can give you
expert advice. So I’ve had to ask questions and get into some of the detail, just to get my head around
it, and I’ve come back out again. Do you see what I mean?
With the 1000 Lives+ national programme, I think, possibly, it’s been even more challenging for my
nurse director colleague. From an organisational perspective across Wales, 1000 Lives+, a great deal
does come down to the director of nursing. It is very much a nursing domain.
Director of Therapies, case site C1 (118); transcription 6:18
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Second-order emergents and situational logic
In case sites A to D, the interplay of structural, cultural and agential emergent properties impacted on
the three groups of actors central to the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI.
Structurally, the presence of necessary and internal linkages of a complementary nature between structures
such as the mandated bureaucratic performance management systems and associated 1000 Lives+ and ILQI
goals, notably the RAMI, which was integrated into local mortality measurement practices, rendered these
performance management and governance institutions mutually reinforcing. Similarly, structural resilience
emerged from the co-ordinated action of directors of medicine, nursing, and therapies and health sciences,
as collective champions of 1000 Lives+ and the broader patient safety agenda.
Second, at board level, the institutionalisation of 1000 Lives+ and ILQI draws professional logic into
alignment with that of the bureaucratic state. Moreover, there is coalescence and cohesion across medical,
nursing, allied professional and health-care management logics. This places each into a complementary
stance, fosters the cross-cultural systematisation of facets of 1000 Lives+ and ILQI across NHS Wales and
promotes the reproduction of such practices across each health board. Consequently, at board level, the
ILQI operated under a situational logic of protection that moulded sociocultural interaction, agency,
strategic negotiation and the ensuing mode of institutional work.
Sociocultural interaction: agency and strategic negotiation
A situational logic of protection emerged from a context of necessary and internal linkages of a
complementary nature between systemic structures and harmonising logics. However, given the status of
the people involved, the inherent change agenda overarching the 1000 Lives+ programme and, thus, the
ILQI were executed from a position of high negotiating strength. Below, we highlight this complex
interplay in both a discrete case site and across multiple case sites, drawing out different degrees of
bureaucratisation and normalisation to help understand the interplay of the focal intervention, context
and mechanism.
Power-induced compliance and political sanction
To examine the adoption of power-induced compliance under a board-level situational logic of protection
and to trace its impact across management tiers, we reflect on some of our discussions with respondents
in case site B. At this site the chief executive had visibly responded to the bureaucratic demand for
engagement with 1000 Lives+ and ILQI, and WalkRounds had also become successfully integrated and thus
normalised as an expected professional role-position practice (transcription 6:20, below).
Our approach to 1000 Lives+ is reflected by the leadership of the health board. WalkRounds are a
central aspect of 1000 Lives+ but [name, chief executive officer] is out and about to each of the main
hospital sites to deliver our monthly team brief, and that team brief is expected to be cascaded out to
other managers – then they speak to their leads, their teams, on a one to one, that’s the expectation –
so that leadership and visibility is there in addition to the WalkRounds. That’s about four a month, or
eight a month with the team briefings and the open forums, on top of which the director of nursing
also does theirs – about four a year – and goes out and about and meet the nurses and midwives
across the organisation. So they try their best to communicate and be visible, but they can’t be as
visible as they used to be because of the size of the organisation.
Associate Director, case site B2 (009); transcription 6:20
Thus, under a situational logic of protection, the chief executive enacted the practices mandated for
his role, building them into an ambassadorial display that promoted similar enactment by other board-level
and sub-board managerial actors. Furthermore, such activity was appreciated for its ‘very hands-on’ and
‘approachable’ manner (transcription 6:21).
IMPROVING LEADERSHIP FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
92
Transcription 6:22 (below) reveals the impact of the Francis Report81 as a parallel driver for change across
NHS Wales, one that was used in an overt act of professional role-positional power to deliver higher
standards of care.
One of the things that I did, to address patient safety, was to remove a ward sister from the ward –
and we changed the team – because there was a deep-rooted culture in that ward, that went back
years and years and years. So I removed the ward sister and put two registered nurses through a
disciplinary. It was like a volcano going up.
I don’t want to turn this into a blame culture but where there are failings and poor standards of practice or
poor leadership – they either want to be a ward sister and all that entails or they don’t – so we’re making
some quite hard moves at the moment and I think that, given Francis, I think it’s the right time to do that now.
Director of Nursing, case site B1 (030); transcription 6:22
Such power was also used to enable those involved to drive forward their evolving patient safety agenda
by the display of visible leadership (‘walk the wards’); the engagement and co-option of medical staff to
act as clinical champions for 1000 Lives+ (‘we must have the medical champions out there’); and building
the will for change across the functional health-care team (‘strong clinical leadership to give teams the
confidence to challenge’) (transcriptions 6:23 to 6:25).
Reciprocal exchange and the harmonisation of desires
A more subtle deployment of power arose through reciprocal exchange and the harmonisation of desires
with other key professional actors. At case site A, board-level actors exerted their managerial control
and co-opted their associates who demonstrated interest and relevant clinical expertise to lead the
implementation. Thus, the implementation of 1000 Lives+ gained further visible professional leadership
closer to the point of care (transcription 6:26, below).
Given my professional background, and experience of service delivery, I’ve always been really
interested in quality and safety, so as associate director, I was tasked with patient safety and patient
experience. I’m responsible for sorting out the patient experience agenda –working out how we can
capture the patient experience – and making sure that we close the loop. So if we discover something
about patient experience through patient satisfaction, patient stories, complaints or anything like that,
I aim to ensure that we close the loop in terms of the organisational learning. And for good practice
as well because, obviously, as part of that feedback, I get to find out what’s really good about our
service. It’s not always about what’s really bad about our services. . .!
I also work with clinicians and managers to put in any action plans, in terms of any work, if things
aren’t up to standard, or if there’s some developmental work that needs to be put in place. So, if my
early warning system is telling me that I’ve got signs of a problem in an area then, obviously, I’ll work
with the area and the managers to see what needs to be done to improve quality and service. And I
work with clinicians to make sure our policies and procedures are up to date and fit for purpose.
Associate Director, case site A1 (048); transcription 6:26
Such leadership, in itself, fostered the engagement of consultant medical staff with aligned clinical
interests. This promoted further medical engagement with 1000 Lives+, [‘. . . if you’ve got somebody at
that level that drives it, it’s so much easier. Medical leadership makes it work a lot quicker than
management’ (transcription 6:28)] and, ultimately, the local leadership of discrete interventions [’it’s local
leadership because they understand the pressure within the organisation, and what makes a difference
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within that particular area’ (transcription 6:29)]. Creative institutional work, targeted at those who were
believers in the aims of 1000 Lives+ programme and, therefore, motivated to engage by a strong sense of
coherence, aided its normalisation in practice (transcription 6:27, below).
The thing that enabled it to happen [1000 Lives+ national programme], the places where it happened,
it was due to the individuals who were committed to it. [Was that limited to consultant-level clinical
leadership or were others involved?] Both. In our health board, here, there’s myself and there’s a
consultant, and we’re both who committed to it. You need – rightly or wrongly people listen to
consultants, people listen to doctors – you can have the best nurse in the world, who’s an expert in
something, but they’re still a nurse. It’s a hierarchical culture in the NHS. Doctors don’t learn – doctors
are not prepared to learn from nurses – they’ll learn from doctors: it’s completely wrong. Some of the
universities are now doing a lot more multiprofessional learning, the Peninsular Medical School, you
know, they’re fantastic at this sort of stuff. So, because there’s this hierarchical thing, you do need
consultant leadership but that can’t work on its own. [You need nurse leadership and broader
followership to embedded 1000 Lives+ into practice?] Yes.
Consultant, palliative medicine, case site A1 (052); transcription 6:27
In case sites B, C and D, the deployment of power through reciprocal exchange and the harmonisation
of desires led to similar patterns of expert co-optation to promote resource control of the 1000 Lives+
programme at the point of care. However, discussions at each case site exposed different features. For
example, in case site B, reciprocal exchange, manifested through knowledge, flows from board to ward
and to the 1000 Lives+ programme team (transcriptions 6:30 to 6:33). At case site C, reciprocal exchange
was deployed to build intraprofessional coherence and commitment to 1000 Lives+ for medical and
nursing professionals (transcriptions 6:34 and 6:35). Finally, at case site D, reciprocal exchange manifested,
once again, through knowledge flows from board to ward (transcriptions 6:36 and 6:37). This was
also marked by a subtle shift in expertise to lower management tiers, illustrating the normalisation of
1000 Lives+, and, thus, the inherent successful implementation of ILQI.
Structural elaboration or reproduction in the Welsh health-care field
We also sought to gauge key actors’ perceptions of the structural elaboration or reproduction that had
emerged under a situational logic of protection. A national programme team member described how,
through the formalisation of ILQI, a network of patient safety leaders, health-care professionals from
managerial, medical, nursing and other allied groups, had evolved (transcription 6:38, below).
Well, throughout the 1000 Lives campaign and 1000 Lives+, there were some specific interventions
that were focused on board-level leaders. But we quickly recognised that, actually, the people
that we needed to get at were often senior leaders who didn’t have a formal board-level role.
Another thing was that, because of the level of disruption with the NHS in Wales – due to the
reconfiguration – there weren’t people in all the formally appointed board roles, so you had a much
more, a looser coalition of senior leaders that we needed to engage with. But one of the things
that we have recognised, increasingly, is that to achieve a connection between the clinical teams
working on programmes and an organisation level focus involves much more than board-level leaders
and front line leaders. It involves a network of people throughout the organisation.
1000 Lives+ national programme team member (089); transcription 6:38
This notable structural change, in indoctrinating others, promoted the distributed leadership of patient
safety and the local integration of the 1000 Lives+ programme at each case site. Furthermore, the structural
change associated with the integration of mortality reviews into the Welsh Government’s performance
management framework was viewed to have added an important ‘critical lens’ through which to view
patient safety, providing a valued means of organisational learning (transcriptions 6:39 to 6:41).
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In contrast, cultural change was viewed as far more fragmented. This was viewed as owing partly to the
pejorative perception of 1000 Lives+ as a nurse-dominated agenda and partly to the time demanded for
such cultural evolution, if not revolution (transcriptions 6:42 to 6:44, below).
One success is that it’s certainly been embraced by the nursing profession but I’d like to see it
embraced by the multidisciplinary teams in a broader context. Some of the other professions are quite
dismissive: ‘it’s a nursey-nursey thing’.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (140); transcription 6:42
I do think we have driven structural change through 1000 Lives+ but, I think, cultural change is slower.
It’s happening, no doubt, and the new website will, I hope, help NHS Wales to build a workforce that
has a detailed understanding of service improvement – the skills and knowledge, the capabilities to
sustain patient safety – and the sense of empowerment to act.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (145); transcription 6:43
That notion, that simple acknowledgement that, in the Welsh NHS, we do harm. It’s politically difficult
to stand-up and say that but I believe it’s the start of real culture change: a revolution in care.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (081); transcription 6:44
Importantly, the cultural change that was in play included some notes of discord. For instance, the means of
guiding care could become an end in itself, much to the detriment of the patient (transcription 6:45, below).
The nurses have become conditioned, in some respects to, if they’re having a problem with a patient,
they reach for a piece of paper to document behaviours. So I’ll give you an example of one of the recent
wards that I’ve been working on – it’s a very, very busy trauma ward – and we have a big problem with
older people becoming delayed transfers of care because it’s difficult for us to discharge older people,
with high intensity needs, out into a more appropriate setting once their orthopaedic and the trauma
care is finished.
One of our patients on this particular ward has, is completely dependent, unable to verbalise her
needs or her wants, bed bound, reliant on us for everything, from feeding, to turning, to toileting, to
trying to interpret communication. And in that, clearly, she becomes very frustrated. So she’s taken
to grabbing out or grabbing nurses as they’re turning her. Instead of the nurses stopping and thinking
how can we better interact with her, and how can we reassure her more, they’ve reached for a
behaviour chart. So now her behaviours are being documented – instead of actually stopping and
thinking about what can we do differently – let’s document the bad behaviour is their response.
I think, as a nurse leader, that’s what we’re conditioning our nurses to do.
Associate Director, case site C1 (119); transcription 6:45
In addition, some aspects of WalkRounds and the use of patient stories were found wanting. For some
respondents, WalkRounds were centred on ‘good news stories’ that lacked feedback and action at ward
level rather than providing a means for transparent and open discussions (transcriptions 6:46 to 6:49), and
ownership of the voice behind the patient story was a source of concern for others. However, overall the
1000 Lives+ programme’s ILQI was considered to be a catalyst for change (transcription 6:50).
In Wales, the NHS is characterised by a management style which is probably best described as pace
setting, so it tends to have a pace setting management style. And 1000 Lives+ and collaborative working
and engagement with the public and all of those sorts of things, is more about a coaching style. So for
me, it’s getting that right balance between targets setting a pace and underpinning it with something,
which then coaches people at the best way of how they can do those maturely, so it’s how we go about
bringing that together, which for me is the absolute challenge that we’ve got. And it seems very easy to
say that but when you think of the characteristics that you’re changing to do that, it’s immense.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 6:50
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1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: ILQI – local implementation of
the focal intervention and contribution to the I-CMAO
configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field
In this section, we seek to further our understanding of the local implementation of ILQI and define its
contribution to the 1000 Lives+ programmes’ I-CMAO configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field.
In case sites A–D, ILQI was targeted primarily at executive board-level actors. Hence this focal intervention
connected the infrastructural system of the Welsh Government and the Department of Health and Social
Care to NHS Wales’ health boards. Viewed at a high level of abstraction, as illustrated in Figure 17, the
institutional change inherent to formalisation, therefore, shaped the context of action for such actors.
The 1000 Lives+ and the MI-PDSA approach were embedded in Welsh Government tier 1 targets and
associated escalation framework. The ILQI, therefore, served to define expected performance across
the Welsh health-care field. Such bureaucratisation, through command and control of board-level
actors, signalled the legitimisation of the ILQI’s mandate. Board-level negotiation, formalisation and
co-optation of others promoted the deinstitutionalisation of redundant board practices and fostered
the preinstitutionalisation of mortality reviews, associated RAMI (see Tables 17–23), WalkRounds
and the use of patient stories at board level. Hence across each case site, with respect to the 1000 Lives+
programme and ILQI, the mandated context for all was comparable and overtly coercive.
In each health board, innovation emerged from the evidence-based learning arising from the MI-PDSA
approach. As clearly illustrated with respect to mortality reviews in transcriptions 6:10 and 6:11 (see
Director of medicine and associates), identification of problems and systematic failings, catalysed
knowledge mobilisation and the validation of extant clinical coding practices, thus promoting the broader
moral and pragmatic legitimisation of the newly normalised practice. In this manner, the actors involved
drew on the resources of the 1000 Lives+ programme, notably RAMI monitoring guidelines.
Tables 11–13 show, respectively, I-CMAO configurations illustrating the infrastructural system of the
Welsh Government, the institutional setting of NHS Wales and its constituent health boards and
interpersonal relationships within the institutional settings.
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Figure 17: key point summary
In Figure 17 we depict the implementation of the mortality review component of the ILQI focal intervention.
At point 1 we draw attention to the formalisation of this process in Welsh Government policy, thereby
mandating engagement by all health boards, typically under the strategic oversight of the medical director.
In point 2 structural constraint impacts at the level of the executive team, fostering the co-optation of other
medical leads and clinical coding staff, who are to operationalise the mortality review across the health board
together with its associated audit practices.
In point 3 mandated engagement drives the innovation cycle in the situated context, so that new practices for
measuring harm, morbidity and mortality emerge. This, therefore, functions as a fundamental stage in
organisational learning with respect to health-care quality and patient safety.
In point 4 we depict feedback to Welsh Government and public sector partner agencies as the implementation
and operationalisation of the mortality review component of the ILQI focal intervention gradually systematises
across NHS Wales.
In point 5 co-existent and countervailing logics are muted by structural constraint.
TABLE 11 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement I-CMAO configuration: infrastructural system –
Welsh Government
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component ILQI (centred on mortality review as an exemplar)
Context Welsh Government
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+, ILQI and
mortality review
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+,
ILQI and mortality review
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across policy and
professional domains
l Team work: policy leads and professional
engagement across aligned organisations
l Encultured values: centred on defining ILQI and
mortality review as mandated evidence-
based practices
l Decoupling limited by structural and
cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme, ILQI and mortality review institutionalised into policy processes
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:01 (T145) – Coupling
l 6:02 (T146) – Coupling
l 6:03 (T143) – Coupling
l 6:05 (T146) – Coupling
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TABLE 12 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales
and constituent health boards
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component ILQI (centred on mortality review as an exemplar)
Context NHS Wales/NHS Wales’ health boards
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+, ILQI and
mortality review
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+,
ILQI and mortality review
l Agency – negotiation under a situational logic
of protection
l Institutional work – creation/maintenance
l Leadership: board-level
l Team work: harnesses multiprofessional leadership
at board level to foster adoption of ILQI and
mortality review, in close liaison with and via
co-optation of sub-board leadership
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level
l Team work: dependent on relational structure of
three core board-level roles with oversight of
patient safety: directors of medicine, nursing,
therapies and health science
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level
l Team work: centred on relational structure across
director of medicine and associate roles
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to LWSQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level
l Team work: centred on relational structure across
director of medicine and associate roles
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national programme, ILQI
and mortality review approach embraced and
absorbed into extant management, internal
governance and audit processes
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
continued
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Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – negotiation under a situational logic
of protection
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:08 (T076) – Coupling
l 6:10 (T117) – Coupling
l 6:26 (T048) – Coupling
l 6:31 (T016) – Decoupling
l 6:34 (T116) – Coupling
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:04 (T051) – Coupling
l 6:07 (T078) – Coupling
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:08 (T076) – Coupling
l 6:16 (T093) – Coupling
l 6:22 (T030) – Coupling
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:07 (T078) – Coupling
l 6:09 (T117) – Coupling
l 6:11 (T042) – Coupling
l 6:13 (T116) – Coupling
l 6:17 (T034) – Decoupling
LWSQI, Leading the Ways to Safety and Quality Improvement.
TABLE 13 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting –
interpersonal relations
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component ILQI (centred on mortality review as an exemplar)
Context Hospital multisite department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – Coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+, ILQI and
mortality review
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+,
ILQI and mortality review
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level with mortality review
primarily distributed across medical profession
l Team work: centred on relational structure across
director of medicine and associate roles, with
input from clinical coding
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level with mortality review
primarily distributed across medical profession
l Team work: centred on relational structure across
director of medicine and associate roles
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level with mortality review
primarily distributed across medical profession
l Team work: centred on relational structure across
director of medicine and associate roles and wider
board-level input
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
TABLE 12 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales
and constituent health boards (continued)
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l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level with mortality review
primarily distributed across medical profession
l Team work: centred on relational structure across
director of medicine and associate roles and wider
board-level input
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: board level with mortality review
primarily distributed across medical profession
l Team work: centred on relational structure
bridging infrastructural system and director of
medicine roles
l Encultured values: mandated adherence to ILQI
and mortality review
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l Top-down mandated task centred on elite board-
level roles with limited scope of emancipation of
lower-level roles in management hierarchy
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national programme, ILQI
and mortality review approach embraced and
absorbed into daily practice
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:26 (T048) – Coupling
l 6:30 (T079) – Coupling
l 6:32 (T056) – Coupling
l 6:46 (T052) – Decoupling
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:14 (T146) – Coupling
l 6:36 (T050) – Coupling
l 6:37 (T046) – Coupling
l 6:39 (T022) – Coupling
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:18 (T118) – Coupling
l 6:20 (T009) – Coupling
l 6:24 (T044) – Decoupling
l 6:27 (T052) – Decoupling
l 6:33 (T039) – Decoupling
l 6:41 (T117) – Coupling
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l 6:45 (T119) – Coupling
l 6:48 (T069) – Coupling
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l 6:28 (T079) – Decoupling
l 6:29 (T025) – Coupling
l 6:43 (T145) – Decoupling
l 6:47 (T010) – Decoupling
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l 6:25 (T030) – Coupling
l 6:35 (T080) – Coupling
l 6:40 (T049s) – Coupling
TABLE 13 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting –
interpersonal relations (continued)
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Tables 14–20 illustrate the type of information about mortality rates in hospitals made publicly available as
part of the new emphasis on transparency in relation to patient safety.
We now turn to the findings of our realist analysis. For illustration, we focus only on the mortality review
component of the ILQI, and thus primarily on the generative mechanisms and ensuing agency attributed to
directors of medicine. Figure 17 and Table 21 support our discussion.
As signposted in Table 21, the bureaucratic sense of force majeure that drove engagement with ILQI gave
rise to aligned first-order emergents in board-level actors. This included compliance with task allocation
and appropriate action to ensure delivery in accordance with the dominant logic of the bureaucratic
state. Given the complementary linkages between systemic structural and cultural logics, this fostered
a situational logic of protection.229 In part, this was self-referential: board-level actors had to engage,
visibly, in the leadership of patient safety, so aiding the normalisation of such practices within the board.
The sociocultural interaction encouraged by board-level activity centred on strategic negotiation across
management tiers and professional networks. Driven by the board and honed through the 1000 Lives+
MI-PDSA approach, legitimisation, formalisation and co-optation ensued. This drove the innovation cycle,
as illustrated in Figure 17.
An objective outcome of ILQI was the normalisation of the three practices – mortality reviews, WalkRounds
and patient stories – examined in this chapter. The relational structure at each site had also evolved,
encouraging the diffusion of the ILQI, and thus the 1000 Lives+ programme, and promoting a culture of
organisational learning. However, cultural change was restricted by medical disengagement, notably
via challenge to the moral and pragmatic legitimacy of some components of the 1000 Lives+ programme,
the burden of documentation and weak feedback from boards to wards. We return to these issues in
Chapter 7, where we examine the implementation of our second focal intervention under far more
challenging constraints.
TABLE 14 Local implementation of ILQI: Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board RAMI
Reporting period Health board Morriston Singleton Neath Port Talbot Princess of Wales
January 2011 to December 2011 122 115 122 123 125
February 2011 to January 2012 119 112 121 118 120
March 2011 to February 2012 115 109 117 119 115
April 2011 to March 2012 114 109 117 117 112
May 2011 to April 2012 113 107 112 120 112
June 2011 to May 2012 110 103 109 117 111
July 2011 to June 2012 109 102 107 113 111
August 2011 to July 2012 109 101 106 113 112
September 2011 to August 2012 107 100 106 112 114
October 2011 to September 2012 108 102 101 109 112
November 2011 to October 2012 105 100 100 107 112
December 2011 to November 2012 105 99 100 106 111
January 2012 to December 2012 104 98 102 109 109
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
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TABLE 16 Local implementation of ILQI: Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board RAMI
Reporting period Health board Gwynedd Glan Glwyd Wrexham
January 2011 to December 2011 114 103 101 126
February 2011 to January 2012 112 101 99 124
March 2011 to February 2012 111 97 98 123
April 2011 to March 2012 109 95 98 124
May 2011 to April 2012 108 95 98 122
June 2011 to May 2012 107 94 97 119
July 2011 to June 2012 108 96 97 119
August 2011 to July 2012 107 95 98 118
September 2011 to August 2012 107 97 98 116
October 2011 to September 2012 108 97 99 115
November 2011 to October 2012 107 98 99 115
December 2011 to November 2012 107 100 99 115
January 2012 to December 2012 107 101 99 113
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
TABLE 15 Local implementation of ILQI: Aneurin Bevan University Health Board RAMI
Reporting period Health board Royal Gwent Neville Hall Ystrad Fawr
January 2011 to December 2011 107 111 97 83
February 2011 to January 2012 107 111 97 105
March 2011 to February 2012 107 113 93 116
April 2011 to March 2012 107 115 91 101
May 2011 to April 2012 108 119 89 98
June 2011 to May 2012 107 118 87 99
July 2011 to June 2012 106 116 88 100
August 2011 to July 2012 106 117 87 96
September 2011 to August 2012 107 118 86 96
October 2011 to September 2012 106 117 86 92
November 2011 to October 2012 106 117 86 90
December 2011 to November 2012 106 118 87 93
January 2012 to December 2012 108 120 88 99
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
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TABLE 18 Local implementation of ILQI: Cwm Taf University Health Board RAMI
Reporting period Health board Royal Glamorgan Prince Charles
January 2011 to December 2011 115 123 99
February 2011 to January 2012 114 121 98
March 2011 to February 2012 113 119 97
April 2011 to March 2012 113 120 97
May 2011 to April 2012 111 116 95
June 2011 to May 2012 111 115 94
July 2011 to June 2012 111 114 95
August 2011 to July 2012 117 113 98
September 2011 to August 2012 112 111 100
October 2011 to September 2012 113 112 100
November 2011 to October 2012 113 112 100
December 2011 to November 2012 114 114 99
January 2012 to December 2012 112 114 96
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
TABLE 17 Local implementation of ILQI: Cardiff and Vale University Health Board RAMI
Reporting period Health board Wales LLandough
January 2011 to December 2011 99 104 85
February 2011 to January 2012 99 105 85
March 2011 to February 2012 100 106 86
April 2011 to March 2012 100 107 84
May 2011 to April 2012 101 108 83
June 2011 to May 2012 99 107 81
July 2011 to June 2012 99 105 81
August 2011 to July 2012 99 105 81
September 2011 to August 2012 97 103 81
October 2011 to September 2012 98 102 84
November 2011 to October 2012 98 102 83
December 2011 to November 2012 97 101 83
January 2012 to December 2012 97 99 85
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
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TABLE 20 Local implementation of ILQI: Powys (Teaching) Health Board RAMI
Hospital site Discharges, n Deaths, n Mortality, %
Brecon 460 35 7.61
Bronllys 337 36 10.68
Ystradgynlais 242 23 9.50
Knighton 200 17 8.50
Llandrindod Wells 396 40 10.10
Machynlleth 153 19 12.42
Llanidloes 230 32 13.91
Newtown 230 10 4.35
Welshpool 264 30 11.36
Powys (Teaching) Health Board offers a specialist but more restricted range of services and therefore does not participate in
the RAMI scheme owing to the tendency to produce inaccurate RAMI scores.
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
TABLE 19 Local implementation of ILQI: Hywel Dda University Health Board RAMI
Reporting period Health board Bronglais Glangwili Prince Philip Withybush
January 2011 to December 2011 100 101 100 97 103
February 2011 to January 2012 99 97 98 95 104
March 2011 to February 2012 97 98 96 94 101
April 2011 to March 2012 96 97 94 92 100
May 2011 to April 2012 97 100 96 91 101
June 2011 to May 2012 96 98 95 92 99
July 2011 to June 2012 96 99 94 92 98
August 2011 to July 2012 95 99 94 91 98
September 2011 to August 2012 94 98 93 90 97
October 2011 to September 2012 94 95 95 89 97
November 2011 to October 2012 92 92 94 87 95
December 2011 to November 2012 91 90 94 84 93
January 2012 to December 2012 92 90 97 85 91
RAMI data accessed via http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/publications/health/reports/mortality/?lang=en.
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TABLE 21 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement: realist analysis – signposting how the empirical data
connect to I-CMAO
Intervention Leading the Ways to Safety and Quality Improvement (ILQI)
Component Mortality review
Context Structural conditioning of the institutional setting: NHS Wales health
boards’ executive-level implementation of 1000 Lives+ national programme
Structural emergent properties l Structural constraints and enablements shaped by the bureaucratic
processes of formalisation emergent from the infrastructural system of
the Department of Health and Social Care impact 1000 Lives+ and ILQI
l Structural resilience was derived from the mutually reinforcing presence
of necessary, internal and complementary linkages between systemic
structures, e.g. the mandated bureaucratic performance management
systems and associated 1000 Lives+ and ILQI goals, notably
mortality measurement
l Structural resilience also emerged from the tripartite interlock and
solidarity between directors of medicine, nursing, and therapies and
health sciences, as collective champions of, and advocates for,
1000 Lives+ and the broader patient safety agenda
Cultural emergent properties l Cultural constraints, attributed to the Francis Report, impact on the
directors of medicine, nursing, therapies and health science who have
delegated strategic oversight of patient safety, and thus 1000 Lives+
and ILQI
Social actors l Directors of medicine: the focal intervention, ILQI-mortality review is
targeted to board-level actors but is primarily addressed by directors
of medicine
Social position l Elite power role with high social position, professional standing and
widespread networks
Role-position practices l Professional role-position practices encompass organisation wide
management and, specifically, professional leadership of medical staff.
They therefore permeate across the health boards’ hospital site-based
wards or multisite departments, through to the level of the functional
team and individual doctor
Mechanism Mediation of structural conditioning to core actors and their reflexive
theorisation
Institutional logics and nature of alignment
between core actors
The institutionalisation of 1000 Lives+ and ILQI draws professional logic into
alignment with that of the bureaucratic state. Moreover, there is
coalescence and cohesion across medical, nursing, allied professional
and health-care management logics, thereby placing each into a
complementary stance. This fosters the systematisation of 1000 Lives+ and
ILQI across the cultural system level of NHS Wales, and promotes the
reproduction of such practices across each health board
First-order emergents The vested interests of directors of medicine and their associates, tasked
with the strategic oversight of the 1000 Lives+ programme and ILQI, lay
primarily in the successful development of a systematic locally agreed
approach to undertaking the mortality review in the aftermath of the
structural reconfiguration of NHS Wales
Second-order emergents Necessary complementarities
Situational logic Protection
Reflexive theorisation Complementarity between the dominant logic of the bureaucratic state,
professional (medical) logic and collaborative logic fosters coherence,
cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring. This results in the
discernment of issues, deliberation of their importance and dedication of
ensuing agency in alignment to the goals of the ILQI
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Summary
In Chapter 6, we examined the local implementation of the focal intervention ILQI and discussed its
contribution to the 1000 Lives+ programmes’ I-CMAO configuration across the Welsh health-care field.
TABLE 21 Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement: realist analysis – signposting how the empirical data
connect to I-CMAO (continued )
Agency and institutional work Agency, the unfolding strategic negotiation of change, and the mode of
institutional work enacted
Agential emergent properties Given the high status of such actors, the inherent change agenda
overarching the 1000 Lives+ programme, and thus the ILQI, was executed
from a position of considerable negotiating strength
Strategic negotiation l Power-induced compliance and
political sanction
l Exemplar transcriptions: 6:10,
6:11, 6:14, 6:41
l Reciprocal exchange and
harmonisation of desires
l Exemplar transcriptions: 6:07,
6:09, 6:12, 6:39
Institutional work Primarily creative and augmented by actions which maintain relevant
associated practices
Outcome Social elaboration, reproduction or invariance
Structural Integration of mortality reviews into the Welsh Government’s performance
management framework was viewed to have added an important ‘critical
lens’ through which to view patient safety and the maturation of the
health-care quality agenda in NHS wales amid organisational
reconfiguration
Cultural Cultural change was viewed to be far more fragmented
Agential A network of patient safety leaders, health-care professionals from
managerial, medical, nursing and other allied groups, evolved
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Chapter 7 Reducing Surgical Complications
Overview
In this chapter we examine RSC, the second focal intervention drawn from the 1000 Lives+ national
programme. Our focus is explicitly directed to one strand of this complex intervention: the WHOSSC. To
begin, we set out a brief overview of RSC, defining its multicomponent structure, aim and drivers. This we
augment with a review of the WHOSSC, highlighting its emergence, acknowledged benefits and the
perceived barriers that impede its normalisation into daily practice.
Second, we undertake a realist analysis of the institutionalisation of RSC and the WHOSSC, through a
comparative case study of sites A, B, C and D. In doing so, we explain the structural conditioning, sociocultural
interaction and structural elaboration or reproduction fostered through the actions of three groups of key
actors: theatre managers, consultant surgeons and anaesthetists, and theatre nurses. We concentrate on these
groups as they were formally tasked with the implementation of the RSC within the 1000 Lives+ programme.
Again, to aid our understanding of context and mechanism, we also consider the perspectives of policy leads
and other senior health-care management staff. Finally, informed by the findings of our realist analysis we set
out our understanding of the RSC-WHOSSC I-CMAO configuration.
Focal intervention, aim and drivers
Reducing Surgical Complications aims to support theatre department staff to deliver high-quality, safe and
effective care for adult patients undergoing surgical procedures in a hospital setting. As illustrated in Figure 18,
RSC is composed of four interventions to reduce the number of infections after surgery, two interventions to
improve teamwork and three to facilitate patient involvement in their care. In this study, attention focused
on the WHOSSC,531 a tool for clinical teams to improve the safety of surgery by reducing deaths and
complications.
World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist
The WHOSSC evolved from the Safe Surgery Saves Lives initiative, established by the World Alliance for
Patient Safety as part of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) efforts to reduce the number of surgical
deaths across the world. This initiative sought to harness political commitment and clinical will to address
important safety issues. The principal concerns were poor communication among team members;
inadequate surgical and anaesthetic safety practices; and avoidable surgical infection.531
As illustrated in Figure 19, the WHOSSC is characterised by simplicity and brevity, and is composed of a
series of questions to guide the co-ordinated actions of the theatre team. Notably, many of the individual
steps advocated are accepted as routine practice. But, as expanded below, such acceptance does not
reduce the barriers to its collective adoption.531 It is, therefore, acknowledged that to foster engagement
and enhance compliance,532 each theatre team must adapt the WHOSSC to their needs and routine
operative workflow and to address many different types of surgery.533–545
With increasing acceptance of the WHOSSC,546 aligned approaches have been adapted to address broader
surgical issues and hazards.547–550 There have also been more subtle changes such as the adjustment of
the timing of questions likely to cause anxiety to patients.173
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FIGURE 18 Driver diagram: RSC.
Figure 18: key point summary
Figure 18 depicts the driver diagram for the focal intervention, RSC, focusing specifically on one strand of this
multicomponent intervention, the WHOSSC. To aid our understanding of the interplay of context and
mechanism in the operationalisation of this intervention, we sought the perspectives of theatre managers,
consultant surgeons and anaesthetists, and theatre nurses, each tasked with the implementation of the RSC
and WHOSSC under the auspices of the 1000 Lives+ national programme.
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Since its inception, the WHOSSC has proved to be a robust means of reducing perioperative
complications.70,406,551,552 Empirical research supports assertions that the WHOSSC (i) saves lives;553–557
(ii) improves communication across the surgical team;558 (iii) reduces the occurrence of wrong-site surgery;63
(iv) promotes adherence to defined antibiotic protocols, thereby reducing the incidence of surgical-site
infection;559–561 and (v) fosters more efficient use of theatre time and resources,556 while supporting
appropriate staffing levels.439
Despite such obvious benefits, operationalisation of the WHOSSC may be poor.70,190,562–564 Failures to follow
the checklist include not identifying the patient; undertaking a wrong-site surgery or procedure;565 and
failing to identify staff members.123,566 In addition, pressure of time may lead to surgical procedures being
started before the checklist is completed.567–569 Failure to complete sign out is another common
deviation.122 Poor engagement by anaesthetists,71 surgeons570 and nursing staff due to resistance and gaps
in knowledge has also been reported.435,543,571
Realist analysis and comparative case study
We now undertake a critical realist analysis of the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ national
programme’s RSC and WHOSSC. Again, our case study considered sites A, B, C and D. Our analysis
focuses on three groups of key actors, theatre managers, consultant surgeons and anaesthetists, and
theatre nurses, tasked with the implementation of the RSC under the auspices of the 1000 Lives+
national programme.
FIGURE 19 The WHOSSC. Source: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241598590_eng_Checklist.pdf.
Reproduced with permission.
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First, we consider the focal intervention in context and explore the dominant structural and cultural
emergent properties impacting key personnel in the theatre departments at each case site. Next,
to reveal the generative mechanisms in play, we examine mediation via first- and second-order
emergents and the resultant situational logic. Then, to examine the initiation of change, we explore
the unfolding strategic negotiation of change and the mode of institutional work enacted. Finally,
we reflect on the nature of any sustained outcome, be that elaborative or reproductive, that occurred
following the implementation of the RSC and WHOSSC. This analysis forms the foundation of our
refinement of the I-CMAO configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field in 1000 Lives+
institutionalisation: RSC – local implementation of the focal intervention and contribution to the I-CMAO
configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field.
Structural conditioning: structural and cultural emergent properties in the
Welsh health-care field
Completing the WHOSSC surgical checklist was a compulsory element of the overarching policy mandate
of the 1000 Lives+ national programme (transcription 7:01, below).
1000 Lives+– well, it’s not rocket science by any stretch of the imagination – it’s an incredibly simple
approach and that is one of the reasons why it works. The PDSA cycles and all of that stuff it’s created
a language that they like: it’s language that they all understand. The WHO checklist just adds
another element to it, which is recognised world-wide. It’s mandated as a practice – in policy and
professionally – so they’ve just got to do it. After all it saves lives, we know it saves lives.
Policy lead, Welsh Government (146); transcription 7:01
In addition, the WHOSSC was strongly advocated by the WHO, the IHI and the array of associated medical
professional Royal Colleges, placing the dominant logic of the bureaucratic state into close alignment with
that of professional medical logic within the theatre environment (transcription 7:02, below).
The WHO checklist – it’s compulsory – so it was a little bit more straightforward because, at the end
of the day, if people didn’t comply then they were in breach of contract with their controlling body.
So that was it, essentially.
Consultant surgeon, case site D1 (083); transcription 7:02
Such structural constraint was amplified by a parallel programme, Transforming Theatres, representing a
Welsh adaptation of the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement’s Productive Series, The Productive
Ward and The Productive Operating Theatre (transcription 7:03).
The dominant cultural emergent properties, which moulded the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ RSC
and WHOSSC, arose from the institutional system of the theatre departments in case sites A–D. First, such
theatre departments were perceived to function in relative isolation within the base hospital and parent
health board (transcription 7:04, below).
Theatre attracts extroverts – you wouldn’t work here if you didn’t have thick skin and couldn’t
deal with some of the issues that we have to deal with – but they feel quite isolated from the
organisational agenda in a way. Theatre is its own little world. There isn’t that link between the
theatre and the rest of the wards, and the larger organisation. But there is a link across the different
operating theatres in the health board even though they are all different.
Theatre manager, case site A1 (008); transcription 7:04
The perception of a distinctive functional and professional culture underscored this sense of separation
(transcription 7:05) and this second cultural emergent property fostered the potential for conflict. Across
each case site, the traditional view that the surgeon was in charge still lingered. This created a schism: a
managerial logic aligned to the nursing profession versus a counterpoised stance aligned to surgeons and
their medical colleagues. This tension was not a key issue at all case sites. However, such institutionalised
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professional role-positions arose as a perceptible fault-line throughout many discussions (transcription
7:06, below).
In theatre, traditionally, the surgeon was the captain of their ship – they ran the show and all the rest
of it – and people just did their bidding. But today that’s completely the wrong way round! That’s
completely not what modern surgery’s about because you’re only as good as your parts. Now a lot of
people won’t believe that still! So if you’re trying to get people to implement the WHO checklist and
yet they believe that everything depends on them performing correctly and that they don’t make
errors [laughs] then it’s a very difficult task! You’re far more likely to engage with people that actually
are slightly less self-assured because they understand there may be a better way to improve the care
of the patients. So my gambit with some of my colleagues was to say: ‘I’m not as perfect as you – but
do you know your error rate? Are you perfect? Are you one in a million perfect? And if it is that one
in a million then what are you going to do to improve’– but people have to accept there’s a problem
before they’ll look for a solution. I think they have to see that it’s a problem before they’ll change
their practice.
Consultant surgeon, case site A1 (063); transcription 7:06
Such cultural constraints highlight the critical role of agential emergent properties. Most notably these
include leadership and orchestrated collective action within the multidisciplinary theatre team to address
perceived problems (transcription 7:07, below).
There was a surgeon I worked with – an orthopaedic surgeon – who I really respected. One day,
because I’d just been on a course and knew the proper way of doing the procedure he was going to
do, I realised he was going to use the wrong approach. Basically, he was going to go in from the
other side of the leg. I knew he was wrong, so I told his registrar, because I couldn’t tell him. The
registrar knew he was wrong, and he couldn’t tell him. That’s the example I always use with theatre
clinicians: ‘if the most senior consultant was just about to stick a knife into someone, and the most
junior member of the department walked in and said – excuse me, stop – what would be the
response?’ Would the response be: ‘OK, what have you got to say?’ or would it be ‘get the hell
out of my theatre’ with somebody throwing something at him? That usually raises a smile, and once
you start talking about it, they realise that the teams that they think were good teams are actually
not. Getting back to my example, I said to him in the end: ‘Mr [Name], so you’re using the medial
approach today, are you?’, and it was as if somebody switched a switch on in his brain. You could see
him almost like come awake and go: ‘no, I think I will go in laterally’. But he couldn’t say to me, you
know: ‘thanks for that, I was going to make a mistake’ – we both had to play the game – this whole
thing about hierarchies!
1000 Lives+ national programme team member (041); transcription 7:07
Consideration of the underlying contextual strata at the interpersonal and individual levels further reveals
the impact of this cultural fault-line and exposes the deeply held belief systems anchored to such
discordant professional logics. Different cultural stances could lead some individuals to pay little attention
to the RSC and WHOSSC. For instance, it was reported that some consultant surgeons did not believe the
WHOSSC to be necessary and, thus, viewed it as little more than a management weapon to exert control
(transcriptions 7:08 and 7:09). As succinctly expressed in an excerpt from transcription 7:10, below, the
institutionalisation of the WHOSSC was dependent on flattening the professional role-based hierarchy in
the theatre department.
Our theory on it is if people get the briefings right – where they develop a real team by flattening the
hierarchy – and there’s respect for everyone in the theatre, the whole checklist sails through! People
start to understand – they’re not worried about challenging a surgeon – they see the value of it!
1000 Lives+ national programme team member (041); transcription 7:10
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
113
First-order emergents for key actors central to the institutionalisation of the
World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist
A distinctive set of structural and cultural emergent properties shaped the context in which individuals who
were central to the institutionalisation of the WHOSSC found themselves and conditioned their ensuing
actions. Deeply entrenched professional role-positions orchestrated the operation of the theatre
departments, and we asked theatre managers, consultant surgeons and anaesthetists, and theatre nurses
to reflect on their placement, their vested interests and the perceived opportunity costs associated with
various courses of action to determine how this shaped their activities.
Theatre managers
In case sites A–D, theatre managers’ placement shaped their vested interests towards ensuring the
successful implementation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme’s RSC and WHOSSC initiatives. They
operated under a professional logic aligned to health-care management and, for hybrid professional staff,
the nursing profession. Given the need to succeed, their activity centred on the brokerage of support
resource to leverage the RSC and WHOSSC via the emotions of pride and shame. To achieve this they
drew on the core resources of the 1000 Lives+ programme’s team, the MI-PDSA approach and the aligned
Transforming Theatre team (transcriptions 7:11 and 7:12, below, and transcription 7:14).
We did have problems with the WHO checklist but they were picked up by 1000 Lives+ team, and they
were followed through via the Transforming Theatre Team. They did their own audits and glitch lists.
They’d go to each and every health and safety briefing and they would name and shame – which
theatre was doing well, which ones weren’t; which surgeons were turning up, which ones weren’t –
that caused huge amounts of conversation! But I think you can say it was nothing but positive
because, even when they were arguing, they did start improving because they did not like seeing their
poor results. That really helped get our WHO checklist and safety briefings on track. So we used both
1000 Lives+ and Transforming Theatre.
Theatre manager, case site A1 (008); transcription 7:11
To begin with we had difficulty with the PDSA approach. Yes, we had difficulty with that! We had
difficulty in getting our heads around it – we thought we’d mastered it but we hadn’t – but we did
eventually get through it! We worked with the 1000 Lives+ team and the Transforming Theatre team
and looked at what we could improve. With the PDSA, well, we didn’t understand it very well: we
couldn’t get our heads around it! At times we thought we’d mastered it but then they’d say: ‘no,
that’s not right’, and we thought: ‘oh God, you know, somebody please give us a simple explanation
so we can just get it right’. We’d sort of grasped it but we were trying to do it in sort of one hit and
not doing small things – small rapid cycles of change – and then sort of escalating it gradually.
Theatre manager, case site B1 (005); transcription 7:12
Consultant surgeons and anaesthetists
The behaviour of the consultant surgeons and anaesthetists interviewed during our study was markedly
influenced by the nature of their engagement with the 1000 Lives+ national programme. For those who
were simply participants, lacking the burden of professional and managerial accountability for the
programme’s implementation, the RSC and WHOSSC were viewed with a degree of disdain. In case site A,
surgeons were perceived to be in a position of security, given NHS Wales’ assumed reluctance to ‘play
heavy handed’. In response, surgeons tended to ignore the medical director’s efforts at control
(transcription 7:15, below).
If you want to play heavy handed then what you need to do is – which is what they’ve done in many
trusts in England – is they sack people. It happens, that’s what NHS England does. But we don’t do
that in Wales. Surgeons are in a position where we have security and the stick that the medical
director can wield is just not big enough.
Consultant surgeon, case site A1 (063); transcription 7:15
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Such disengagement rendered the implementation of the RSC and WHOSSC into ‘quite an interesting
shambles’, with senior medical professionals deciding to ignore the initiative (transcription 7:16, below).
Thus actors’ vested interests lay in maintaining their professional role-positional power, as there appeared
to be no sanctions associated with their disengagement. The dominant logic of the bureaucratic state
and aligned professional health-care management logic were, therefore, countervailed by professional
medical logic.
One surgeon didn’t want to play, he thought: ‘why should I introduce myself to the anaesthetist?
I’m busy writing up my previous case, so I’m not going to. . .’ Also, the WHO checklist was all done,
sort of, at the wrong time – you know, the end of the case bit, well it was done sort of retrospectively
rather than live! [Laughs] It was all quite an interesting shambles actually. The senior people decided
that they were above it all basically.
Consultant anaesthetist, case site A1 (064); transcription 7:16
In contrast, in case site B, the theatre manager was able to broker wider medical participation through
effective leadership of the implementation (transcription 7:17, below).
We have a really proactive Theatre manager, who is really good at working with the doctors and
surgeons, so I think the WHO checklist was a breeze! I am assured that it is fully implemented because
I have spot-checked them. I spoke to [Name, Theatre manager] when I first came into the organisation
and I saw that we were 100% compliant. So, yeah, we seem to be rocking with the WHO checklist!
Consultant surgeon, case site B1 (062); transcription 7:17
However, this overtly positive perspective was diluted by a respondent who pointed out that, despite
apparent use of WHOSSC, mistakes had not been entirely eliminated, and suggested that not everyone at
site B was enthusiastic about the initiative (transcription 7:18, below).
I gather, here, it’s got its enthusiasts and it’s got its detractors. But across NHS Wales we’ve had
disasters even with the checklist being used: wrong site surgery, instruments left in, etcetera.
[Even though the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist is being used?] Yes! In other words it’s not being
used properly. It will never cure all problems but you do wonder whether it’s being used properly or
whether people just pretend it’s being used.
Consultant anaesthetist, case site B1 (059); transcription 7:18
In contrast, for those chosen and tasked with the implementation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme,
the RSC and the WHOSSC met with approval. In case sites C and D, such actors’ vested interests lay in
brokering participation with the WHOSSC with their professional colleagues to ensure that the checklist
did not merely function as a ‘tick-box exercise’. Their agency was directed to managing the tension
promoted by the countervailing stance of professional medical logic (transcriptions 7:19 and 7:20, below).
When I first started in the health board, I got asked to assist with the implementation of the WHO
checklist. I think – I’m not quite sure if I had an official title as such – but I was responsible for some of
the surgical aspects. [Did you encounter any resistance towards the WHO checklist?] Ah yes . . . [Long
pause] . . . that was an old chestnut, we had to deal with it at the time. I think with a lot of these
projects where people are looking to try and implement change the difficulty is the people who
volunteer to do them, of course, they’re the believers! And the people who don’t volunteer are not
the believers. So, there’s always a sort of a clash of culture, I guess, between the two. But clinicians
like to see themselves as being very independent. Surgeons probably more than most! They have a
certain arrogance and belief in themselves that they need in order to survive their day-to-day job. So,
yes, you’re right, there were a lot of, I don’t know, issues. There were lots of little teething problems.
One of which was how you actually record that you’ve done it!
Consultant surgeon, case site D1 (083); transcription 7:20
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This contested terrain is expressed in transcription 7:21, below. It reveals that other facets of the RSC,
essentially the easy, less controversial ones that did not impugn surgical ability, were adopted first as
readily achievable ‘quick wins’.
When you think about the WHO checklist . . . [long pause] . . . Well you can understand why theatre
nurses are going to choose to do normothermia! [Another component of the 1000 Lives+ RSC
intervention] It’s simple! You take a temperature, you make sure they’re kept warm – the intervention
is easy and there’s no controversy – everyone knows normothermia is good; everyone knows good
glycaemic control matters. Safe hair removal, it’s fine, we just ban razors and go to clippers! We just
stop procuring them, problem sorted. Done! So in some of the RSC interventions, all of those people
are able to go: ‘look, we are a success, and we’ve done it quickly’. So they’ve had the quick win. But
the message is people choose the path of least resistance. The WHO checklist is more complex and so
it’s harder to achieve.
Medical Director, case site D1 (117); transcription 7:21
Theatre nurses
Theatre nurses in case sites A–D, though their vested interests were aligned to the implementation of the
RSC and the WHOSSC, varied in their perception of the degree to which their roles allowed them freedom
to act according to its precepts. In case site A, engagement of all staff was promoted by a surgical
consultant who, from personal experience of a surgical ‘never event’, was committed to the WHOSSC.
However, others who showed only ambivalent adherence diluted such clear strategic surgical leadership
(transcription 7:22, below).
We have one surgeon who was doing the WHO checklist before it was even implemented here – they
had their own sort of version of it – and that because . . . [long pause] . . . they had had an incident
happen, I think it was here, a wrong site surgery. From that moment on, they now make sure that
everybody stops, everybody agrees, so that they get it right. They’re the biggest convert! But most of
them are ambivalent about it and just realise that they’ve got to do it.
Theatre nurse, case site A1 (024); transcription 7:22
Theatre nurses in case site B, however, perceived that their role in the implementation of the RSC and
especially of the WHOSSC was facilitated by the professional role-position of scrub nurse. The expertise
and knowledge enacted through this role-position helped to level the entrenched professional hierarchy
of the theatre department, particularly for surgeons in training, ensuring that they ‘learn to listen’
(transcription 7:23). This empowered and emancipated stance set the strategic direction for other theatre
nurses to follow, aiding the normalisation of the WHOSSC in daily practice.
In case site C, rudimentary contextual constraints, such as a surgeon’s family commitments preventing his
attendance at the eight o’clock briefing, posed formidable barriers to engagement which nurses lacked the
role-positional means to counter (transcription 7:24), while in case site D, the placement of one theatre
nurse tasked with the implementation of the RSC and WHOSSC was devoid of resource support and
expertise. This rendered the nurse ill equipped and isolated, limiting the extent to which she was able to
promote the implementation (transcription 7:25, below).
I was seconded, part-time, to theatres. From my perspective, I was brought in late. It [1000 Lives+ RSC
focal intervention] had already started, and the staff, which were heading it up for [name, health
board], had already gone and had their briefing session. So I felt I was brought in blind. I didn’t really
understand it at the start to be honest. But we were given drivers of things that we needed to
address – improvements that we needed to achieve; change in practice and audit really – and told to
gather data to see if we were meeting the drivers and the standards. It was my job to tell the staff
about what the standards and the drivers were, and how we were going to identify how we were
going to change practice in line with what they were saying we needed to do. I had to gather all the
data, put it into a graph, and then present that on a monthly basis. But I was isolated. I did the PDSA
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cycles – I tried to involve people, I tried my hardest, I even had champions – but I was doing the PDSA
cycles, writing them up, because they wanted written evidence that they were being done. It’s
embarrassing when you’re presenting data that you haven’t got – so I was doing it to make sure I had
data to present – so that I wasn’t going to be standing there saying: ‘well sorry, I haven’t got anything’.
When theatre staff are working clinically they’ve got the pressure of patients coming through – and
they come first – this is [WHO checklist] just a bit of paper that doesn’t do anything.
Theatre nurse, case site D1 (028); transcription 7:25
Second-order emergents and situational logic
In case sites A–D, the interplay of structural, cultural and agential emergent properties impacted on the
three groups of actors central to the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme, the RSC
and the WHOSSC, enabling or frustrating the position they adopted and their role in implementation.
Where structure was concerned, the RSC and WHOSSC emerged into a context moulded by internal and
necessary linkages that reflected both complementarities and contradictions. However, as illustrated
in the transcriptions above, culturally there was deep discord as the key actors were confronted by the
constraining contradictions (necessary incompatibilities) between the dominant logic of the bureaucratic
state with its aligned professional health-care management logic versus that of professional medical logic.
This led to development of a situational logic of correction/compromise, where those tasked with
the implementation of the WHOSSC confronted a context fraught with the power play of different
professional groups and had to act in a manner that sought to ameliorate this sociocultural constraint.
Sociocultural interaction: agency and strategic negotiation
At each case site, the situational logic of correction/compromise motivated an essentially concessionary
negotiating stance among the key actors. Below, we elaborate two features in depth to highlight this
complex interplay across multiple case sites.
Power-induced compliance and political sanction
To examine the adoption of power-induced compliance and political sanction under a situational logic of
correction/compromise, we considered individual actors’ strategic negotiating stances across each case site.
In transcription 7:26, below, the medical director admitted using reference to the Mid Staffordshire scandal
and threats of losing their jobs to coerce colleagues into compliance with new practices.
With 1000 Lives+, the WHO checklist, whatever, resistance to that sort of change has to be managed
in an open and transparent way, and it has to be managed in terms of saying a number of things –
different drivers – if you like.
I haven’t yet used the F word, but we’ll use it now – Francis [Report of the public inquiry into Mid
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust] – Francis will act as an important driver. Francis is ground
breaking. So, I will use Francis, as a lever, to say: ‘If you are not. . .’. But revalidation is another
important lever; so we’ve got two levers. The third is: ‘Well, the Welsh Government expects this of
you. . .’, and I don’t like using that as a lever but why not chuck it in! [It causes more resistance. . .]
Yes, it does.
But where I need to get to as a medical director is to have a culture where I go to a consultant and
say: ‘Oh dear, I hear your complication rates are a bit high’, to which I get an open answer in which
they say: ‘Yes they are, and do you know what, I’m doing an audit to check whether . . .’, as opposed
to ‘No, I’m fine’. So, I think, that we want to develop is that candour culture that Francis wants.
With revalidation everybody has to reflect now – I’ve just revalidated all the medical directors, so I’m
reflected out! – but now you have to reflect on everything! This is good; but they’re going to have to
do that. So, now, if they say to me: ‘No, everything’s fine’, then they won’t revalidate.
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So that is how I will be moving forward, in terms of driving openness and transparency, and saying:
‘You have no choice but to engage in this because otherwise those mechanisms will see to it that you
are removed’.
Medical director, case site D1 (117); transcription 7:26
However, some argued that such compliance was only token, with checklists being completed casually and
inaccurately (transcriptions 7:27 and 7:28, below).
The WHO checklist should be 100% compliant: end of story! But drilling down through our data for
that in more detail revealed problems. We do the safety briefings but what we were finding was it
was a tick-box exercise – they were being done – but they were being done without the presence of
the key members of the team, such as the consultant; they were being done a little bit flippantly, not
necessarily with the real information that we needed for patients on the list; there were assumptions.
They were very much nurse-led. . . [Long pause]. Look, I’m not confident that the data is accurate.
I couldn’t actually find evidence as to who was not doing it but whether or not it’s 100% reliable I’m
not sure. But the trend that we’re setting is that we’re 98–100% compliant.
Theatre manager, case site A1 (008); transcription 7:27
I get the monthly reports from the computer system on the checklist compliance and it’s always about
99 something per cent! I don’t suppose that’s true for a moment because people are just ticking the
box on the computer. [You don’t think that’s a representative value?] No, I don’t believe it: 99% every
month, no way! My problem with all this is it’s quantitative data being collected about a qualitative
process. Take the incident that happened back last year. Somebody sat there in front of me, after it
had all happened, and said: ‘well, I did do the checklist’, and I said: ‘well, how do you account for the
fact that they nearly did the wrong operation?’, ‘I don’t know, perhaps the surgeon didn’t hear me’.
So they ticked the boxes on the checklist but they didn’t do the checklist if you know what I mean.
Theatre nurse, case site D1 (029); transcription 7:28
Observation of practice revealed computer-based systems that recorded completion of the WHOSSC via a
simple yes-or-no option with progress through subsequent screens being prohibited by a no response, thus
completely negating the purpose of the checklist and decoupling it from the physical enactment of the
WHOSSC. Thus, under a situational logic of correction/compromise, the contested institutionalisation of
the WHOSSC corrupted and was decoupled from meaningful governance processes. However, such
subversions of the purpose of the checklist were felt likely to be exposed by growing public awareness of
the WHOSSC, and the possibility of subsequent legal challenge in the face of surgical adverse or never
event was perceived to be a latent generative mechanism for change and one that would be a ‘very, very
quick way to get it up to speed’ (transcription 7:29).
Reciprocal exchange and harmonisation of desires
In case site B, the actions of the nurse theatre manager in ensuring that the WHOSCC was completed
facilitated detailed examination of the use of strategic negotiation via reciprocal exchange and resource
control. In this context, the manner of negotiation that held sway bordered on the coercive and the
bureaucratic policy mandate for the RSC and the WHOSSC was employed to manifest effect. The role
of nurse empowerment, in aiding normalisation, was also evident, with the manager and other nursing
staff having sufficient confidence to insist that the checklist was completed. This illustrated both coherence
of purpose and commitment to the WHOSSC as a practice (transcription 7:30, below).
[How did you get surgeons to participate in the WHO checklist?] Well, they didn’t have a choice!
[Laughs] Don’t tape that! We said to them: ‘you know, we’ve got to do the WHO checklist’ – it is a
mandatory patient safety check – ’so we haven’t got a choice, you’ve got to be part of it, and we’ll do
it with the patient, and you, in here [Theatre], so you’re going to have to listen’. Basically, we came
to an agreement with the surgeons. We agreed that the scrub nurse would not start helping the
surgeon until the WHO checklist was completed. So they had to be part of it! In the end, I think, they
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came to the conclusion that they hadn’t a choice really. It was a bit of a battle at the very beginning
because they started arguing with us, and we just said: ‘no, we don’t want to argue about this,
we haven’t got a choice, we’ve got to do it’. We took the same approach with visiting consultants.
[How did you manage them?] Well, actually, that was the easy bit. What I said was: ‘if you’re doing it
in the [name, alternative hospital theatre site in health board], well then it doesn’t bother you to do
it here, does it?’
Theatre manager, case site B1 (005); transcription 7:30
Such processes were enabled by the dominance of the professional role-position of theatre manager,
manifesting through their long-honed expertise and social capital within the relational structure of the
theatre department. Under such orchestration the situational logic of correction/compromise resulted in
the progressive institutionalisation of the RSC and the WHOSSC.
In case site D, the situational logic of correction/compromise that held sway was attributable to five key
individuals: an associate director with strategic oversight for the theatre department; the theatre manager
tasked with the strategic oversight of its implementation; the consultant surgeon leading the clinical
implementation of the WHOSSC; and two theatre nurses (transcriptions 7:31 to 7:35).
As illustrated in the excerpt from transcription 7:31, below, difficulties in brokering change, due to the
entrenched schism between the managerial logic aligned to the nursing profession and the counterpoised
stance aligned to surgeons and their medical colleagues, were acknowledged with the setting up of a
multiprofessional team to support the implementation of the RSC and the WHOSSC.
Before the WHO checklist came out we were trying to introduce safety briefings in theatres. That was
generally, sort of, well we tried, tried to be led by a nurse – a nurse-led approach – but there was a lot
of challenge and resistance because the general thinking was that: ‘we already do this, it’s a waste of
time, and how dare other people come in and try to tell us what to do!’ But then there was a great
team set up with one of our senior anaesthetists who worked with a nurse practice educator in
operating theatres and we had even had a consultant surgeon! So, really, the three of them worked
together and put their own house in order to set the example.
Associate Director, case site D1 (049); transcription 7:31
Despite this apparently successful implementation, it was clear that the normalisation of the RSC and the
WHOSSC remained contested, with some staff treating the WHOSSC in a cavalier manner, undermining it as
a meaningful practice and eroding its value to that of a joke. Such disruptive institutional work diminished
the legitimacy and moral foundation of the practice. It also served to limit the requisite remoulding of
underlying belief systems to aid cognitive participation, collective action and reflexive monitoring during the
implementation of the RSC and the WHOSSC (transcription 7:32, below).
I’ve had students come and tell me: ‘Oh, the surgeon introduced themselves, they did the
checklist’ – so the tick on the box said: ‘yes, we did it’ – but then they tell me: ‘they introduced
themselves as Mickey Mouse’, so they weren’t taking it seriously. When you question them on
that, they will say, quite rightly: ‘we’ve worked together for 5 years, we all know each other’.
We have even had: ‘I am Spartacus, no I’m Spartacus!’ when they go round introducing themselves.
About 99% of our audit data is saying they’re doing it, and yes, they might. But they’re probably not
doing it that often and, even when they are doing it, it might not be as fully comprehensive as it
should be.
Theatre manager, case site D1 (068); transcription 7:32
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In the excerpt from transcription 7:33, below, the strategic negotiation led by the consultant surgeon
exposes the reasons given by some surgical colleagues for their reluctance to adopt the WHOSSC.
. . . When we started we also went to people, individually, and spoke with them and gauged their
resistance to it – you have to negotiate that with the individuals – a lot of it was, you know, a lot of
people were fairly positive; but as I said they were the believers in the first place. Some people said:
‘well OK, well it won’t do any harm, so I might as well just do it just to please you’, which isn’t
particularly positive but they did it.
Now, there are always going to be a group of people that will simply refuse and we basically ignored
them – that was too big a fish to fry – because they were worried about other issues of their job of
which the WHO checklist was a very small part. I mean colleagues would say, in as many words: ‘why
would I worry about doing the WHO checklist at the beginning of the list when I can’t even guarantee
that all of my patients get into hospital!’, which is understandable and real problem and it’s something
we all grapple with. So it’s very difficult to say to them: ‘OK, well this is only a small change that
you’re going to make and I can’t help you with your patients’ access’ as some will just say: ‘well, OK,
I’ll help you out’ but others will say: ‘sort out my issues first, then I’ll help you!’. One way or the other,
they’re sort of trying to get leverage.
Consultant surgeon, case site D1 (083); transcription 7:33
Transcription 7:34, and transcription 7:35, below, illustrate the nuanced negotiation that is demanded
under a situational logic of correction/compromise and the creative institutional work involved in
reconstructing the social rules impacting on each operating theatre team, despite the lingering barriers of
professional power and legitimacy.
We can only persuade people that it’s what they need to do. I can do very little – I have no authority
over any of the medical staff – I have some power to tell staff what to do. But I think all along we’ve
taken the approach that we’re trying to get people on our side, to understand the importance of the
WHO checklist because what I’m asking people to do is – before you hand the knife over to the
surgeon, after you’ve prepped and draped the patient, and it’s all ready to go, the anaesthetist is
ready to go – is that you stop and get everybody’s attention and there is a point where you have
that opportunity. But they have that power because they’ve got the knife. If they don’t hand it over
and say: ‘right, we’re going to do the time out, we don’t start operating’ because if you give them the
knife then they’re away, and they’re doing it. But it’s the constant sort of having to nag – it needs
quite a strident person to be able to stand there, an empowered person – to stand there and say:
‘you’re not starting until you’ve done this’.
Theatre nurse, case site D1 (029); transcription 7:35
Structural elaboration or reproduction in the Welsh health-care field
In examining the contested institutionalisation of the WHOSSC under a situational logic of correction/
compromise we sought to gauge key actors’ perceptions of emergent outcomes. Structural change,
wrought through the introduction of the WHOSSC and its integration into governance processes, was
viewed to have been achieved. However, some interviewees openly acknowledged decoupling from
governance processes and the diminishing of the RSC and WHOSSC to a ‘tick-box exercise’ (transcriptions
7:36 and 7:37, below).
As far as the WHO checklist [long pause]. I think it’s disappointing that the figures that are sent in to
the centre about compliance bear no resemblance to what’s actually going on out in the service. I just
worry that people at the top may be comfortable in the fact that everyone’s having a WHO checklist
done and that’s not – that’s not – the case.
Theatre manager, case site C1 (006); transcription 7:36
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I think they saw the benefit but the time constraints get in the way – it became a tick-box exercise –
and they weren’t being filled in properly. I remember going round to pick up the form, and seeing
someone quickly take it off the stand and tick it, so that data was not really true. The worth wasn’t
seen immediately.
Theatre nurse, case site D1 (113); transcription 7:37
Yet other interviewees, who viewed the institutionalisation of the RSC and WHOSSC pragmatically,
perceived structural progress, albeit blended with residual gaps due to professional cultural contradictions.
Transcription 7:38, below, captured a cautionary viewpoint that acknowledged that discrete aspects
of the WHOSSC had indeed failed to fully embed into daily practice. This reveals an important issue to
be addressed when seeking to attain such cultural change: the act of brokering alignment between
discordant professional logics demands ongoing creative institutional work to promote the desired
alignment and unification at the cultural-system level.
The WHO checklist does work now, generally, but there are gaps. The things that didn’t really take off
were things like the theatre briefings before the meetings – they keep being revisited but they keep
failing – and they’re trying to relaunch those in [name, different health board] too! They talk about
these ‘champion theatres’ of course but nobody knows what champion theatres are! If you ask
anyone who’s not in the know – who isn’t a believer – then they won’t have a clue! It’s then very
difficult to say: ‘look, the guys in Theatre 3 are doing really good work, can you do the same?’ And
they say: ‘well I don’t know anything about it, why should I do that? What’s in it for me?’ It’s
compulsory! But even then it won’t be taken care of.
Consultant surgeon, case site D1 (083); transcription 7:38
In contrast, no pejorative stance muted the perceived success reported in transcriptions 7:39 and 7:40;
although the respondent in transcription 7:40, below, was concerned about disparity in theatre
department practice, this was mitigated by the belief that auditing such engagement would accommodate,
though not reconcile, such variation.
The WHO checklist has been rolled-out across the organisation for some time now and it’s used in
each of our theatre suites. But how it’s used is different, it’s different: some of them will do their team
debrief on the same day, others will do the WHO meetings all in the meeting, and then it’s managed
differently. But whatever they’re doing it’s audited. The activity around the WHO checklist is audited
every month.
Associate Director, case site C1 (119); transcription 7:40
Such varied responses underline the need for leadership and skilled strategic negotiation to broker
compromise, contain discord and disregard among the disbelievers and deliver successful change to
promote local patient safety practices.
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1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: RSC – local implementation of the focal
intervention and contribution to the I–CMAO configuration spanning the
Welsh health-care field
We now seek to further our understanding of the local implementation of RSC-WHOSSC in theatre
departments, and to define its contribution to the 1000 Lives+ programmes’ I-CMAO configuration
spanning the Welsh health-care field.
As illustrated in Figure 20 and Tables 22–26, the RSC and WHOSSC were a mandatory part of the
1000 Lives+ programme, signalling systemic legitimisation and promoting negotiation across those staff
tasked with the implementation of the intervention. This ensured that formalisation and the co-optation
of others occurred. It also promoted the deinstitutionalisation of redundant theatre practices and fostered
the preinstitutionalisation of the WHOSSC, together with other less controversial practices.
Tables 25 and 26 illustrate the type of information made publicly available as part of the new emphasis on
transparency in relation to patient safety. They relate to the incidence of so-called ‘never events’ in surgery
that the WHOSSC was designed to prevent.
Across each case site, the situated context was essentially comparable and overtly coercive; however,
relational structures – the ties that bind social actors – were different. In each health board, innovation
emerged from the MI-PDSA approach. Though this led to the identification of problems and systematic
failings, thereby catalysing knowledge mobilisation and the validation of practices, the broader moral and
pragmatic legitimisation of the WHOSSC remained contested.
To forward our I-CMAO configuration we turn to the findings of our realist analysis. First, in Figure 20,
we consider the overall scheme of the intervention across the different structural contexts. Following this,
in Tables 25–27, respectively, we show I-CMAO configurations illustrating the infrastructural system
of the Welsh Government, the institutional setting of NHS Wales and its constituent health boards, and
interpersonal relationships within the institutional settings.
REDUCING SURGICAL COMPLICATIONS





































































































































































































































































































































































































































DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
123
Figure 20: key point summary
In Figure 20 we depict the implementation of the WHOSSC component of the RSC focal intervention.
In point 1 we draw attention to the formalisation of this process via professional guidelines and Welsh
Government policy, thereby mandating engagement by all health boards and relevant theatre department staff.
In point 2, such structural constraint impacts at the level of the theatre department, fostering the co-optation
of others, primarily surgical, anaesthetic, nursing and operation department practitioner staff, to support the
implementation of the WHOSSC.
In point 3 such mandated engagement drives the innovation cycle in the situated context, so that new practices
associated with the WHOSSC are enacted.
In point 4 we depict feedback through the multisite department to the health board as the operationalisation
of the WHOSSC component of the RSC focal intervention gradually systematises across NHS Wales.
In point 5 we depict co-existent and countervailing logics, which, though muted by structural constraint,
nonetheless impact at the level of the multisite department.
TABLE 22 Reducing Surgical Complications I-CMAO configuration: infrastructural system – Welsh Government
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component RSC and WHOSSC
Context Welsh Government
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
WHOSSC
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+
and WHOSSC
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across policy and
professional domains
l Team work: policy leads and professional
engagement across aligned organisations
l Encultured values: centred on defining
RSC and WHOSSC as mandated
evidence-based practices
l Decoupling limited by structural
and cultural constraints within
infrastructural system
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme, RSC and WHOSSC institutionalised into policy processes
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:01 (T146) – Coupling
l 7:02 (T083) – Coupling
l 7:03 (T005) – Coupling
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TABLE 23 Reducing Surgical Complications I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales and
constituent health boards
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component RSC and WHOSSC
Context NHS Wales as a corporate whole/NHS Wales’ health boards
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
WHOSSC
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+ and
WHOSSC
l Agency – negotiation under a situational
logic of correction/compromise
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: typically, consultant surgeon-led
participative negotiation of the brokerage
of change
l Team work: harnesses multiprofessional
leadership to foster adoption of the
WHOSSC, augmented by heterarchical
relational structure across theatre
micro-work system
l Encultured values: centred on ‘believers’
to embed WHOSSC and associated
practices across the theatre micro-work
system to address perceived problems
l Agency – negotiation under a situational
logic of correction/compromise
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: consultant surgeon-led, status
a profound barrier to the participative
negotiation of the brokerage of change
l Team work: surgical professional
role-position practices dominate with
hierarchical relational structure of the
theatre micro-work system
l Encultured values: WHOSSC poses
challenge to traditional surgical
professional role-position practices and
is a management means of control
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed, augmented by
local champions
l Team work: centred on MI-PDSA
approach to change.
l Encultured values: ‘trying to get people
on our side’ to broker
meaningful engagement
l Decoupling limited by structural and
cultural constraints within institutional
setting
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: medical director-led,
formalised through revalidation/
relicensure process
l Team work: centred on medical
professional networks
l Encultured values: drive for cultural
change aligned to demands of
Francis Report
l Decoupling limited by structural and
cultural constraints within institutional
setting
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed, augmented by
local champions, and supported by
1000 Lives+ team
l Team work: ‘flattened’ hierarchy, with
heightened scope for nurse leadership
of change
l Encultured values: acceptance of
challenge across theatre micro-work
system
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: ‘isolated’, nurse led,
ill equipped to broker change
l Team work: fragmented and unsupportive
of the change
l Encultured values: WHOSSC is ‘just a bit of
paper that does not do anything’
continued
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TABLE 23 Reducing Surgical Complications I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales and
constituent health boards (continued )
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national programme
and WHOSSC approach embraced and
absorbed into extant management,
internal governance and audit processes
l Decoupling 1000 Lives+ national
programme and WHOSSC approach
resisted and adsorbed onto extant
management, internal governance and
audit processes
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – negotiation under a situational
logic of correction/compromise
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:06 (T063) – Decoupling
l 7:07 (T117) – Decoupling
l 7:20 (T083) – Decoupling/coupling
l 7:21 (T117) – Decoupling
l 7:33 (T083) – Decoupling/coupling
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:34 (T028) – Coupling
l 7:35 (T029) – Coupling
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:26 (T062) – Coupling
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:10 (T041) – Coupling
l 7:17 (T062) – Coupling
l 7:25 (T117) – Decoupling
l 7:30 (T005) – Coupling
TABLE 24 Reducing Surgical Complications I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – interpersonal relations
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component RSC and WHOSSC
Context Hospital multisite department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
WHOSSC
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+ and
WHOSSC
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: nurse-led practice-based
focus
l Team work: nurse-led practice-based
focus
l Encultured values: MI-PDSA central to
practice-based change
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: surgeon led
l Team work: fragmented and unsupportive
of the change
l Encultured values: WHOSSC poses
challenge to traditional surgical professional
role-position practices and is a management
means of control
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed
l Team work: multiprofessional
engagement with WHOSSC
l Encultured values: exposure of
non-adherence to WHOSSC to limit
decoupling
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – maintenance/disruption
l Leadership: disengaged
l Team work: limited identification of errors,
compounded by weak audit practices
l Encultured values: WHOSSC ‘tick-box’
exercise with acceptance of poor and overt
malpractice normalised with failure to
identify errors. Expanded in Tables 28 and 29
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l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed
l Team work: multisite enabled
knowledge mobilisation supported via
1000 Lives+ networking events
l Encultured values: acceptance of
challenge to foster innovation and
change across theatre micro-work
system
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: disengaged
l Team work: limited identification of errors,
compounded by weak audit practices
l Encultured values: WHOSSC ‘tick-box’
exercise with acceptance of poor and overt
malpractice normalised
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: theatre manager-led
governance and audit processes
established
l Team work: multidisciplinary
participation in governance and
audit processes
l Encultured values: monitoring and
measurement of patient safety
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: theatre manager-led processes
established
l Team work: multidisciplinary participation on
governance processes contested
l Encultured values: WHOSSC ‘tick-box’
exercise with acceptance of poor and overt
malpractice normalised
l Agency – legitimisation
(moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed
l Team work: multiprofessional
participation in WHOSSC
l Encultured values: WHOSSC accepted as
‘routine’ theatre practice
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: disengaged, especially by
consultant surgical staff
l Team work: contested participation
in WHOSSC
l Encultured values: WHOSSC ‘tick-box’
exercise with acceptance of poor and overt
malpractice normalised
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l Leadership: centred on role-position
practices which erode traditional medical
power base
l Team work: negotiated engagement
with WHOSSC
l Encultured values: acceptance of
challenge across multidisciplinary team
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: ‘isolated’, nurse led, ill equipped
to broker change
l Team work: fragmented and unsupportive
of the change
l Encultured values: WHOSSC is ‘just a bit of
paper that doesn’t do anything’
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national
programme and WHOSSC approach
embraced and absorbed into
daily practice
l Decoupling 1000 Lives+ national programme
and WHOSSC approach resisted and only lip
service given to outward form of practice
TABLE 24 Reducing Surgical Complications I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – interpersonal
relations (continued)
continued
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TABLE 24 Reducing Surgical Complications I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – interpersonal
relations (continued)
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:13 (T006) – Coupling
l 7:14 (T068) – Coupling
l 7:15 (T063) – Decoupling
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:11 (T008) – Coupling
l 7:18 (T059) – Decoupling
l 7:27 (T008) – Decoupling
l 7:31 (T049) – Coupling
l 7:36 (T006) – Decoupling
l 7:40 (T119) – Coupling
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:14 (T068) – Coupling
l 7:24 (T112) – Decoupling
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l 7:28 (T029) – Decoupling
l 7:36 (T006) – Decoupling
l 7:37 (T113) – Decoupling
l 7:38 (T083) – Coupling/Decoupling
l 7:40 (T119) – Coupling
l Agency – legitimisation
(moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l 7:08 (T029) – Decoupling
l 7:15 (T063) – Decoupling
l 7:16 (T064) – Decoupling
l 7:19 (T061) – Decoupling
l 7:22 (T024) – Coupling
l 7:32 (T068) – Decoupling
l 7:39 (T005) – Coupling
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l 7:25 (T028) – Decoupling
l 7:30 (T005) – Coupling
TABLE 25 Reducing Surgical Complications: local implementation – ‘never events’ across NHS Wales’ health boards:
1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013
Health board Type of surgical ‘never events’ Details




l Retained foreign object post operation
l Retained swab
l Right implant into left knee
l Retained swab
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board l Wrong implant/prosthesis l Wrong size lens
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board l Retained foreign object post operation
l Wrong-site surgery
l Retained swab
l Wrong tooth removed
Cardiff and Vale University Health Board l Misplaced naso or orogastric tube
l Retained foreign object post operation
l Misplaced nasogastric tube
l Silicone object
Cwm Taf Health Board None recorded None recorded
Hywel Dda Health Board l Retained instrument l Retained swab
Powys (Teaching) Health Board None recorded None recorded
Data accessed via Patient Safety Wales: www.patientsafety.wales.nhs.uk/never-events.
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TABLE 26 Reducing Surgical Complications: local implementation – ‘never events’ across NHS Wales’ health boards,
1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014
Health board Type of surgical ‘never events’ Details
Abertawe Bro Morgannwg
University Health Board
l Retained foreign object
post operation
l Misplaced naso or orogastric tube
l Wrong-site surgery
l Retained swab
l Misplaced nasogastric tube
l Wrong toe incised
Aneurin Bevan University Health
Board
l Retained foreign object
post operation
l Retained foreign object
post operation
l Retained foreign object
post operation
l Retained swab
l Retained foreign object
l Retained tip of needle
identified postoperatively
Betsi Cadwaladr University Health
Board
l Misidentification of patient
l Wrong-site surgery
l Maladministration of insulin
l Maladministration of insulin
l Wrong gas administered
l Wrong-site surgery
l Wrong patient had exploratory
procedure
l Wrong part of organ identified:
rectified during procedure
l No wristband in place:
misidentification of patient
l Maladministration of insulin
l Seal not removed on oxygen
cylinder
l Left side prosthesis implanted
instead of right





l Wrong scar site identified for
procedure
l Initial skin incision incorrectly made:
rectified during procedure
l Intraoperative air embolism
Cwm Taf Health Board l Misplaced naso- or orograstric tube l Misplaced nasogastric tube
Hywel Dda Health Board l Misidentification of patient l Relates to histopathology specimens
Powys (Teaching) Health Board None recorded None recorded
Data accessed via Patient Safety Wales: www.patientsafety.wales.nhs.uk/never-events.




Context Structural conditioning of the institutional setting: NHS Wales health boards’
implementation of 1000 Lives+ national programme’s RSC
Structural emergent properties l Structural constraints and enablements shaped by the bureaucratic
processes of formalisation emergent from the infrastructural system
of the Department of Health and Social Care impact 1000 Lives+,
RSC and WHOSSC
l The dominant structural emergent property impacting the RSC and
associated WHOSSC was the overarching policy mandate of the
1000 Lives+ national programme. The policy and professional compulsion
to undertake the WHOSSC, therefore, created a sense of structural
force majeure
continued
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TABLE 27 Reducing Surgical Complications: realist analysis – signposting how the empirical data connect
to I-CMAO (continued )
Cultural emergent properties l The dominant cultural emergent properties, which moulded the
institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ RSC and WHOSSC, arose from the
institutional system emblematic of the theatre departments, namely its
sense of separation from the health board, compounded by distinctive
functional and professional cultures
Social actors l Consultant surgeons tasked with the implementation of the WHOSSC:
the focal intervention WHOSSC is targeted to all theatre
department staff
Social position l Elite power role with high social position, professional standing and
widespread networks
Role-position practices l Professional role-position practices centred on professional leadership of
surgical staff and close liaison with theatre manager and theatre nursing
staff and operating department practitioners
Mechanism Mediation of structural conditioning to core actors and their reflexive
theorisation
Institutional logics and type of alignment
between core actors
Consultant surgeons tasked with the implementation of the WHOSSC
operated under a professional logic that was aligned to the dominant logic
of the bureaucratic state and professional health-care management logic.
However, their actions were directed to managing the tension promoted by
the countervailing stance adopted by other surgeons
First-order emergents The vested interests of consultant surgeons, tasked with the implementation
of the RSC and WHOSSC, lay primarily in the successful brokerage of
theatre staff engagement with the WHOSSC
Second-order emergents Constraining contradictions (necessary incompatibilities) between the
dominant logic of the bureaucratic state and aligned professional
health-care management logic vs. that of professional medical logic held by
surgeons opposed to the introduction of the WHOSSC
Situational logic Correction/compromise
Reflexive theorisation For consultant surgeons tasked with the implementation of the WHOSSC,
their logic is shaped by alignment between the dominant logic of the
bureaucratic state, aligned professional health-care management logic, and
that of their professional medical logic. This therefore fosters coherence,
cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring focused towards addressing
the constraining contradictions, which arise as a result of the countervailing
professional medical logic held by surgeons opposed to the introduction of
the WHOSSC, and who remain disengaged
The reflexive theorisation of consultant surgeons tasked with the
implementation of the WHOSSC is, therefore, directed towards the
discernment of issues impairing such logical alignment, the deliberation of
their importance, and dedication of ensuing agency to broker compromise
to correct and counteract the opposing stance thereby normalising the
WHOSSC into daily practice
Agency and institutional work Agency, the unfolding strategic negotiation of change, and the mode of
institutional work enacted
Agential emergent properties Agency was directed to managing the tension promoted by the
countervailing stance of professional medical logic
Strategic negotiation l Power-induced compliance and
political sanction
l Exemplar transcriptions: 7:02,
7:09, 7:15, 7:16
l Reciprocal exchange and
harmonisation of desires
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Finally, in Table 27, and focusing, for expediency, primarily on the generative mechanisms and ensuing
agency attributed to consultant staff tasked with the implementation of the RSC and WHOSSC, we
present our realist analysis linking the empirical data to I-CMAO.
As alluded to above, a sense of structural force majeure was evident, but its influence was reduced by
theatre departments’ feeling of relative separation from the parent health board and wider health-care
institutional field. Consultant staff, tasked with the implementation of the RSC and the WHOSSC, were
confronted by the contradictions between the dominant logic of the bureaucratic state and aligned
professional health-care management logic and that of professional medical logic. In such circumstances a
situational logic of correction/compromise arose that was open to the power play of different professional
groups, each seeking to turn such sociocultural constraint to their advantage.
As set out in Table 27, the reflexive theorisation of consultant staff tasked with the implementation of the
RSC and the WHOSSC focused on addressing the concerns of surgeons opposed to the introduction of
the WHOSSC. Their thinking and actions were, therefore, directed towards seeking the reasons for such
opposition and seeking ways of finding compromise positions and/or solutions which would be acceptable
to the dissidents and enable the WHOSSC to be normalised into daily practice.
The structural elaboration evident across each case site was shaped by the integration of the WHOSSC into
governance processes. However, the openly acknowledged decoupling of the insulated surgical theatre
world from such governance processes distorted coherence and commitment to the RSC and the WHOSSC
by diminishing it to a tick-box exercise. Indeed, the large number of ‘never events’ (serious patient safety
violations) which occurred in NHS Wales’ health boards during the period 1 April 2012 to 30 September
2013 (see Tables 28 and 29), while unable to necessarily be directly attributed in part or in whole to failure
to implement the WHOSSC, serve only to underscore such decoupling.
This contested institutional change highlights the time required to negotiate alignment between discordant
professional logics and stresses the complexity of the creative institutional work required.
Summary
In Chapter 7, we furthered our understanding of the local implementation of the focal intervention, RSC,
centred on the WHOSSC, and defined its contribution to the 1000 Lives+ programmes’ I-CMAO
configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field.
TABLE 27 Reducing Surgical Complications: realist analysis – signposting how the empirical data connect
to I-CMAO (continued )
Agency and institutional work Agency, the unfolding strategic negotiation of change, and the mode of
institutional work enacted
Outcome Social elaboration, reproduction or invariance
Structural Structural change, wrought through the introduction of the WHOSSC and
its integration into governance processes, was achieved. However, the
openly acknowledged decoupling from governance processes distorted
coherence and commitment to the RSC and WHOSSC by diminishing it to a
tick-box exercise
Cultural Cultural change limited as harmonising discordant professional logics
demands prolonged creative institutional work to promote the desired
coalescence and unification at the cultural system level
Agential Invariant
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Chapter 8 Reducing Health-care-Associated
Infection
Overview
In this chapter we examine RHAI, the final focal intervention drawn from the 1000 Lives+ programme.
Our attention was directed to two aspects of this patient safety intervention: (1) hand hygiene and (2) the
appropriate use of antimicrobial drugs. Importantly, in contrast to the other focal interventions selected
from the 1000 Lives+ national programme, set out in Chapters 6 and 7, such interventions do not
represent practice innovations. Instead, they represent the consolidation of established best practice.
We begin with a brief overview of the RHAI, defining its multicomponent structure, aim and drivers.
This we augment with a review of health-care-associated IPAC, highlighting key issues and the challenges
that confront developed health-care systems.
Second, we undertake a realist analysis of the institutionalisation of RHAI in Wales, as illustrated by our
comparative case study of sites A, B, C and D. We explain the structural conditioning, sociocultural
interaction and structural elaboration or reproduction fostered through the actions of three groups of
key actors: consultant microbiologists, IPAC nurses and pharmacists specialising in antibiotics medicines
management. We concentrate on these three groups because they are directly involved in the operation
of RHAI under the 1000 Lives+ programme, but we also include in our analysis the perceptions of a
wide range of health-care professionals. Finally, informed by the findings of our realist analysis, we set
out our understanding of the RHAI I-CMAO configuration.
Focal intervention, aim and drivers
Reducing Health-care-Associated Infection, the last of the three focal interventions considered in this study,
aims to support health-care staff to reduce the overall burden of nosocomial (hospital-acquired) infection
in NHS Wales. As illustrated in Figure 21, RHAI comprises four interventions to prevent the transmission of
infection, two of which are aligned to promote the effective treatment of infection, and a further three
interventions to facilitate patient involvement in their care. During the period of this study RHAI was
augmented with further advice on the appropriate and timely use of invasive devices, specifically guidance
aimed to reduce peripheral venous cannula (PVC) and catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI).
This extension was beyond the scope of our research protocol and ethics submissions, and so our research
focused on standard precautions for hand hygiene to prevent the transmission of infection and the
appropriate use of antimicrobial drugs to ensure the effective prevention and treatment of infection.
Nonetheless, the publicity surrounding the launch and implementation of the PVC and CAUTI interventions
impacted on the context of care.
Health-care-associated infection, prevention and control
Health-care-associated infection (HCAI), prevention and control is an issue that impacts on developed and
developing health-care systems.572–574 It is a source of concern for politicians, health-care professionals, patients
and the public alike.575,576 Addressing the human costs in terms of morbidity and mortality is paramount,577,578 but
there is also a need to minimise the cost burden incurred through protracted treatment and extended lengths
of stay.577,579–582 A range of patient safety interventions have been designed to improve this problem.181,583–590
Such interventions typically encompass (i) mandatory reporting and surveillance programmes;591–594 (ii) ensuing
targets, standards and performance indicators for IPAC,595–620 especially for high-risk clinical practices600–602 and
vulnerable patient groups;603–606 and (iii) heightened control over the use of antimicrobial drugs in the face of
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FIGURE 21 Driver diagram: RHAI.
Figure 21: key point summary
Figure 21 depicts the driver diagram for the focal intervention: RHAI. Attention is directed to two of the four
aspects of this patient safety intervention which are focused at clinical and other staff, as defined below:
l point 1, standard precautions for hand hygiene to prevent the transmission of infection and
l point 2, appropriate use of antimicrobial drugs to ensure the effective prevention and treatment
of infection.
To aid our understanding of the interplay of context and mechanism in the operationalisation of this focal
intervention, the perspectives of consultant microbiologists, IPAC nurses and pharmacists specialising in
antibiotics medicines management, each directly involved in the operationalisation of the RHAI under the
auspices of the 1000 Lives+ national programme, enrich our analysis.
In contrast to the other focal interventions selected from the 1000 Lives+ national programme, standard
precautions for hand hygiene and the appropriate use of antimicrobial drugs do not represent practice
innovations but are merely the consolidation of established best practice.
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the changing epidemiology of HCAIs,589,607–610 exemplified by the rise of MRSA and extended-spectrum
beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing strains of Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumonia.609,611–619
In the NHS, following major outbreaks of hospital-acquired (nosocomial) infection,620 national targets for
the reduction of MRSA bacteremias (blood infections) and C. difficile (gastrointestinal) infection are
supported by enhanced mandatory surveillance. Oversight rests with the Health Protection Agency in
England and Scotland,592,597,621 and, in Wales, the WHAIP led by Public Health Wales. In this manner,
IPAC is placed at the centre of clinical and corporate governance.622 Indeed, the Health Act 2006 Code of
Practice mandates adherence to national and local policies and protocols.623 Zero tolerance of HCAIs624,625
is a primary policy goal.
Core to success is the enactment of good hand hygiene across health-care practitioners, support
workers626–630 and patients.631–635 This standard precaution, perceived to be fundamental to safe health-care
practice,636 is captured through the WHO’s ‘five moments of hand hygiene’.637 These guidelines harness a
substantial evidence base in support of hand antisepsis to limit the incidence of HCAIs.587 However, such
education requires regular updating638–640 to promote the adoption of, and continued adherence to,
evidence-based improvements,641,642 and monitoring systems are necessary to audit compliance.595,596,643–645
Although existing studies highlight success in limiting HCAIs48,181 through hand hygiene195,639,646–648 and
wider reaching educational programmes,649–653 a high level of non-compliance with basic infection control
measures persists among health-care professionals.654 Indeed, junior medical and nursing staff copy the
aberrant behaviour of their superiors,655–657 which results in the entrenchment of non-compliance
across successive generations.655–660 IPAC teams, therefore, have a central role to play in active staff
engagement,661 support for peer-to-peer education,662 and the monitoring of HCAIs to reduce the burden
of avoidable harm to patients and its associated untoward costs.581,663–689
The changing epidemiology of HCAIs607,608,611,612,617,666–694 also places demands on medical microbiologists
and clinical pharmacists specialising in antibiotic medicines management.57,671 Collectively, their active
stewardship of antibiotic prescribing is acknowledged to limit overprescribing672 and improve adherence to
guidelines.673–676 However, their oversight of surgical prophylaxis is constrained by the charting and timing
of the administration of such drugs within the theatre environment.677–679
There are many other ways in which patients may acquire infections while in hospital. These include the
use of invasive medical devices such as ventilators,48,680–710 intravenous and arterial cannulae605,687–690 and
various sorts of catheter691–695 However, these sources of infection and the precautions taken to avoid them
are not considered in this study.
Realist analysis and comparative case study
We now undertake a critical realist analysis of the institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme’s
RHAI. Again, our case study considers sites A, B, C and D. Our analysis focuses on three groups of key
actors: consultant microbiologists, IPAC nurses and pharmacists specialising in antibiotics medicines
management. Each is directly involved in the operation of RHAI under the auspices of the 1000 Lives+
national programme. However, as HCAIs are an issue for all to address, we include the perceptions of
a wide range of health-care professionals in our analysis.
As in the two previous chapters, we consider the focal intervention in context and explore the dominant
structural and cultural emergent properties impacting key actors involved in the operation of the RHAI.
Next, to reveal the generative mechanisms in play, we examine mediation via first- and second-order
emergents and the resultant situational logic. Then, to examine the initiation of change, we explore the
unfolding strategic negotiation of change and the mode of institutional work enacted. Finally, we reflect
on the nature of any sustained outcome, be that elaborative or reproductive, that occurred following the
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implementation of RHAI. This analysis forms the foundation of our refinement of the I-CMAO
configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field in 1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: RHAI – local
implementation of the focal intervention and contribution to I–CMAO configuration spanning the Welsh
health-care field.
Structural conditioning: structural and cultural emergent properties in the
Welsh health-care field
In contrast to the other focal interventions selected from the 1000 Lives+ programme and analysed in
Chapters 6 and 7, the discrete interventions selected from RHAI – standard precautions for hand hygiene
to prevent the transmission of infection and the use of antimicrobial drugs to ensure the effective
prevention and treatment of infection – did not represent practice innovations. The dominant structural
emergent properties impacting the RHAI were, therefore, the complex array of established alternative
frameworks and the ongoing surveillance of their effectiveness via the WHAIP (transcription 8:01, below).
The question for me is, how do we untangle 1000 Lives+ from all of the other elements in play – it’s
complicated, confounded – because what’s happening is happening between 1000 Lives+, all of the
other frameworks and antimicrobial guidelines that are out there, and mandatory surveillance
reporting and feedback via WHAIP.
So, it’s through one or a combination of all of those things that the higher echelons, if you like,
of hospital management are now faced with infection control, and its importance, much more so
than they were 10 years or so ago, or even less than that. So I think, whether it’s due to 1000 Lives+,
other frameworks, or the surveillance processes in place, I think it’s achieving something – because
they have to be aware and address HCAI due to WHAIP reporting to the Welsh Government – my
impression is that they are aware of it and they feel accountability.
Now when you have accountability in the higher levels of management, the way that they effect that
accountability, quite rightly, is through delegation and spreading the message in terms of what needs
doing. The previous medical director here, who was spectacularly engaged, even before 1000 Lives+,
with the idea of infection control provided a real sense of leadership, and had an awful lot of insight.
I don’t know why that was, perhaps he just saw it as part of his role, I don’t know, but he did it
very well. But now, now that we’re a lot bigger, and we have a wider range of – I don’t want to use
that term ‘lower’ – some of the next tier down levels of management, like director level and their
associates or assistants, that message is dissipated.
Consultant microbiologist, case site C1 (034); transcription 8:01
Other structural issues also surfaced during discussions with respondents, notably the compounding impact
of the reconfiguration of NHS Wales on framework alignment, and the need for the co-ordination and
consolidation of different guidelines under a health-board-wide and emergent all-Wales remit
(transcriptions 8:02 and 8:03, below).
The reconfiguration of NHS Wales, the formation of health boards that’s occurred during the roll-out
of the original 1000 Lives campaign and 1000 Lives+, I think this has created issues which are
problematic. I think that the creation of much larger health boards has created barriers to the roll-out
of 1000 Lives and 1000 Lives+. So, for example, something that’s seen to be an incredibly high priority
within this health board, quite rightly, is the fact that before we were [number] Trusts, and we all
had, I imagine, a pretty good spread of infection control policies that were broadly in line, and in their
own way ticked the boxes for national recommendations. But they were not the same. Now a priority,
here, is that we have harmonised consistent policies. So, you know, we all have workable policies
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that we could just leave alone to would work on each site; but no, we are required to have single
harmonised policies that we all agree to. Now the differences that existed were there for a reason. But
now we’ve got to try and overcome those differences, agree amongst ourselves, and then get wider
agreement across the consultants. And the point being that that’s a job of work that takes time and is
outside the time requirements that might be put into 1000 Lives+.
Consultant microbiologist, case site A1 (035); transcription 8:02
Working with consultant microbiologists, we produce and review the antibiotic policies used across
the health board. There’re planning to have all Wales antibiotic policy guidelines. [Have they been
produced and published?] No, no way: it’s still at a very early stage of discussion, about 6 months in,
and I think it will take years to agree: there’s so much disagreement about what to use, when,
and some doctors simply refuse to follow any guidelines, no matter who produces them: ‘where’s
the evidence; the evidence is disputed; it’s not that clear cut; it’s my freedom to prescribe how I see fit
for my patient’. We get that same old argument, from some of them, all the time.
So, we produce the health board’s antibiotic guidelines and monitor them through audit cycles across
each ward or base hospital; we do the education associated with antibiotic usage for the junior
doctors, nurses, and other staff, including other pharmacists; and we do antibiotic ward rounds with
consultant microbiologists – this is a small hospital, so consultant microbiologists don’t have junior
doctors attached to them, so, in a way, we act like their juniors – this involves antibiotic prescribing
and follow-up, checking that the drug and indication are appropriate, that the dose, route, are all
correct, that sort of stuff. I don’t think of the context outside so much, I suppose; for me, it’s about
the people I talk to and work with each day.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site B2 (001); transcription 8:03
In addition to the structural constraints arising from various existing guidelines, a previous patient safety
improvement programme, the Safer Patients Initiative, had a legacy effect which resonated strongly with
some IPAC nurses interviewed as part of this study (transcription 8:04, below, and transcription 8:05).
If I’m honest with you, when it [1000 Lives] came out originally, it was a bit of a spin-off from the SPI
[Safer Patients Initiative], you know, the IHI approach, wasn’t it?
It came out at the time when we were reorganising the health service in Wales. So, I think, a lot of the
correspondence went to people whose positions have changed and so on and so forth. They started
off at a very high level but there was a lot going on in the organisations and it didn’t really filter
down – the leadership was a little bit fragmented at that time – I think in the last 2 years we’ve sort
of taken hold of it.
We were a little bit at odds with the priorities of the RHAI programme initially because we had done
our own prevalence survey, internally, and we hadn’t identified problems with catheter-associated UTIs
[urinary tract infections]. We did an incident survey over a period of 1 month in wards in the
organisation and there were no issues with catheter-associated infections at that point in time.
However, we identified problems with peripheral venous cannulas during our point prevalence survey.
But the campaign was mandating a focus on short-term urinary catheters, whereas our priority at
that time was more to do with peripheral lines. So it was a little bit of, it was a little bit, you know,
sort of didactic I guess: ‘this is a priority, and this is what you must do’, and I was thinking, well,
in our organisation, this is our priority and we will do that, at the moment we need to focus on that.
Senior nurse, IPAC, case site A2 (076); transcription 8:04
Such structural constraints were interwoven with the current financial challenge; as one respondent
commented, ‘the biscuits are gone!’ (transcriptions 8:06 and 8:07).
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
137
The cultural emergent properties impacting staff involved with infection control arose from their different
but interlocking roles. It was clear that there was close liaison between each professional group
(transcriptions 8:08 and 8:09, below).
I’m aware that there are different models, if you like, with the consultant leading, consultant
microbiologist, the infection control doctor leading the service. Here it’s a flat model – a flat model
between the lead infection control nurse and the lead infection control doctor – and it is something
that I feel not only works well but is appropriate because we bring different skills to the mix, and I’m
not sure that any set of skills is more important than the other.
Consultant microbiologist, case site C1 (T034); transcription 8:08
Well, predominantly, in infection control, our role is for support and advice to staff. That’s our role.
But we’re also involved in conducting audits – particularly things like hand hygiene audits, commode
audits, environmental audits, and those kind of things – and those are fed back to ward staff,
the results and an required action. But we also carry out things like surveillance, so we’ll monitor
our alert organisms [for WHAIP]. If there’s any kind of change – an indication that there’s an increase
in health-care-associated infections, or an increase in any of our WHAIP alert organism, such as MRSA,
MSSA [meticillin-sensitive S. aureus], C. diff, Group A strep [Group A Streptococcus], E. coli, any of the
alert organisms, we’ll go and find out, and liaise with the consultant microbiologist.
Senior nurse, IPAC, case site D2 (017); transcription 8:09
Such liaison also gave rise to professional networks which enabled processes of interprofessional
knowledge mobilisation that were perceived to be operating at a more challenging level than those of
1000 Lives+ (transcription 8:10, below).
If I’m facing something that new, a bit different to what I’ve handled before, I would first contact
other antibiotic specialist pharmacists – there’s a network across Wales – so that would be one source
of information and advice. The others, naturally, are the consultant microbiologists and IPAC nurses.
Also, there’s a formal meeting twice a year of the Antibiotic Stewardship Forum, which consists of
medical microbiologists, pharmacists, and some specialist nurses. They don’t meet that often but
they’re a great source of information, and an opportunity to share learning and development.
[Are there any other groups that you would contact for advice or support?] Yes, the UK CPA [UK
Clinical Pharmacy Association] is another source of information. They have an infection management
group – they’re more advanced in England – there’s a good web site, support materials, that sort of
stuff which is very helpful. In England, they have developed the consultant pharmacists role – we don’t
have those in Wales yet; but I think one is due to be developed in Renal Pharmacy, which is an
incredibly complex field. So that sort of recognition, legitimacy almost, is absent in Wales. Another
group is the British Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy. They’ve got a useful website, and they
run all Wales study days, which, in terms of the evidence and focus, are pitched at a far higher level
than 1000 Lives+. I feel like I’m learning something new when I attend these, not just being told
to wash my hands before I go onto a ward, or to make sure that a course of antibiotics has a
defined stop date! Another is the Welsh Microbiological Association and again, they run study days,
really focused on education, and this is linked into Public Health Wales. So this is all at a level above
1000 Lives+.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site B2 (001); transcription 8:10
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First-order emergents for key actors central to the institutionalisation of
Reducing Health-care Associated Infection
Such structural and cultural emergent properties shaped the context in which key actors, central to the
institutionalisation of the RHAI now found themselves and conditioned their ensuing actions. We therefore
asked consultant microbiologists, nurses specialising in IPAC and pharmacists specialising in the
management of antibiotic medicines to reflect on their placement, their vested interests and the perceived
opportunity costs associated with various courses of action, to determine how this shaped their activities.
Consultant microbiologists
The vested interests of consultant microbiologists lay in the day-to-day operational management of IPAC,
centred on the provision of their expert advice, and the ongoing demands which arose from WHAIP
surveillance (transcriptions 8:11 to 8:13). The 1000 Lives+ national programme and RHAI, though aligned
to such tasks, were a secondary consideration (transcription 8:12, below).
Well, of course, a lot of the mandatory reporting used to be done manually by microbiologists – that
used to take up our time, particularly statistics for bacteraemia – but that’s all done centrally now.
So all that information is sucked out of the data store in Wales.
In terms of mandatory requirements, there’s, in theory, there’s less for us to do. But I strongly suspect
that – I’m not alone here, in fact I guarantee you that all microbiologists who used to do it, still do
it – because there is an expectation that, a requirement for us, when reports are generated centrally
through WHAIP before those reports come out as you know the raw data is circulated back to us to
check if we think it’s correct but we would only know that if we were doing the same data collection
that we ever did!
But we would want to do it anyway – not just to check the accuracy of WHAIP reports, bearing in
mind that some of those reports are somewhat retrospective – because if we relied on them to find
out if we were having an out of the ordinary rise in numbers of C. diffs in a given area or MRSA
bacteraemia associated with line use in a certain area, we’d miss the boat and problems would have
deteriorated. So we have, we need to do these things, relatively, real time. So that’s one form of
reporting pressure if you like. I mean we see it as part of our work – as our normal role – and that’s
why I’m fairly confident that it doesn’t matter who you ask in Wales they’ll probably give you that
exact same answer. But nonetheless it’s a time pressure that needs, a role that needs to be fulfilled.
On top of that you’ve then got two other pressures. So, one is the one I’ve just mentioned, whereby
you’re noticing your own local priorities with these figures that you’re generating for WHAIP, so that
we can focus our attention and look at the interventions that should be being made, and audit
whether they are being made, and how well they’re being done and that kind of thing. But at the
same time we might be receiving instructions that we should be looking at other areas – and it’s
not that those areas aren’t important – but then our time is split because there’s the thing that
we see, that we feel we have an immediate need, and then there’s the requirement to fit in with
1000 Lives+ I suppose.
Consultant microbiologist, case site B1 (036); transcription 8:12
In focusing on the broader remit of IPAC, as opposed to the progressive institutionalisation of RHAI,
consultant microbiologists operated under a professional (medical) logic co-existent with and
complementary to professional (health-care management) and bureaucratic state logics. Thus, the RHAI
was absorbed and integrated into existing and culturally entrenched monitoring processes. This aided its
adoption and reproduction across NHS Wales’ health boards.
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Infection prevention and control nurses
The vested interests of IPAC nurses at each case site, captured in transcriptions 8:14 to 8:21,
again reflected the impact of their traditional role jurisdictions. These overshadowed and pre-dated
the 1000 Lives+ national programme and RHAI (transcriptions 8:14 and 8:15, below).
We do all the audits – environmental audits, hand hygiene audits – ward-based teaching, like the
session that you’re going to see this afternoon, and just general support for the wards, and where we
find a problem, we like to go back and offer a solution and support the staff to eradicate hospital-
acquired infections.
Nurse, IPAC, case site A2 (003); transcription 8:14
We were doing all this before 1000 Lives and 1000 Lives+ – including looking at urinary catheter-
associated infections and peripheral and central line infections – so the interventions 1000 Lives+
promotes are already integrated into our monitoring systems, and it would be the same for all
health boards.
Senior nurse, IPAC, case site A2 (002); transcription 8:15
In addition, some aspects of infection control lay far beyond the scope of RHAI (transcription 8:17, below).
It is unacceptable to have a case of Clostridium difficile, and if you have two within a 28-day period,
a formal meeting is called. [What do you do if you have a persistent problem with Clostridium
difficle?] If there was a continuing problem, then we’d look to Bioquel the ward – bio-bomb it with
hydrogen peroxide – they go in, in their decontamination suits, and close the doors. They do it one
section at a time, they vapour blast it with hydrogen peroxide, they leave all the equipment in there,
all the beds, everything stays in there, so there’s no risk of us missing something really. After that
the domestic staff will go in and just clean – soap and water, detergent – and then we put the
patients back in the ward. So far, that seems to be very effective. But we’ll only do that if we have
real hotspots.
Nurse, IPAC, case site B1 (131); transcription 8:17
The newer 1000 Lives+ interventions associated with RHAI, though beyond the scope of this study, were
an extension of established practice. However, owing to medical resistance, some specified changes
were a source of concern (transcription 8:18, below).
The new 1000 Lives+ intervention was launched nationally last year, and we’ve been rolling out the
PVC bundle but we have the catheter bundle in place for about 4 years now. The PVC bundle has
proved a little more difficult to implement really, in that there’s been a change to practice, there’s also
been a lot of medical opposition. [Why?] Because they’ve got to do stuff! What they’re saying is:
‘where’s the evidence to say that they’re not doing things properly, and that we’ve got a high rate of
infection? Why should I change my practice without the evidence that there’s a problem in the first
place?’ [They don’t perceive a problem in their current practice or the rates of infection?] Because
they don’t believe they’ve got a problem. They don’t believe that by changing practice, or being
forced to evidence that they’re doing what they should be doing, that that will make any difference.
And, in one respect, you could sort of see their point, in that there is a low rate of peripheral
venous infections. But we do get catheter-related bloodstream infections and the incidence of MSSAs
[meticillin-sensitive S. aureus] within the health board has been increasing. But what we asking them
to do, due to 1000 Lives+, well, for them, it just takes too long.
Nurse, IPAC, case site C1 (132); transcription 8:18
In regards to 1000 Lives+, I’d say the introduction of the bundles and the STOP campaign is probably
all the infection control team have been involved with and some of that just involved minor changes
to our practice.
Nurse, IPAC, case site D2 (019); transcription 8:21
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In focusing their agential activity on the broader remit of IPAC, in addition to the institutionalisation of
the RHAI, specialist nurses operated under a professional (nursing) logic that was complementary to
professional (health-care management) and bureaucratic state logics.
Antibiotic medicines management pharmacists
Transcriptions 8:22 to 8:29 suggest that the vested interests of pharmacists with expertise in antibiotic
medicines management were poorly aligned to RHAI, which they saw as irrelevant given their level of
expertise (transcriptions 8:24 and 8:25, below).
[When you think about the knowledge and information that you use within you role, do you draw on
the 1000 Lives+ resources?] No, I don’t use them. There’s little information in them that relevant to
me; I mean, it’s just so basic – really bottom-end stuff, basic, mundane – if you don’t know it, you
shouldn’t be working as a clinical pharmacist.
1000 Lives+ is, it’s too basic, directed at lower-level nurses. For me, it offers little. [Do you use the
driver diagrams?] No, they’re not relevant: they’re basic. I do a ward round with a consultant
microbiologist each day and there’s more to that than hand washing! The diagrams aren’t education.
I mean, we are using the key points in our stickers, developed as part of the antibiotic care bundle,
but it’s our system. [Do you use the PDSA cycle?] No, we have ongoing audit cycles, which, I guess,
serve the same function but they’re part of the health board’s audit regimen and not informed by the
1000 Lives+ programme.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site B2 (001); transcription 8:24
[When you think of 1000 Lives+, what does it mean to you?] That’s a good question. What does it
mean to me? I’d say it’s pretty much invisible. I guess it’s one of a number of elements that we take
into account on a day-to-day basis. It’s tricky because you’re undertaking CPD [continuous professional
development] all the time. It’s probably not recorded as CPD but every article you read in the PJ
[Pharmaceutical Journal] is all CPD. For example, I’m going to have a lunchtime teaching session,
and there could be two or three things in that that I will take away, and then use in my day-to-day
practice. But as a consequence there are things that I will probably drop out by day-to-day practice
because they’re become superseded by something else more important. 1000 Lives+ is just one
element. There are lots of other things you’re taking in and trying to maintain as current all the time.
Pharmacy manager, case site B2 (016); transcription 8:25
Such disregard was augmented by the notion that, for pharmacists, aspects of 1000 Lives+ have not been
‘translated to pharmacy-speak’ (transcription 8.26). Hence, for this professional group, the resources
offered by RHAI were not considered to be a worthwhile innovation in practice (transcription 8:28, below).
If you look the 1000 Lives+, although I think this might have existed with 1000 Lives as well, but I
mean, with 1000 Lives+ – I forget what the terminology is but the project theme or something for
health-care-associated infection – you have the key intervention areas, if I remember correctly, you’ve
got things like standard precautions, hand hygiene and decontamination; isolation precautions, that
would be another, and antimicrobial stewardship and so on and so on. But all of these are in the
strategies we’ve had in Wales for years! So they, they’re not new and they’re not separate are they?
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site D2 (020); transcription 8:28
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Second-order emergents and situational logic
In case sites A–D, the interplay of structural, cultural and agential emergent properties impacted on the
three groups of actors directly involved in the operationalisation of RHAI. First, in structural terms, RHAI
was integrated into the social system-level but was overshadowed by existing systems. Second, in cultural
terms, though internal and necessary complementarities could be seen between the RHAI and the array of
professional logics in play, this was not considered to add much to already existing principles and
procedures and was largely disregarded. RHAI, therefore, operated under a situational logic of protection
that was primarily directed towards the pre-existing structural and cultural system-level, and thus to
sociocultural interaction aligned with long-established practices.
Sociocultural interaction: agency and strategic negotiation
As discussed in Chapter 6, a situational logic of protection is typically associated with a defensive
negotiating stance. However, for RHAI, prior systems of HCAI surveillance and developed IPAC practices
overshadowed the intervention. The progressive institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme
and RHAI, therefore, unfolded in a terrain marred by a degree of disdain. We highlight this complex
interplay in both a discrete case site and across multiple case sites, again drawing out different degrees
of bureaucratisation and normalisation to help enrich our understanding of the institutional work
complementary to the interplay of the focal intervention, context and mechanism.
Power-induced compliance and political sanction
To examine the issues of power-induced compliance and political sanction, we considered individual
actors’ strategic negotiating stances across different case sites and professional roles.
It was clear that the IPAC team, in the broader sense, were connected to the managerial core
(transcription 8:30). However, they were also intermittently connected to ward-based functional
health-care teams, though IPAC nurses and pharmacists undertook regular ward visits as part of their
practice. This created a context in which such roles, while offering advice and expertise, also functioned
as part of the ward-based governance of IPAC.
However, this oversight role was compromised. Poor practice was adapted in the presence of IPAC nurses,
changing so that it demonstrated, while observed, close adherence to the hand washing guidelines of
RHAI (transcriptions 8:31 and 8:32, below). This finding was corroborated by our observation of practice
at each case site.
There’s some wards you go to and, you know, 1000 Lives+ is just an aside, an extra element of work.
For example, you ask them about commode cleaning and they say: ‘well, we don’t have to clean it
after every patient’, and then we say: ‘but you’ve got to, that is part of the task, it’s part of the
commode bundle’, and they roll their eyes and argue: ‘well, we haven’t got the time’.
I think, wow, if you haven’t got time to just clean a commode, what else have you not got time for?
It’s almost as if everything on some wards is seen as on top of what they’re trying to do, you know,
because they’re so run ragged, which is understandable, but that’s when it’s harder, then, to
implement something new: when they can’t even be doing the things that they should be, you know?
[Can you mandate adherence to these guidelines?] Yes, we tell them, and we audit them, but because
we are all known to staff, the minute we walk onto a ward their practice changes. [So they adopt the
expected behaviour when you are present?] Yes.
Nurse, IPAC, case site D2 (019); transcription 8:31
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About 90% of the staff in ITU [intensive therapy unit] are familiar with me. So, they all know me, and
they all know what my job is. When I walk in twice a year, even if they don’t know my name, they
know who I am – that sounds really self-important, and that not the issue, but they know me and it’s
a problem – and people often will come up, and they’ll stand and chat to me and wash their hands,
and I know perfectly well that they’ve done absolutely nothing – they haven’t been near a patient –
it’s just that conscious effort to demonstrate hand washing. They’ll walk into ITU, they’ll have a squirt
of alcohol gel, and they’ll be watching me, looking at me, to check I’m watching them. So now I sent
up [namea] and [nameb], both IPAC as most of the staff don’t know them. So, they went up, on the
pretext of looking through patients’ notes, and the hand hygiene practice was not acceptable. But, as
soon as they realised that they were being audited, their practice changed immediately. They were like
washing their hands, alcohol gel, everything changed.
Nurse, IPAC, case site B1 (137); transcription 8:32
The IPAC staff demonstrated the professional role-positional power to challenge poor practice within
extant bureaucratic governance processes. However, confronted by normalised malpractice and decoupling
from pre-existing and repacked RHAI standards, their institutional work was predominantly corrective.
Similar corrective institutional work was also demonstrated in the ward-based actions of pharmacists with
expertise in antibiotic medicines management (transcriptions 8:34 and 8:35, below).
We don’t get all doctors following the antibiotic prescribing guidelines. Some do, some don’t. So it’s a
core part of the role for pharmacists to challenge and change that when they do their ward rounds.
Pharmacy manager, case site D1 (021); transcription 8:34
[What happens if a doctor prescribes off guidelines within the health board?] We challenge them. I
had one, a few days ago, who I challenged because he had prescribed two drugs, and only one was
needed for the patient’s indication; but all he said was: ‘so what’s the problem, it’s not illegal is it?’
But it’s a waste of money, medicine, and more of a risk and inconvenience for the patient. I think that
a lot of my role is really about education and changing the culture in the health board. [But is that
refusal to follow the guidelines reported to anyone?] Yes, all the audits go to the medical director. But
it’s anonymised data: ward level, not prescriber level. One of my colleagues in [name, health board]
has done this per consultant team, and they’ve had good results in changing prescribing because the
data is ranked. Everyone knows who’s playing ball, and more importantly, who’s not, so to speak.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site B2 (001); transcription 8:35
In this example, though such staff demonstrated the professional role-positional power to challenge poor
practice and enacted corrective institutional work, the lack of transparency and feedback at this site,
compared with the respondent’s example of another site, where ’everyone knows who’s playing ball, and
more importantly, who’s not, so to speak’, only served to erode the goals of RHAI.
Reciprocal exchange and harmonisation of desires
Gaining widespread support and agreement for a harmonised approach to IPAC, and thus RHAI, proved
difficult due, in part, to individual prescribing preferences and ensuing practices. Indeed, this issue was a
consistent theme at each case site and across professional groups (transcriptions 8:36 and 8:37, below).
Getting agreement between the all of the consultant microbiologists in the health board is quite
demanding but that pales into insignificance when we have to start telling other medical consultants
or surgeons what they are supposed to prescribed for a given indication. You know this as much as
me! They’re all got their preferred drugs, ones that they have used for years, new ones that offer
more, and cost more, it’s that debate that difficult, and it’s one we are having to address due to the
formation of the health board.
Consultant microbiologist, case site B1 (036); transcription 8:36
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I don’t know if they’ll all agree to a health board-wide antibiotic policy. I mean, we’ll get agreement
on the overarching health-care-associated issues – say C. diff management because that’s changing,
and it’s our area per se: they don’t want to claim that for themselves – but it’s harder to negotiate
with respiratory physicians, orthopaedics, all the rest, as they’ve got their preferred drugs. So changing
their prescribing practice is difficult. Our policy is monitored by pharmacists, and IPAC nurses, as they
work at ward level, so they are at the sharp end.
Consultant microbiologist, case site C1 (034); transcription 8:37
The comment from a respondent that ‘To change something – whether you’re talking about the
1000 Lives+ work, adherence to current policy guidelines, or the development of new guidelines across
the health board, you’ve got to know the people involved in the system’ (transcription 8:38) highlights
the critical role of contextual relational structure and social interaction in the brokerage of such contested
change. Leadership and the use of co-opted medical power were also seen as central to the negotiating
stance employed (transcriptions 8:39 and 8:40, below).
On the wards, well, you’ve got issues, other things, you know, if you’ve got high sickness rates on a
ward as well, motivation is often low, so when you’re trying to introduce 1000 Lives+ guided change
that’s going to impact more on their workload, often that’s seen as a negative. The key issues then is,
how do you really sell that to them because it’s no good us saying: ‘this is all the new paperwork, go
on, use this’, the wards have got to see the benefits of that, and own it, and want it, for it to work.
I think that’s where good leadership comes in because it’s sort of, you know, if they sell it, if the ward
manager sells it as this is a positive thing: ‘if we do this we can reduce our rates’, the staff will be
on board.
Lead nurse, IPAC, case site A1 (037); transcription 8:39
We’re having problems with the PVC insertion bundles because we went on the sticker route for the
insertion bundles, whereby you put the sticker on the prescription chart, on the PRN [as required
medication] side of the prescription chart. Well, every time they went to change a cannula they would
just need to sign the prescription chart to say that they’d changed it, and the sticker will have things
like hand hygiene, personal protective equipment, and the right dressing on it, you know. But doctors
insert venflons and doctors don’t like to document that they’ve inserted something! So when we
spoke with the associate medical director at the time, he suggested that we approached clinical
champions to try and embed that a little bit further. So with the audit work and the regular feedback,
and identifying clinical champions, we’ll begin to see an improvement in compliance, you know, if we
don’t, we’ll feed it back to them.
Nurse, IPAC, case site B1 (131); transcription 8:40
Although these IPAC nursing staff demonstrated the professional role-positional power to challenge poor
practice, their corrective institutional work, buttressed by the power of others, was directed towards the
maintenance of best practice and its evolution through RHAI.
Structural elaboration or reproduction in the Welsh health-care field
In examining the progressive institutionalisation of the 1000 Lives+ national programme’s RHAI we sought
to gauge key actors’ perceptions of the structural elaboration or reproduction that had manifested under a
situational logic of protection. For consultant microbiologists, attributing improved outcomes in HCAIs to
1000 Lives+ or RHAIs was considered to be very challenging, owing to the interplay and collective impact
of multiple IPAC policies on WHAIP’s robust epidemiological modelling (transcription 8:41, below).
If you’re looking at say, catheter care policy, now, looking for it to reduce catheter-associated UTIs
[urinary tract infections] then that’s going to be a small subset. So, it’s very, very difficult to be
able to draw and demonstrate a reduction. It’s technically possible, if you have a big enough study
population. However, practices in hospital are not static, things change, for the better, for the worse,
for a whole host of reasons, and controlling any one aspect through 1000 Lives+ policy, or something
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of that nature, that may have one impact but there may be contrary aspects that the main path is
working on. So, it can be, I think, very challenging, and very difficult to really show a reduction and
improvement in outcomes.
Consultant microbiologist, case site A1 (035); transcription 8:41
Structural change was apportioned to the ward-based functional health-care team. In enacting RHAI and
other IPAC guidelines, such staff not only delivered change (transcription 8:42, below), but were
continually motivated to do so through fear of exposure of failings (transcriptions 8:43 and 8:44).
Our C. difficile rates have actually gone down, a reduction again on last year. So it’s good. But, you
know, that’s where our support and advice has come in. But at the end of the day, in infection
control, we’re not there on the coalface, if you like, it’s the staff who put that into practice, into place,
you know, they carry on with what we advise. So, you know, a lot of the hard work is down to them.
Nurse, IPAC, case site D2 (019); transcription 8:42
Cultural change, by contrast, was perceived to be far more marked, with a professional logic of zero
tolerance of HCAIs emerging across NHS Wales, although it remained far removed from the reality of
day-to-day health-care practice (transcription 8:45, below).
I think the culture is changing, I mean, I’ve seen it in the short time I’ve been in infection control, the
ownership at ward level for infection control has shifted. Whereas, you know, if there was a problem
on the ward, often the wards wouldn’t call us, so we would find out by our surveillance!
But now wards are contacting us to say: ‘I think we’ve got a problem’, so there’s the acceptance of
their role in infection prevention and control. Before, for Clostridium difficile, it was accepted that it’s
just a consequence of being in hospital – the attitude was: ‘what do you expect, you’re going to have
antibiotics, you’re elderly, you’re bound to get it’ – but that is changing now. Now people are saying:
‘no, they shouldn’t be getting a health-care-associated infection, it’s just not good enough’. There
should be zero tolerance on infection, health-care-associated infection. [But they still happen, don’t
they? And patients still die as a consequence, don’t they?] Yes. [Long pause] But I think at ward level
staff now are not accepting that patients should acquire an infection as a result of being in hospital.
Nurse, IPAC, case site B1 (131); transcription 8:45
In addition, though tangential to RHAI, the normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ MI-PDSA approach was
evident (transcriptions 8:46 and 8:47). However, the crux of such cultural change lay in the education of
staff (transcription 8:48, below, and transcriptions 8:49 and 8:50).
Education is key, too, not just education for the sake of antibiotic education but to change the culture.
But, again, we face a huge problem here as the attitude is: ‘well, what’s the problem; why do we
need to change how we do things; the evidence is weak’, it’s always the same.
I don’t want to sound cynical, I don’t. I love my job. But getting people to change is difficult, especially
doctors, though they do know that I know what I’m on about. But we go through the same issues
with each junior doctor rotation – I feel that I have to re-prove myself to them because they prescribe,
wrongly – I know what they should be prescribing better than they do. So, a large part of what I do is
education, and not just about drugs.
[Do you think that the junior doctors respect the work you do?] If they’re arrogant, and think they
know it all, probably not; but they’re the most dangerous. Once you’re stopped them from killing a
patient, once or twice; once they’ve realised how fallible they’re, and how, within the NHS, you’re
lucky if you got a good team around you, who all know their own profession and offer different
expertise, they start to listen. They’re not all like it, thankfully. Some are really good, and with more
joint training early on in health-care professional careers, I think the issue of professional respect is
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getting better. But the best doctors are those that listen, and, more importantly, they ask for
information and advice, they’re keen to learn, and you know they’re going to be good because they
work constructively within the team. But with some with doctors, we often just get point blank refusal
to co-operate.
[What are the consequences of this? How does the audit cycle, and associated governance processes
intervene to feedback in such circumstances?] Well, the pharmacy audit will be sent to the medical
director but, with the lack of prescriber identification, and data aggregation, it gets blunted.
Pharmacist, Antibiotics Medicines Management, case site C1 (013); transcription 8:48
1000 Lives+ institutionalisation: RHAI – local implementation
of the focal intervention and contribution to the I–CMAO
configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field
Our efforts to understand the local implementation of RHAI, and define its contribution to the 1000 Lives+
programmes’ I-CMAO configuration spanning the Welsh health-care field, were limited, as there was a
profound sense of it being overshadowed by the complex array of established alternative frameworks and
the ongoing surveillance of their effectiveness via the WHAIP. Indeed, RHAI was found to be, in some
respects, a leftover theme from the predecessor 1000 Lives campaign. Furthermore, for some staff, the
legacy effect of the Safer Patients Initiative was more pertinent. Consequently, though the institutional
change inherent to formalisation shaped the situated context of action for all, the impetus of RHAI,
nonetheless, dissipated.
Turning now to the findings of our realist analysis, we first consider, in Figure 22, the overall scheme of
the intervention across the different structural contexts, focusing, for simplicity, on only one of the two
processes researched in this part of the study, namely the appropriate use of antimicrobial drugs to ensure
the effective prevention and treatment of infection.
In Tables 28–30 we show, respectively, I-CMAO configurations for the implementation of RHAI, illustrating
the infrastructural system of the Welsh Government, the institutional setting of NHS Wales and its
constituent health boards, and interpersonal relationships within the institutional settings.
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Figure 22: key point summary
In Figure 22 we depict the implementation of local antibiotic guidelines in association with the RHAI
focal intervention.
At point 1 we draw attention to the formalisation of this process via professional guidelines and Welsh
Government policy, thereby mandating engagement by all health boards, health-care staff with prescribing
privileges and pharmacists with expertise in antibiotics medicines management.
In point 2 we highlight that, although such practices are legitimate and formalised, under the 1000 Lives+
national programme they represent established practices which do not represent or drive innovation.
Point 3 highlights illustrates that such mandated engagement may be opposed across the micro-work system.
TABLE 28 Reducing health-care-associated infection I-CMAO configuration: infrastructural system –
Welsh Government
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component RHAI
Context Welsh Government
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
RHAI
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+ and
RHAI
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: distributed across policy and
professional domains
l Team work: policy leads and professional
engagement across aligned organisations
l Encultured values: centred on defining
RHAI and WHAIP as mandated
evidence-based practices
l Decoupling limited by structural and cultural
constraints within infrastructural system,
specifically pre-existing mandated WHAIP
monitoring
Outcome 1000 Lives+ national programme and RHAI institutionalised into policy processes via WHAIP
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:01 (T034) – Coupling
l 8:02 (T035) – Decoupling
l 8:28 (T020) – Decoupling
REDUCING HEALTH-CARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTION
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
148
TABLE 29 Reducing health-care-associated infection I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales and
constituent health boards
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component RHAI
Context NHS Wales/NHS Wales’ health boards
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
RHAI
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+ and
RHAI
l Agency – negotiation under a situational
logic of protection (status quo ante)
l Institutional work – creation/maintenance
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system but contested by
others outside relational structure
l Team work: harnesses multiprofessional
leadership to foster adoption of the RHAI
centred on maintenance of extant IPAC
guidelines, greater alignment at health
board-level and gradual progression to all
Wales standards
l Encultured values: mandated adherence
via WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – negotiation under a situational
logic of protection (status quo ante)
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system but contested by others
outside relational structure
l Team work: contested due to extant
practices within each health board
hospital site
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and RHAI
subsumed by site-specific routine IPAC
clinical practices
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system
l Team work: dependent on relational
structure of IPAC clinical micro-work
system
l Encultured values: mandated adherence
via WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system but contested by others
outside relational structure
l Team work: dependent on relational
structure of IPAC clinical micro-work
system
l Encultured values: mandated adherence
via WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system
l Team work: centred on IPAC clinical
networks
l Encultured values: mandated adherence
via WHAIP monitoring
l Decoupling limited by structural and
cultural constraints within infrastructural
system, specifically pre-existing mandated
WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: bound by IPAC clinical
micro-work system
l Team work: centred on IPAC clinical
networks, integrated knowledge and skills
l Encultured values: mandated adherence
via WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system but contested by others
outside relational structure
l Team work: vulnerable to staff absence
and recruitment limitations
l Encultured values: IPAC practices entrenched
within clinical micro-work system
continued
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TABLE 29 Reducing health-care-associated infection I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – NHS Wales and
constituent health boards (continued )
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national programme
and RHAI approach embraced and
absorbed as part of mandated
WHAIP monitoring
l Decoupling 1000 Lives+ national
programme and RHAI approach resisted
and adsorbed onto daily practice as part of
mandated WHAIP monitoring
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – negotiation under a situational
logic of protection (status quo ante)
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:03 (T001) – Decoupling
l 8:31 (T019) – Decoupling
l 8:36 (T036) – Decoupling
l 8:37 (T034) – Decoupling
l 8:38 (T019) – Coupling
l Agency – legitimisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:04 (T076) – Decoupling
l 8:05 (T002) – Decoupling
l 8:06 (T013) – Decoupling
l Agency – formalisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:11 (T035) – Coupling
l 8:43 (T130) – Coupling
l Agency – co-optation
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:08 (T034) – Coupling
l 8:23 (T015) – Decoupling
l 8:27 (T017) – Decoupling
l 8:45 (T131) – Coupling
TABLE 30 Reducing health-care-associated infection I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting –
interpersonal relations
Intervention 1000 Lives+ national programme
Component RHAI
Context Hospital multisite department/hospital site-based ward (functional team)
Mechanisms l Institutional isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and normative
l Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring
Agency and
institutional work
Normalisation: coupling to 1000 Lives+ and
RHAI
Habituation: decoupling to 1000 Lives+ and
RHAI
l Focal interventions selected from the
RHAI do not represent evidence-based
practice innovations
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system but contested by others
outside relational structure
l Team work: contested owing to extant
practices within each health board
hospital site
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and RHAI
subsumed by site-specific routine IPAC
clinical practices
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC
clinical micro-work system
l Team work: centred on IPAC clinical
networks with heightened participation
from ward-based staff
l Encultured values: mandated adherence
via WHAIP monitoring and extant
audit processes
l Decoupling limited by structural and
cultural constraints within infrastructural
system, specifically pre-existing mandated
WHAIP monitoring
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l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC
clinical micro-work system
l Team work: centred on IPAC clinical
networks with heightened participation
from ward-based staff
l Encultured values: heightened awareness
of IPAC practices
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: profession-specific
knowledge led
l Team work: fragmented
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and RHAI
subsumed by site-specific routine IPAC
clinical practices
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC
clinical micro-work system, supporting
extant governance and audit processes
l Team work: multidisciplinary participation
in governance and audit processes
l Encultured values: monitoring and
measurement of RHAI to enhance
patient safety
l Decoupling limited by structural and
cultural constraints within infrastructural
system, specifically pre-existing mandated
WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC
clinical micro-work system
l Team work: multiprofessional
participation in RHAI
l Encultured values: RHAI accepted as part of
pre-existing mandated WHAIP monitoring
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l Leadership: distributed across IPAC clinical
micro-work system but contested by others
outside relational structure
l Team work: multiprofessional participation
in RHAI eroded by profession-specific
knowledge and associated standards
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and RHAI
subsumed by site-specific routine IPAC
clinical practices
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l Leadership: centred on role-position
practices which erode traditional IPAC
power base
l Team work: centred on IPAC clinical
networks with heightened participation
from ward-based staff
l Encultured values: ‘everyone believing
the same thing and working towards
improving patient care’ legitimising
challenge
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l Leadership: role position-practices
profession specific
l Team work: fragmented
l Encultured values: 1000 Lives+ and RHAI
subsumed by site-specific routine IPAC
clinical practices
Outcome l Coupling 1000 Lives+ national
programme and RHAI approach
embraced and absorbed into
daily practice
l Decoupling 1000 Lives+ national
programme and RHAI approach resisted
and adsorbed onto daily practice
TABLE 30 Reducing health-care-associated infection I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – interpersonal
relations (continued)
continued
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Tables 31 and 32 report data relating to the incidence of two types of hospital-acquired infection made
publicly available as part of the new emphasis on transparency in relation to patient safety.
Finally, in Table 33, we present our realist analysis linking the empirical data to I-CMAO.
In this context, deinstitutionalisation did not occur. After all, no appreciable change to practice was
required. As illustrated in Tables 31–33, RHAI placed emphasis on well-established health-care practices,
each supported by a wealth of tacit knowledge and a burgeoning evidence base, which were
institutionalised in NHS Wales. Hence the information offered by the discrete components of this
intervention was neither new nor challenging to extant practice. Instead, these components were merely
the continuation of standard precautions for hand hygiene, together with the ongoing debate on
appropriate antimicrobial prescribing and the merger of guidelines that was required following the
reconfiguration of NHS Wales.
In addition, the transcriptions set out in in Tables 28–30 depict high levels of decoupling. This finding is
supported by the wider literature. For example, it is known that hand hygiene benefits from entrenched
ideas about its meaning and broader social utility.352 This most basic of practices, therefore, constitutes a
cognitive and behavioural ensemble that demands little by way of organised competencies.595,626 However,
in order to be effective, hand hygiene must be enacted as a conscious activity.630 But its broader social
utility positions this practice as routine and somewhat mindless696 and habitual,697 which limits the
individual’s reflexive monitoring and appraisal of the practice.
Moreover, as RHAI did not demand change, theorisation was not triggered, so that established factors
inhibiting actors’ meaningful participation629,645,658 persisted. Compounded by environmental
contamination,698 these factors encouraged the spread of nosocomial infection.
TABLE 30 Reducing health-care-associated infection I-CMAO configuration: institutional setting – interpersonal
relations (continued)
Exemplar transcriptions
l Agency – innovation
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:15 (T002) – Decoupling
l 8:26 (T013) – Decoupling
l Agency – identification
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:09 (T017) – Coupling
l 8:12 (T036) – Decoupling
l 8:13 (T034) – Coupling
l 8:14 (T003) – Coupling
l 8:20 (T018) – Decoupling
l 8:34 (T021) – Coupling
l 8:35 (T001) – Decoupling
l Agency – knowledge mobilisation
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:10 (T001) – Decoupling
l 8:21 (T019) – Decoupling
l 8:22 (T031) – Decoupling
l 8:24 (T001) – Decoupling
l 8:40 (T131) – Coupling
l 8:42 (T019) – Coupling
l Agency – validation
l Institutional work – maintenance
l 8:32 (T137) – Coupling
l Agency – legitimisation (moral/pragmatic)
l Institutional work – creation
l 8:18 (T132) – Decoupling
l 8:19 (T133) – Coupling
l 8:25 (T016) – Decoupling
l 8:30 (T034) – Coupling
l 8:41 (T035) – Decoupling
l 8:48 (T013) – Decoupling
l Agency – emancipation
l Institutional work – disruptive
l 8:44 (T099) – Coupling
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TABLE 31 Reducing health-care-associated infection: local implementation – WHAIP. Data are rates of MRSA
bloodstream infections per 100,000 bed-days
Health board
Monitoring period
1 April 2012 to
31 March 2013
1 April 2011 to
31 March 2012
1 April 2010 to
31 March 2011
1 April 2009 to
31 March 2010





4 4 6 5 8
Aneurin Bevan
University
4 5 4 5 8
Betsi Cadwaladr
University




4 6 7 10 12
Cwm Taf University 5 4 4 9 8
Hywel Dda 4 6 5 7 8






Data accessed via WHAIP: www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/page.cfm?orgId=379&pid=23913.
TABLE 32 Reducing health-care-associated infection: local implementation – WHAIP. Data are rates of S. aureus
bloodstream infections per 100,000 bed-days
Health board
Monitoring period
1 April 2012 to
31 March 2013
1 April 2011 to
31 March 2012
1 April 2010 to
31 March 2011
1 April 2009 to
31 March 2010





26 24 21 24 22
Aneurin Bevan
University
23 23 23 25 26
Betsi Cadwaladr
University




27 26 30 29 32
Cwm Taf University 20 15 15 24 23
Hywel Dda 30 25 26 28 26






Data accessed via WHAIP: www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/page.cfm?orgId=379&pid=23913.
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TABLE 33 Reducing health-care-associated infection: realist analysis – signposting how the empirical data connect
to I-CMAO
Intervention RHAI
Component Antibiotics medicines management
Context Structural conditioning of the institutional setting: NHS Wales health boards’
implementation of 1000 Lives+ national programme’s RHAI
Structural emergent properties l Structural constraints and enablements shaped by the bureaucratic processes of
formalisation emergent from the infrastructural system of the Department of
Health and Social Care impact 1000 Lives+ and RHAI
l The dominant structural emergent properties impacting the RHAI were the
complex array of established alternative frameworks and the on-going
surveillance of their effectiveness via the WHAIP
Cultural emergent properties l The cultural emergent properties arose from the close liaison between each
professional group and their different but interlocking professional roles in IPAC
Social actors l Pharmacists with expertise in antibiotics medicines management
Social position l Expert professional role and widespread networks
Role-position practices l Professional role-position practices centred on promoting and monitoring the
appropriate prescribing of drugs used in the treatment of infection
Mechanism Mediation of structural conditioning to core actors and their reflexive theorisation
Institutional logics and nature of
alignment between core actors
For this professional group, their agential activity therefore manifested under a
professional (pharmacy) logic that, though co-existent to others in the field, express
disregard for the RHAI
First-order emergents The vested interests of pharmacists with expertise in antibiotic medicines
management was poorly aligned to the RHAI as it was perceived to lack relevance
Second-order emergents The RHAI emerged into a context moulded by internal and necessary linkages of a
complementary nature to extant structures. The RHAI was integrated into the social
system-level but, in so doing, it was overshadowed. Though internal and necessary
complementarities manifested between the RHAI and the array of professional logics
in play, this was tainted by disregard
Situational logic Protection (of status quo ante)
Reflexive theorisation Although the RHAI emerged into a context moulded by internal and necessary
linkages of a complementary nature to extant structures – thereby in alignment to the
dominant logic of the bureaucratic state, and collaborative logic, and professional
(pharmacy) logic – the reflexive theorisation that manifested was, as indicated above,
not considered to add much to already existing principles and procedures and largely
disregarded. Coherence, cognitive participation and reflexive monitoring were,
therefore, anchored to the past, such that the discernment of issues, deliberation of
their importance, and dedication of ensuing agency in alignment to the goals of the
RHAI were superficial as, for these actors, little had changed
Agency and institutional
work
Agency, the unfolding strategic negotiation of change, and the mode of institutional
work enacted
Agential emergent properties Agency was directed to the maintenance of practice








Institutional work Primarily maintenance
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As illustrated in Table 33, and supported by the explanatory schematic Figure 22, our realist analysis adds
insight. Centred on pharmacists with expertise in antibiotic medicines management, sociocultural
interaction through the wide range of activities depicted in this study, though undertaken in logical
alignment to the RHAI, were marred by the lack of appreciable change demanded. Indeed, only the new
interventions, focused on the appropriate and timely use of invasive devices – specifically guidance aimed
to reduce PVC and CAUTI – prompted cognitive participation and collective action to deliver change.
Accordingly, little structural elaboration was displayed across each case site, compounded by the view
expressed by some pharmacists that RHAI did not offer any substantive enhancement of their practice.
Summary
In Chapter 8, we furthered our understanding of the local implementation of the focal intervention RHAI
and defined its contribution to the 1000 Lives+ programmes’ I-CMAO configuration spanning the Welsh
health-care field.
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Chapter 9 Discussion and conclusion
Overview
In this chapter we present the discussion and conclusion of our study. Here, the explicit intention is to
move beyond simple iteration. We therefore present our closing argument in four main parts.
First, we return to the original research questions posed in the aim and objectives of this study and address
them guided by our empirical findings. In this manner, we forward our conceptualisation of context,
mechanism, agency and ensuing outcome, and develop insights from the local implementation of the
three focal interventions selected from the 1000 Lives+ national programme: ILQI, RSC and RHAI. Second,
we acknowledge the limitations of our study and set out our stance regarding the generalisability of our
findings. Next, we consider the contribution of this study to the study of patient safety, outline the future
outputs from this project and suggest areas for future research. Finally, we consider the implications of the
research for health-care practice and patient safety.
Which contextual factors matter: how, why and for whom?
In this study, we sought to ascertain which contextual factors matter, how, why and for whom, in order
that processes and outcomes of future patient safety programmes may be improved. Our study therefore
deviated, quite markedly, from the traditional focus of realist inquiry, and the newly established RAMESES
publication standards for realist syntheses (www.ramesesproject.org). Most significantly, our unit of
analysis was the process of local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme, as opposed to the
evaluation of the 1000 Lives+ programme per se.
Before we could begin to address this issue, the notion of context demanded clarification. As Bate699 has
recently commented, context is everything. However, there has been very limited systematic and
independent analysis of the relationship between organisational factors, which shape the local context of
health care, and the outcomes of patient safety interventions.124,216–223 In this study, guided by the
established approach to realist inquiry,228,241,242,247 we specified four main levels of contextual hierarchy:
infrastructural system, institutional setting, interpersonal relations and individual. All levels except the
individual are divided into substrata (see Figure 5). Through this depiction we sought to capture and
convey the accumulated sense of contextual constraints and enablements, structural and cultural, which
impact differently positioned actors within the Welsh health-care field to shape their scope and perceived
discretion to act. Context was, therefore, conceptualised as ‘situated’. By this we mean that context is
stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic.
Importantly, our view of context was reflected in our findings. At the level of the functional team, context
was perceived to be distinct from that of the wider organisation. Indeed, it resonated with that of a
bounded health-care managerial or clinical micro-work system.163,164,166,700–704 Accordingly, we suggest that
this finding challenges the use of the health-care organisation as a unit of analysis for patient safety
programmes, as adopted in this study and as advocated in the ‘four high-priority’ features of organisational
context.5,223,705 Indeed, our use of a comparative case-study design across major, district general and small
community hospital sites within each participant health board was somewhat confounded.
In phase 1 of our analysis, despite the bureaucratic mandate to engage with the 1000 Lives+ programme
that was evident at the field level of analysis (see Chapter 4), our examination of the normalisation of
1000 Lives+ at the suborganisational level (see Chapter 5) surfaced a complex pattern. At this level,
discrete pockets of high adherence sat alongside areas of enforced but somewhat disengaged adoption.
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As such, even within case sites, it was not uncommon to find disparity between adjacent wards. In
essence, two polarised types of situated context emerged. In the first type, 1000 Lives+ was normalised
and absorbed into daily practice, becoming integral to care. In the second type of situated context,
engagement with 1000 Lives+ was merely adsorbed (attached to but not fully integrated with) onto daily
practice. It was then perceived to be an additional burden above and beyond the routine demands of
health-care provision. The local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme was, therefore, positioned
across a spectrum between these polarised stances. This highlights the transitional and fragile state of its
progressive institutionalisation across NHS Wales. We therefore contend that focus directed at the level
of the ‘micro-work system’163–170,706–711 may offer greater insight into the impact of patient safety
improvement programmes at the point of patient-centred care. Indeed, this may even help to challenge
Pawson’s iron law of evaluation: the expected value of any net impact assessment of any large-scale social
program is zero.241
Contextual organisational factors pertinent to the health outcomes of
hospital patient safety interventions
In this section we build on our conceptualisation of a situated context. Informed by our realist analysis
of the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme’s three focal interventions – ILQI, RSC and
RHAI – we identify and analyse the supraorganisational and organisational factors in the Welsh health-care
field which are pertinent to the health outcomes of these hospital patient safety interventions.
What supraorganisational factors matter: how, why and for whom?
In this study, we have drawn on the long-held view that multiple institutional logics co-exist.331 As illustrated
in Figures 8 and 9, at the higher-order societal level, the balance between these logics shapes what is
expected and accepted behaviour for broader society. Moreover, at the level of the Welsh health-care
institutional field, their expression orchestrates the rituals, routines and practices constituting day-to-day
professional work.38 The interplay between logics and their inherent tensions give rise to the institutional
complexity that all health-care practitioners confront.712 Consequently, each individual – whether positioned
as a policy lead in the Welsh Government, a health board chief executive or board-level director, or a
hospital doctor, nurse or other aligned professional group – has to negotiate individually, and as part of a
functional team, the consequences of countervailing, co-existent and complementary logics. Existence
within such a system demands nuanced institutional work. This is typically executed through role and
professional position-based power to attain a state of force majeure, or to broker a workable sense of
reconciliation and compromise.713
Our findings indicate that the precise balance of the institutional logics moulding the Welsh health-care
institutional field impacts patient safety in a particular way. First, the paradigmatic logic of bureaucratic
command and control, which fosters mandated engagement with 1000 Lives+ via coercive institutional
isomorphism, structures the health-care policy context for elite individuals such as policy leads, members
of public sector partner agencies tasked with the strategic oversight of patient safety and board-level
personnel in NHS Wales’ seven health boards.
Although this logic was dominant at the level of the infrastructural system, as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9,
professional logic was found to dominate contextual strata at sub-board organisational levels across
each health board. This gave rise to conflict between logics. In the example of the mandated completion
of the WHO checklist, cited in Chapter 7, while the moral and pragmatic legitimacy of the 1000 Lives+
programme was promoted by the logic of policy leads and health-care managers, it was challenged by the
logic of some groups of health-care clinical professionals. Importantly, it was not the central issue of
patient care that promoted such contestation, but the means through which it was imposed. Mandated
engagement was perceived in a pejorative light as a means of management control that eroded
professional autonomy: a core component of professional logic.335,336 This created tensions that provoked
decoupling from the goals and practices advocated by the 1000 Lives+ programme.
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What organisational factors matter: how, why and for whom?
Our findings set out in Chapter 4 illustrated that the paradigmatic logic of bureaucratic command and
control inculcated a pervasive performance measurement and management ethos across the Welsh
health-care field. Mandated engagement with 1000 Lives+ was, therefore, legitimised as a core policy
lever for health-care transformation. This clearly impacted on board-level actors in NHS Wales’ seven
health boards. Specifically, it caused their actions to be directed to the (i) co-optation, negotiation and
legitimisation of the distributed leadership of change across the relational structure of their personal
managerial and professional networks; and (ii) the formalisation of patient safety governance processes,
specifically the statutory Quality and Safety Committee, aligned to the Welsh National Quality and
Safety Forum.
Such mandated engagement was, however, hindered by the challenges posed by the structural
reconfiguration of NHS Wales. Indeed, our findings highlight that the emergence of health boards has
(i) added management tiers, which now distort communication channels formerly shaped by proximity and
close relational ties for health-care managers and health-care clinical professionals alike; and (ii) disrupted
the relational structures of clinical micro-work systems due to clinical service reconfiguration across
formerly distinct organisations. Furthermore, the profound challenges posed by the economic downturn
impact patient safety and NHS Wales’ organisations engaged with 1000 Lives+ have to do ‘more with less’.
Reflecting on such issues at the level of the functional team added further insight into the nature of
situated context. For example, the organisational factors impacting the focal intervention ILQI, set out in
Chapter 6, were found to be closely integrated with the 1000 Lives+ programme’s position as a legitimised
core policy lever for health-care transformation across NHS Wales. Formalised through the Welsh
Government’s tier 1 targets, this structural constraint drove board-level engagement and severely limited
the scope for decoupling. Moreover, it was compounded by demands for heightened transparency with
respect to the publication of health board and discrete hospital site RAMI data (see Tables 14–20) and
board papers conveying the use of patient stories.
In addition, in the aftermath of the Francis Report,714 cultural constraints and enablements centred on
heightening awareness of systemic failings and the need to foster a culture of high-quality compassionate
care. This gave rise to the institutionalised division of delegated strategic oversight of patient safety – and
thus 1000 Lives+ and ILQI – to the directors of medicine, nursing, and therapies and health science. Given
the board-level status and professional role-positions of such actors, the inherent change agenda
overarching the 1000 Lives+ programme and, thus, the ILQI were executed from a position of high
negotiating strength.
Structural elaboration was, therefore, displayed across each case site. Indeed, an objective outcome of the
ILQI was the normalisation of the three practices examined in Chapter 6. In addition, the relational
structure at each site had evolved, promoting the diffusion of the ILQI, and thus the 1000 Lives+
programme, while engendering a culture of organisational learning. However, cultural change was
restricted by medical disengagement – notably via challenge to the moral and pragmatic legitimacy of
some components of the 1000 Lives+ programme. The two key issues we identified were the burden of
documentation and weak feedback from boards to wards.
The organisational factors impacting at the level of the functional team for the focal intervention RSC and
the associated WHOSSC, set out in Chapter 7, were, once again, shaped by the bureaucratic processes of
formalisation emergent from the infrastructural system of the Welsh Government’s Department of Health
and Social Care. However, in this regard, the overarching policy mandate of the 1000 Lives+ programme
was augmented by the compulsion to undertake the WHOSSC forwarded by professional Royal Colleges.
Cultural constraints and enablements centred on the institutional system emblematic of the theatre
departments. Two critical features surfaced in this study were a sense of separation from the broader
health board that was compounded by distinctive functional and dominant professional cultures.
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In essence, the local implementation of the RSC and the WHOSSC demanded skilful brokerage of
institutional change across two groups of theatre department staff. The first group were consultant
surgeons who lacked the burden of managerial accountability for the implementation of the RSC and
WHOSSC, and who, therefore, were, quite simply, participants in its local operationalisation. This group of
actors viewed the change with a degree of disdain: ’It was all quite an interesting shambles actually. The
senior people decided that they were above it all basically’. The second group were consultant surgeons,
supported by theatre managers, who were explicitly tasked with the strategic oversight of the local
implementation of the RSC and the WHOSSC. Given the professional role-positions of such theatre
department actors and the inherent change agenda overarching the 1000 Lives+ programme, the RSC and
the WHOSSC were executed through negotiated compromise through multimodal institutional work.
Once again, as set out in Chapter 7, structural elaboration was evident across each case site. This was
illustrated by the integration of the WHOSSC into governance processes. However, the openly
acknowledged decoupling from such governance processes distorted coherence and commitment to the
RSC and the WHOSSC by diminishing it to a tick-box exercise. Such a contested change highlights the time
demanded to bring discordant professional logics into alignment. It also underscores the complexity of the
prolonged period of creative institutional work required to promote the desired coalescence and
unification at the cultural system level.
In contrast, the organisational factors impacting the focal intervention RHAI centred on the complex array
of established alternative frameworks and ongoing surveillance of their effectiveness via the WHAIP. This
was compounded by different but interlocking professional roles across the local IPAC team. Accordingly,
in such a situated context, no appreciable change to practice was required and deinstitutionalisation did
not occur. The 1000 Lives+ programme and RHAI were, therefore, blunted through adherence to
alternative frameworks of perceived heightened professional legitimacy via institutional maintenance work.
Mechanisms that interact with contextual organisational factors to generate
the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions
In this section, first, we reflect on the notion of a mechanism. Then we set out how our findings have identified
critical mechanism substructures which impact the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme.
From mechanism to causal configuration
In realist inquiry, mechanisms are considered to be the engines of explanation embodied in an agent’s reasoning
and their selective attention to the disparate resources offered through a social programme.228,241,242 However,
consideration of social actors’ contextually situated reflexive reasoning remains underdeveloped.256 One reason
for this arises from the inherent problems associated with unpacking and conceptualising reasoning, specifically
as justifications for choices may operate within different, and often contradictory, stances.321
The notion of ‘a mechanism’, in the sense of a unitary phenomenon, obscures its inherent structure and
operation within a broader causal configuration. Hence, in this study, mechanism, while centred on
agents’ reasoning, is theorised as part of a causal configuration emergent from a cluster of contextual
factors and organisational components. These typically encompass a complex array of social structures,
practices, relations, rules and resources. Yet, collectively, it is these factors which possess the powers,
capacities and potentials to do certain things when operating in a spatio-temporal relationship with
other objects.306,309,310 Conceptualised in this manner, mechanisms, and their attendant causal I-CMAO
(CMO) configurations, may be embedded in another or configured in a series, so that the outcome of one
configuration becomes the context for the next in the chain of implementation steps.307 This aspect of
realist inquiry remains underdeveloped, as it demands the formulation of I-CMAO configurations, which
pervade and connect contextual strata, in the form of bidirectional (top-down and bottom-up) nested
causal cascades or metamechanisms.316–318
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In this study, our aim was to contribute to these conceptual challenges by examining the nuanced
demarcation between context and mechanism across defined yet linked contextual strata, each involved in
the operationalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme within the Welsh health-care field. Hence, to
examine the process of the local implementation of this complex and ambitious patient safety programme,
we drew on two fundamental institutional processes – bureaucratisation and normalisation – which, we
argue, operate as sociocultural and organisational metamechanisms. Bureaucratisation and normalisation,
therefore, act as the underpinning carriers347 of the processes of health-care institutional change and
ensuing practice-based change advocated by 1000 Lives+. In essence, it is through successful embedding
within these fundamental metamechanisms that the patient safety programme becomes institutionalised.
Our findings from Chapters 4–8 illustrated three mechanism substructures, which collectively compose core
components of the causal configuration for the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme and
further enrich our appreciation of the complex interplay of context and mechanism.
Mechanism substructure I: institutional isomorphism – mimetic, coercive and
normative – coupling and decoupling
Institutional theory has arguably become the dominant approach for the study of macro-organisational
phenomena.715 Indeed, in institutionally informed health-care research it is acknowledged that institutions
are primary and mould the context in which the varied health-care actors’ interests operate.716 Dominant
institutional logics are, therefore, a critical field-level mechanism717 that focus attention on the manner
through which the attendant ‘culture’718 influences lower-level organisational change.719
As set out in Chapter 4, our findings indicated that, within the Welsh health-care field, institutionally
prescribed values were orchestrated at field level and echoed at the organisational level of the Welsh
Government and NHS Wales, though they manifested in a distinctive manner in functional subgroups. This
stance has been identified in other complex, institutionally dense organisations.720 However, it was the
discrete professions embedded within this institutional field that operated as the ‘pre-eminent institutional
agents’, enacting isomorphic institutionalism through mimetic, coercive or normative means.404,721
Furthermore, our findings highlight that such institutional work engendered legitimacy which impacted
strategy and culture as well as associated structures and processes, in part, due to the statutory
accountabilities and governance structures enmeshed with patient safety practices across NHS Wales.
Voronov et al.722 have identified the important role of ‘glocalisation’ – fidelity to global norms with aligned
adaptation to local conditions – in institutional maturation and change. In our study, this effect was
apparent in the transmission of the IHI patient safety practices via mimetic isomorphic forces, driven by
the dominance of the IHI’s position and their acceptance by elite institutional actors with close professional
ties to policy leads within the Welsh Government. Indeed, our data highlighted that for social actors
embedded within the policy domain of the Welsh Government, mimetic isomorphic forces drove
acts of imitative entrepreneurship even for those who expressed questions over the legitimacy of
the 1000 Lives+ programme. Mimetic isomorphism also arose through the institutional work of ‘believers’
in the 1000 Lives+ programme’s ethos and values, thereby catalysing co-optation and engagement of
others. Yet despite the salience and assumed core values enshrined in the notion of patient safety, this
institutional mechanism, as previously illustrated by Van Wijk et al.,723 was marred by the disruptive
distributed brokerage of change.
Coercive institutionalism was apparent throughout our study. It emerged from dominating organisational
structures tied to health-care policy, health board performance and the ‘legitimating rhetoric’724 of
governance – external and internal – of patient safety. Yet this, too, was challenged by professional,
predominantly medical, power-based structures of membership and specialism identity.725
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In addition, isomorphic institutionalism through normative means was apparent in some long-established
interventions, which had previously operated under the banner of the 1000 Lives campaign and, indeed,
the Safer Patients Initiative, together with others associated with the 1000 Lives+ programme. However,
as illustrated in Chapter 5, such normalisation was fragmented and isolated in discrete pockets.
Normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme was also associated with clear leadership of change,
internal health-care practice maturation emergent from the MI-PDSA approach, and complex ‘boundary
brokerage’34,91,726 to signal an identity for the programme, its adherents and associated health-care
practices. The creative institutional work required to change beliefs, values and, through time, associated
norms of practice was frequently displayed by actors occupying hybrid professional roles, including
nurse-managers, associate directors with dual management and clinical portfolios, and board-level clinical
practitioners. This finding parallels that of Reay et al.222,408
Our findings illustrated that, while the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme fostered strong
institutional coupling that was moulded by the institutional isomorphism inherent to its bureaucratisation
and normalisation, the operationalisation of 1000 Lives+ in everyday practice was distorted by adaptive and
maladaptive decoupling.
Adaptive decoupling arose in the focal intervention RHAI, as already established alternative IPAC guidelines
and the ongoing surveillance of their effectiveness via the WHAIP were perceived to offer more rigor and,
thus, heightened legitimacy across the core professional groups examined in our study. Hence given the
embedded nature of such alternatives, and their aligned clinical practices, the 1000 Lives+ programme was
simply circumvented.
In contrast, maladaptive decoupling was apparent in the local implementation of the focal intervention
RSC, centred on the WHOSSC. Given the Welsh health-care policy commitment to this practice, as well as
its world-wide professional advocacy,439,565,727 it is worth considering the means through which such
maladaptive decoupling manifested, that is, the simple and common failure to identify the members of the
theatre team in the checklist. This practice reduced the possibility of individuals being blamed for any
failures, undermining belief in the WHOSSC as a meaningful practice. Indeed, such disruptive institutional
work diminished the legitimacy and moral foundation of the practice and hindered the remoulding of
underlying belief systems. Perceived as a threat to the entrenched professional dominance of surgeons, the
resistance rendered the WHOSSC down to a tick-box exercise which was interpreted by respondents to
demonstrate that it was having little effect on reducing error ’. . .across NHS Wales we’ve had disasters
even with the checklist being used: wrong site surgery, instruments left in, etcetera . . . In other words it’s
not being used properly’.
Mechanism substructure II: alignment of institutional logics – countervailing,
co-existent and complementary – and ensuing coherence, cognitive
participation and reflexive monitoring
At the level of the Welsh health-care institutional field, the nature of the alignment of institutional
logics - be they complementary, co-existent or countervailing – impact patient safety. As discussed in
Contextual organisational factors pertinent to the health outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions,
What supra-organisational factors matter: how, why and for whom?, and as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9,
this centred on the interplay of the logic of the bureaucratic state and professional logic. However,
previous studies have illustrated that, within health care, professional logic does not manifest in unitary
manner.37,38,222,373,728 Rather, different interprofessional logics and attendant institutions are displayed,
each connected by some semblance of an overarching ‘logic of care’.373
Our findings illustrated the dynamic and complex nature of this relationship. When a complementary
alignment of professional logics arose, as in the case of the focal intervention ILQI, coherence, cognitive
participation and reflexive monitoring of the health-care practices advocated by the 1000 Lives+
programme was fostered, thereby aiding its normalisation in daily practice. In contrast, a countervailing
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alignment of logics, or their mere co-existence, was found to have stymied normalisation. Such varied
permutations may be found both between different health-care professional groups, and within a discrete
health-care professional group, and are typically dependent on two factors. The first is variation in individual
practitioners’ reflexive theorisation, encompassing their discernment of the patient safety practice in
question, deliberation over the issues and dedication to a chosen action guided by their situational logic.
The second factor is variation in the situational logic apparent at the level of the functional team.
Normalisation, a pivotal stage of institutionalisation, was therefore found to be dependent on the actions
of those who were the ‘believers’: perceiving meaning in 1000 Lives+ due to alignment with the beliefs
and values of their professional logics. When such coherence manifested, it promoted cognitive
participation and reflexive theorisation in the individual and, importantly, at the level of the functional
team, building commitment and co-ordinated engagement with the programme across the bounded
clinical micro-work systems. Underscoring the fundamental role of leadership and effective teamwork to
orchestrate the actions of the functional team, such processes were central to local innovation and
adaptation of the health-care practices advocated by 1000 Lives+ and appeared to be a viable means of
developing micro-competences across the functional team.
Mechanism substructure III: relational structure – role position-practices and
profession – and the power to change health-care practice
Across Chapters 4–8, our findings highlight the role of the relational structure of the functional team in the
local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme. This mechanism substructure places attention on the
human relationships. By this we mean the ties that bind the functional team, its orchestrating situational
logic, ethos and values, and the presence of hierarchical or distributed leadership.729,730 These factors
collectively impact team-level performance and, in turn, patient safety. Hence relational structure is
moulded by the interplay of role position-practices and profession within the multidisciplinary team, and
the power to change health-care practices is aligned to leadership functions across managerial and clinical
micro-work systems.
In Chapters 4–8, those in professional role-position practices shaped by high levels of social capital – typically
board-level managers and consultant medical or surgical health-care practitioners – were found to have had
a valued role to play in reconfiguring other actors’ belief systems to support the local implementation of
1000 Lives+. Our findings therefore echo those that recognise the role of managerial, medical and nurse
leadership in patient safety, especially in the brokerage of change across different functional teams.34,731,732
Despite this, there were some such actors who, as the following comment illustrates, overtly rejected the
1000 Lives+ programme: ’The 1000 Lives+ national programme and the campaign – it’s command and
control rather than a grass roots culture change – it hasn’t been created by the people. It’s not of the
people. It’s an imposition. It’s control. It’s from Cardiff. It’s very much a Cardiff thing that is being pushed to
everyone else because: “we know better”. Outside Cardiff, it feels remote and distant and not part of us,
it’s something that we all recognise as important, clearly, but we don’t necessarily own it’.
However, such demonstrable leadership was not the exclusive jurisdiction of high-status actors. Social actors
across an array of managerial and clinical roles, who expressed their belief in the 1000 Lives+ programme
and actively engaged in creative institutional work to imbue a similar sense of meaning in others, were
undeniably central to the local implementation of 1000 Lives+ and the ongoing discourse of patient
safety across NHS Wales. This was expressed in the view that ’Clinical leadership is key – credible clinical
leadership – and that’s all about empowerment of Band 7 nurses’, underscoring the empowerment and
emancipation of those in roles traditionally subordinate to the profession of medicine. Therefore, in
supporting staff at all levels, an important outcome of the 1000 Lives+ programme was the progressive
erosion of entrenched professional barriers that prohibit challenge and scope for health-care practice change.
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Mediation and reflexive theorisation
In defining such mechanism substructures, our findings help to reveal how the structural constraints and
enablements of context are mediated to social actors engaged in the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+
programme. As expanded in Chapter 2, these influences give rise to four potential second-order emergents,
which foster the accompanying situational logics of protection, correction/compromise, opportunism and
elimination, thereby guiding the generative mechanisms in play.
Our findings illustrated that the focal intervention ILQI drew professional logic into alignment with
that of the bureaucratic state. This fostered the systematisation of 1000 Lives+ and ILQI across the
cultural system level of NHS Wales and promoted the reproduction of such practices across each health
board. Consequently, at board level, ILQI operated under a situational logic of protection that guided
sociocultural interaction, agency, strategic negotiation and ensuing modes of institutional work.
The focal intervention RSC, centred on the local implementation of the WHOSSC, confronted a more
contested terrain, with the coalescence and cohesion manifest between the views of theatre managers,
consultant surgeons tasked with the implementation of the WHOSSC, and theatre nurses, stymied
by the countervailing stance adopted by some surgeons. These constraining contradictions (necessary
incompatibilities) between the dominant logic of the bureaucratic state and aligned professional
health-care management logic versus that of professional medical logic held by surgeons opposed
to the introduction of the WHOSSC therefore created a situational logic of correction/compromise.
This logic guided sociocultural interaction, agency, strategic negotiation and ensuing modes of institutional
work along its disrupted path.
The focal intervention RHAI emerged into a context moulded by internal and necessary linkages of a
complementary nature to existing structures. Nonetheless, a situational logic of protection of the status
quo ante manifested. Reflexive monitoring was found to be anchored to the past, to preferred and more
highly rated organisational and professional processes currently in use. Under these conditions, there was
only superficial interest in and action to engage with RHAI.
Development and hypothesis testing of relationships between contextual
organisational factors, mechanisms and the health outcomes of hospital
patient safety interventions
In this study, we sought to develop and test hypothesis regarding the nature of the relationships between
contextual organisational factors, mechanisms and the health outcomes of hospital patient safety
interventions. Yet given the ontological commitment to critical realism, set out in Chapter 2 (see
Addressing the challenges of realist enquiry, Realist social theory) and Chapter 3 (see Comparative case
study approach, Ontological and epistemological alignment to realist analysis), such hypothesis testing was
markedly different from that commonly adopted in positivistic studies. In essence, our approach centred
on the progressive explanation and refinement of our understanding of the local implementation of the
1000 Lives+ programme, and the three focal interventions considered in more depth, all framed through
our I-CMAO configurations.
Across Chapters 4–8, this approach revealed the nuanced relationships associated with the bureaucratisation
and normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme, as illustrated in the explanatory schematics and
accompanying data tables. What emerged from our data was the role of structural and cultural conditioning
on the individual, embedded at the level of the functional team – managerial and clinical – and their ensuing
disposition and scope to act to effect institutional change in support of patient safety. Such social structure,
understood as the internal and necessary relations between social positions and positioned-practices,
gave rise to emergent causal powers as the material cause of social activity.733–735 Perceived through our
non-reductionist critical realist ontological stance, patient safety is, therefore, an emergent property of the
micro-level organisation of health care.
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In examining the bureaucratisation and normalisation of the 1000 Lives+ programme, together with the
local implementation of the three focal interventions selected, the underpinning role of the MI-PDSA
approach, depicted in Figures 2–11, was revealed. 1000 Lives+, together with this core resource, were
found to have become ’part of the patient safety language of NHS Wales’ . . . ’PDSA cycles and all of that
stuff it’s created a language that they like: it’s language that they all understand’. That, supported by the
1000 Lives+ dedicated website, and aligned resources from Improving Quality Together and Patient Safety
Wales, now provide the means to spread such practices across NHS Wales.
However, although innovation through identifying failings and honing local knowledge and skills to
change health-care practice was evident throughout our study, there were those who challenged the
evidence that the programme was working: ‘The evidence-base for the 1000 Lives+ national programme
has been systematically attacked by the other factions – for one side, it’s evidence and truth; for the other,
it’s spin and fluff – and reality is caught in the middle’.
Limitations of the study
Although we contend that our realist analysis framework presents an innovative and suitable means to
address the research questions posed, we must acknowledge inherent limitations. There are three main
sets of limitations to this work: (1) those posed by the processs of realist analysis itself, (2) those
consequent on any qualitative social science research, and (3) those posed by a lack of the type of
quantitative data which would have added further validity to our findings.
The most significant limitation in producing a narrative which is true to the tenets of critical realism is in
the abstraction, abduction and retroduction inherent to the data analysis. Abstraction draws out the
various components within the situated context, facilitating the conceptualisation of their interplay,
through combination and interaction, so that the researcher may gain new insight.310 Abduction involves
the production of an elementary account of a basis process or mechanism.363 Retroduction builds on this
analytical stage. The aim is to reconstruct the basic conditions for such phenomena to be what they are,
so fostering knowledge of the transfactual conditions, structures and mechanisms in play.363 In this study,
this process was aided by the hierarchical bureaucratisation of the Welsh health-care institutional field,
which facilitated the explication of the internal and necessary relationships underpinning structural and
cultural emergent properties.
To be adequate, as noted by Herepath,342 this approach must abstract from particular conditions, excluding
those which are believed to have no significant effect, in order to focus on those which do and identify
relations of different types: ‘substantial’, ‘formal’, ‘external or contingent’ and ‘internal or necessary’.310
Only once this step has been achieved may it be possible to combine or synthesise the various separate
understandings into a unity that reconstitutes, or provides a better understanding of, the concrete.736 Thus,
an explanatory structure is devised through a combination of theory and experimental observation.228
Inevitably, such analysis is open to the criticism that, as it must be influenced by the investigator’s
perspective, beliefs and experience, the data represent only individual interpretation. To counter such
criticism we made considerable efforts to ensure the data collected were as robust as possible. We
achieved this triangulation of data collection by accessing documentary evidence and conducting on-site
observation, as well as interviewing a large and varied number of individuals.
A further limitation of our study is our inability to derive detailed linkage of quantitative data to the
qualitative data relating to each specific intervention studied. Paradoxically, given the engagement in the
study of all seven of the health boards in NHS Wales, detailed linkage of quantitative data was prohibited
as it would have proved impossible to ensure anonymisation at organisational, hospital case site and
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individual level. The best we were able to do was to accommodate for this deficit by giving illustrative
public source data for each health board, as set out in Tables 14–20 (RAMI data), Tables 25 and 26
(‘never events’ across NHS Wales’ health boards) and Tables 31 and 32 (MRSA per 100,000 bed-days and
S. aureus per 100,000 bed-days).
Possible applications
As this study centred on the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ national patient safety programme
across NHS Wales, a substate nation with devolved oversight of health-care policy, it is pertinent to consider
to what extent our findings may be applicable to other developed or developing health-care systems.
There is, of course, a global debate on patient safety, and patient safety programmes have been widely
integrated into developed health-care systems on a world-wide scale. In that sense, some of the processes
and practices seen in our study of the implementation of 1000 Lives+ in NHS Wales may well be identified
in other settings and, therefore, offer insights into other similar processes and practices elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the extent to which our findings may be directly transferable to other health-care systems
implementing major programmatic changes is limited by a number of factors.
First, as presented in Chapter 4, NHS Wales is shaped by a distinctive health-care policy trajectory in which
engagement with the 1000 Lives+ programme is mandated and monitored. This created a health-care
institutional field moulded by coercive isomorphism in addition to the normative and mimetic modes more
typical to studies of the diffusion of patient safety practices.358
Furthermore, the study period overlapped the period of transition following the reconfiguration of health
services in Wales. As such, health boards, through the merger of other former NHS Wales’ hospital
trusts with primary care organisations, were newly established. Each organisation, therefore, confronted
a strategic agenda burdened by the managerial demands of reconfiguration, including change to
management cadres and clinical director roles, together with the politicised and public constraints fostered
through the ongoing reconfiguration of hospital service provision across each territory. Though such
circumstances are far from unique in developed health-care systems, they were distinctively shaped by the
particular context of health care in Wales, and these factors do limit the degree to which the lessons
learned from this study may be transferable to other settings.
Another limitation of applicability is that, although in our research protocol our case site selection criteria
encompassed a major hospital, an intermediate hospital and a small local community hospital within each
health board, to offer a desirable mix of different organisational features the strategic oversight of the
1000 Lives+ programme and its leadership was predominantly centred within the major hospital sites.
Indeed, the 1000 Lives+ programme was, ostensibly, acute in its focus, with fewer interventions applicable
to small case hospitals. This limited our scope to explore the implementation of each focal intervention
across the range of organisations. Our findings are, therefore, more broadly applicable to large and
intermediate hospital settings.
Case study participants were initially selected by the research team’s local contact at each case site and,
thus, a degree of bias must be acknowledged. However, we sought to mitigate this issue through our use
of a snowball sampling strategy, as discussed in Chapter 3. As evidenced by the candid and occasionally
very blunt comments embedded in Chapters 4–8, the research team is confident that the data collected
accurately represented the views of those interviewed, although, as a degree of self-selection was involved,
we cannot discount the possibility that others who were not interviewed might have held different views.
Despite these caveats, however, we would argue that, at the micro-level of functional teams in wards and
departments, the processes and practices of implementation identified in this study may well mirror those
to be found in similar circumstances in other health-care systems, and that our findings may thus have
relevance and offer lessons to be learned elsewhere.
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Contribution of the study to patient safety research
This study offers conceptual, methodological and empirical contributions to patient safety research. In
conceptual terms, we developed a theoretically grounded and evidence-based realist model of which
organisational factors matter, how they matter and why they matter. To do this, we introduced conceptual
resources from sociological institutionalism and Archerian critical realism to address challenges associated
with applying realist inquiry. Our model incorporates four elaborations of the established approach to
realist inquiry.
First, so that we may understand precisely ‘what’ is working, for whom, how and in what circumstances,
we include intervention as a separate analytical category in our realist analysis. Second, we forward a view
of ‘situated context’ as stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic. This involves identifying
the dominant structural and cultural emergent properties in play and separating context from its
mediation. Third, we apportion mediation and reflexive theorisation to mechanism. In this manner, we
distinguish the conceptual elements of mechanism from its ensuing outcomes, which include the agential
emergent properties, expressed through the unfolding strategic negotiation of change, and the mode
of institutional work enacted, to deliver sustainable outcomes, be they elaborative or reproductive. This
fine-grained realist analysis therefore explicates the fundamental role of beliefs and values – institutional
logics – on the propensity to act, to reveal the contested nature of institutional change, health-care
practice evolution, and thus social elaboration or, indeed, reproduction. Finally, in our realist analysis
framework, outcome is not perceived as a simple, single aspect of change, such as a defined health
outcome. Rather, we reveal structural and ideational differentiation, together with the regrouping inherent
to the power play of the diverse array of agents embroiled in the institutionalisation of a complex patient
safety improvement programme.
In methodological terms, this is one of the first studies of patient safety to apply realist philosophy of social
science across inception, design, fieldwork, analysis and writing. This has generated a number of features
that may inform and challenge the field of patient safety research.
First, in contrast to the majority of health services research studies, this study has taken seriously, and
explicated, realist epistemology and ontology. These foundations of our research conditioned its design,
conduct and reporting. They helped shape our concern for ontological depth and contextual strata, and
they directed us towards the identification and explanation of the underlying generative mechanisms
which shape structure, agency, social relations and the ensuing practices that are reproduced and/or
transformed. In terms of analysis, this is one of the first health services research studies to conduct
abstraction, abduction and retroduction363 to devise an explanatory structure through a combination of
theory and experimental observation. While we have earlier noted the challenges posed by this approach,
we believe that this study has demonstrated the value of the analytical approach in helping to reconstruct
the basic conditions for focal phenomena to be what they are, so fostering knowledge of the conditions,
structures and mechanisms in play. In addition, the conclusions of our realist analysis are recognised to be
both provisional and fallible.
In terms of empirical contribution, for each of the three focal interventions of 1000 Lives+ programme, this
study offers a nuanced explanation of how local conditions relating to each level of our stratified model
of context differentially combine with mechanisms (the engines of explanation embodied in people’s
reasoning) to derive outcomes in terms of structural and cultural reproduction or change. Reflecting social
reality, these causal configurations are complex and nested. To aid our elucidation of these configurations
we augment our textual description with a series of graphics. This approach to presentation of our findings
allows us to clearly specify how particular configurations of factors across multiple layers of context
(e.g. logics, power relations) combine with two metamechanisms (bureaucratisation and normalisation) and
three submechanisms (isomorphism, logic alignment and relational structure) to generate outcomes that
are variously viewed as more or less successful by multiple stakeholders.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
167
We believe these findings will provide a valuable resource for policy-makers, managers and practitioners,
locally, nationally and internationally, and will enable stakeholders to develop improvement interventions
that are more likely to ‘work’ (for specified stakeholders) in their local contingent circumstances. They
may also serve as a diagnostic tool to be used as a precursor to the design of more differentiated and
context-sensitive interventions in future.
Future project outputs
This report addresses gaps in conceptual, methodological and empirical knowledge about the influence
of context on the local implementation of patient safety programmes so that we may discern which
contextual factors matter – how, why and for whom – in order that processes and outcomes of future
improvement programmes may be improved. Future research outputs will seek to contribute to a broad
range of academic and professional literatures.
Active dissemination of emergent findings to academic audiences has commenced via participation in
relevant national and international conferences [Academy of Management (US); British Academy of
Management; European Group for Organizational Studies; Health Services Research Network; International
Organisational Behaviour in Healthcare; International Research Society for Public Management].
Dissemination will now continue through the submission of papers to leading academic journals. The first
of such papers is currently under review.
As well as disseminating our findings to academic audiences, we intend to work with case site
organisations in NHS Wales and, potentially, to reach out to a wider audience in NHS England, through a
series of interactive seminars for health-care policy and professional audiences. These discussions will be
disseminated through publications targeted specifically at NHS professional audiences including, for
example, the Health Service Journal.
Future research
While the work conducted in this study could be developed in a number of ways, we believe that three
options are most promising.
First, although this study adopted the organisation as the primary unit of analysis, we now consider that
the micro-work system – managerial and clinical – could be a more fruitful unit of analysis from which to
develop further insight into the implementation of patient safety programmes. Indeed, this offers the
potential to examine the complexity inherent to the delivery of patient-centred care across discrete care
pathways, thereby spanning organisational boundaries between primary, secondary and, potentially,
tertiary-based functional teams. Such an approach, we believe, will help to explicate the true demands of
leadership, followership, and empowered and emancipated team working, which underpin health-care
practice innovation and commitment to the delivery of health care of the highest quality for all.
Second, this study has placed great significance on the role of, and interplay between, logics operating
across the multiple strata of our model of context. In our case based in Wales, a critical dynamic occurs
between the field level, where the paradigmatic logic of bureaucratic command and control shapes
the activity of elite actors, while actors at sub-board organisational levels are influenced primarily by
professional logics. It will, therefore, be important to compare the processes and outcomes from that
context with (i) settings with similar institutional arrangements (possibly Scotland), and (ii) arenas with
alterative arrays of dominant logics across contextual strata (possibly England, where the dominant
paradigmatic logic is competition augmented by devolution and transparency).
Furthermore, given the mandated nature of engagement with the 1000 Lives+ programme in our study,
and the tensions thereby fostered for some health-care clinical professionals, it will also be important to
compare future patient safety interventions which emerge at the level of the functional team so that their
insights may be effectively harnessed and their diffusion aided within, and across, health-care organisations.
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Finally, this study has illustrated the complex interplay that lies behind the 1000 Lives+ programme’s
summary I-CMAO configuration. Indeed, it has exposed that distinctive ‘cultures of care’ emerged and
operated throughout the local implementation of the 1000 Lives+ programme. These ranged from ‘discrete
pockets of high adherence’ to situated contexts of ‘enforced but somewhat disengaged adoption’. This
finding demonstrates the time and institutional work needed to achieve change amid competing priorities,
contested professional values and notions of control. Future research should address the relational dynamics
of the functional team within a situated context to refine our understanding of high-performing micro-work
systems and thus penetrate beyond the illusory notion of a cohesive culture of care.
Priorities for practice
Below, we set out the implications of our findings for realist informed research and the design and
operationalisation of complex patient safety interventions.
Realist analysis
The realist analysis undertaken in this study is different from established approaches to realist inquiry. It is
neither a realist evaluation of the success or failure of the 1000 Lives+ patient safety programme, nor a
realist synthesis of extant data to inform the future redesign of the 1000 Lives+ patient safety programme
and associated policy in NHS Wales. Rather, as set out in in the introduction to this report, our approach to
realist analysis defines an alternative means to analyse the complex interplay of this patient safety
intervention within a specified ‘situated’ context. This creates challenges and opportunities for the field.
The challenges posed are primarily conceptual and methodological, and arise from the need to integrate
distinct research traditions – realist inquiry, critical realism and institutional theory – with the information to
be assimilated from aligned medical, health-care policy and health-care organisational and professional
fields. However, we would argue that the opportunities offered by the adoption of our approach, and the
generation of I-CMAO configurations within other studies, arise from the more nuanced understanding to
be gained of the organisation and operation of developed health-care safety practices at the level of the
functional team. This, we consider, possesses the potential to enrich our understanding of the emergence
of patient safety as a dynamic capability within high-performing health-care teams, thereby informing the
design of patient safety interventions.
Realist analysis: refinement of the concepts of context and mechanism
Our conceptual refinement of the situated context of care suggests that future patient safety research
will need to consider context as more than a mere amorphous residual. While it may not be practicable for
all research designs to actively embrace our stratified, conditioned, relational and temporally dynamic
approach, a heightened awareness and account of context will foster cumulative insight and contribute to
appreciation of the locus of change within complex health-care systems or discrete organisations.
Similarly, in future realist informed research, apportioning both the mediation of contextual forces and
reflexive theorisation to mechanism will help to refine our understanding of what drives social agents – be
they organisations, professions or individuals – to actively embrace and normalise a new patient safety
practice or reject and retard such change. This will help to clarify the role of that such mechanisms play
within larger and more complex causal configurations.
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Realist analysis: refinement of agency and outcome
This study suggests that the combination of Archerian critical realism and institutional theory offers a
robust means to examine mechanism across aligned or conflicted institutional logics in different
organisational and professional jurisdictions. This feature of an I-CMAO configuration, therefore, helps to
further inform our understanding of the operationalisation of patient safety practices, specifically by
offering insight into the actions that unfold within and across functional teams. Accordingly, both patient
safety research and the implementation of such interventions will benefit from an enhanced understanding
of practice, centred on the unfolding strategic negotiation of change and mode of institutional work
enacted to deliver sustainable outcomes.
Design of patient safety improvement programmes
This study demonstrates that complex patient safety interventions, though targeted at whole-systems or
multisite health-care organisations, do not embed and normalise into practice in such a totalising manner.
Rather, acceptance and adherence is piecemeal and fragmented. This suggests that their design may be
more logically framed at the level of the functional team and associated discrete high-risk health-care
practice. This has marked implications for the leadership of localised change and support provided, and the
emancipation of front-line health-care professionals may further the development of innovative patient
safety practices at the point of care.
Oversight of the implementation and operationalisation of patient safety
improvement programmes
This study has demonstrated a significant cause for concern by capturing the ready acceptance of
gaming,405 under a legitimacy façade, that obscures the failure to adhere to recommended patient
safety practices. Such actions are diverse – ranging from hollow engagement with WalkRounds and
disconnected recording of the WHOSSC in computer-based systems to the overt ‘performance’ of
observed hand-washing – but they suggest the need for (i) clearly visible and meaningful leadership of
patient safety and (ii) integration of the oversight of patient safety programmes into corporate governance
and organisational development programmes, with ensuing accountability for performance and staff
development. To this end, as outlined in Chapter 5 (specifically in the sections Putative mechanisms
fostering and normalisation of 1000+ Lives, Cognitive participation and Collective action), cognitive
participation is an essential component of collective action to ensure that systemic and organisational
factors giving rise to patient neglect are addressed, while knowledge sharing and trust are enhanced.
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Appendix 1 Summary of case study organisations
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
218
Appendix 2 Semistructured interview
questionnaire
 
HOSPITAL PATIENT SAFETY: A REALIST ANALYSIS 
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Part 1
Information about the interviewee
This opening section of the interview aims to discuss the interviewee’s role, professional background and
management reporting relationships within the hospital case site.
1. What is your current role within the organisation?
i. How long have you worked in that role?
ii. What did you do before you took up your current role?
2. What is your professional background? [Asked if not explicit from comments above.]
3. Please will you tell me a little more about what your role involves on a day-to-day basis?
i. Who do you report to?
ii. Who reports to you?
Part 2
Awareness, understanding, and personal involvement in the 1000 Lives+ national programme and
predecessor 1000 Lives campaign.
1. When and how did you first become aware of the 1000 Lives campaign or 1000 Lives+
national programme?
2. What does the 1000 Lives+ national programme mean to you?
3. How is the 1000 Lives+ national programme managed in your organisation?
i. Who is involved in the local leadership of the 1000 Lives+ national programme?
ii. How would you describe your involvement in the 1000 Lives+ national programme?
Part 3
Discussion of I-CMAO configurations for 1000 Lives+ national programme and relevant focal interventions.
Intervention
1. What patient safety interventions have been adopted?
2. Do you use any of the resources supported by the 1000 Lives+ national programme? [Ascertain
awareness web site and support materials.]
3. Do you use the Model for Improvement, Plan-Do-Study-Act Cycle in your functional team?
APPENDIX 2
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Context
4. What do you consider to be the context in which you work: how would you describe it?
i. Awareness of Welsh health-care policy commitment to the 1000 Lives+ national programme.
ii. How is an ethos of patient safety advocated and developed?
iii. What organisational- or team-level governance processes are in place to measure and monitor the
internal oversight of patient safety? [Assess visits via WalkRounds.]
iv. What external governance processes are in place to measure and monitor patient safety?
[Assess inspection visits by Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, Community Health Councils, etc.]
v. What happens if you have a patient safety incident?
vi. Can you explain your complaints procedure?
5. How has the reconfiguration of NHS Wales/the health board impacted patient safety?
Mechanism
6. Do you think the 1000 Lives+ national programme improves patient safety?
7. Why/how do you believe it works?
8. What has helped or hindered the local implementation and ongoing operationalisation of the
1000 Lives+ national programme?
Outcome
9. How do you measure and monitor the impact of the 1000 Lives+ national programme on
patient safety?
i. Awareness of monitoring processes for local targets, data collection, ownership, analysis
and reporting.
ii. How is such data reported, to whom, formality and frequency?
iii. What changes in health-care practice have been encouraged by the 1000 Lives+
national programme?
10. If you could change the 1000 Lives+ national programme in any way, what would you do?
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ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest) ✓
AMED (Allied and Complementary Medicine) (via Ovid) ✓ ✓
ASSIA (Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts) ✓ ✓
Biomed Central ✓
British Humanities Index (via CSA) ✓
British Nursing Index (via Ovid) ✓ ✓




EBSCOhost Business Source Premier ✓
EMBASE (Excerpta Medica) (via Ovid) ✓ ✓ ✓
Emerald Library (via Emerald) ✓
Ingenta Connect ✓ ✓
JSTOR ✓
MEDLINE (via Ovid) ✓ ✓
MEDLINE In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations ✓ ✓
PsycINFO (via Ovid) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
PubMed ✓ ✓ ✓
ScienceDirect – all subscribed content – V4 (Elsevier) ✓ ✓
SCOPUS – V4 (Elsevier) ✓ ✓ ✓
SwetsWise ✓ ✓
Web of Knowledge ✓ ✓
Zetoc ✓ ✓ ✓
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03400 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2015 VOL. 3 NO. 40
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2015. This work was produced by Herepath et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
223





l Health-care leadership and followership.
l MI-PDSA cycle.
l Mortality review and organisational performance





l WHO Surgical Safety Checklist.
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Appendix 4 Study invitation letter, information
sheet and consent to be interviewed form
Dear [Name to be inserted], 
 
RE: HOSPITAL PATIENT SAFETY—A REALIST ANALYSIS 
 
I am writing to invite you to participate in a research study of hospital patient safety 
in Wales. *[This study is led by Professor Martin Kitchener, Associate Dean, and 
Director of Cardiff Healthcare Organisation and Policy Studies (CHOPS) at Cardiff 
Business School, Cardiff University. It is funded by the National Institute for Health 
Research Service Delivery and Organisation Programme (NIHR SDO)] 
* Latterly revised to: 
[This study is led by Professor Martin Kitchener, Dean, Cardiff Business School, 
Cardiff University. It is funded by the National Institute for Health Research Health 
Services and Delivery Research Programme (NIHR HS&DR)] 
The study aims to examine the local implementation of three safety interventions—(i) 
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement, (ii) Reducing Surgical 
Complications, and (iii) Reducing Healthcare Associated Infections—in NHS 
hospitals participating in the Welsh 1000 Lives+ programme. In so doing, it will 
address the principal research objective to examine which organisational contextual 
factors matter, how they matter, and thus explain why they matter in order that the 
processes and outcomes of hospital patient safety interventions may be improved. 
I hope that you wish to participate in this study, and help to promote improvements in 
patient safety and healthcare quality across NHS Wales. In that hope, I therefore 
enclose a Participant Information Sheet that sets out further information for your 
consideration. 
Participation in this study will involve an interview (approximately one hour) to 
discuss your views of the local implementation of the three focal safety interventions 
selected from the Welsh 1000 Lives + programme, and the organisational factors which 
impact upon hospital patient safety. Furthermore, as the study progresses, participants 
will be invited to attend a feedback workshop to comment on its interim and end-
stage results. 
If you wish to participate in this study, or if you require further details, please do not 
hesitate to call me on [ ] or e-mail me at [ ]. 
Yours sincerely, 
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This study aims to examine the local implementation of three safety interventions—(i) 
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement, (ii) Reducing Surgical 
Complications, and (iii) Reducing Healthcare Associated Infections—in NHS 
hospitals participating in the Welsh 1000 Lives+ programme. 
 
In doing so, it will address the principal research objective to examine which 
organisational contextual factors matter, how they matter, and thus explain why they 
matter in order that the processes and outcomes of hospital patient safety 
interventions may be improved. 
STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The proposed study has five main research objectives. 
1.  To identify and analyse the organisational factors (e.g., structure, culture, and 
managerial priorities) pertinent to the health outcomes of hospital patient safety 
interventions. 
2.  To identify and analyse the contextual mechanisms (logics, or belief systems) 
that interact with organisational factors to generate the health outcomes of 
hospital patient safety interventions. 
3.  To develop and test hypotheses concerning relationships between organisational 
factors, mechanisms, and the health outcomes of hospital patient safety 
interventions.  
4.  To produce a theoretically-grounded and evidence-based model of which 
organisational factors matter, how they matter, and why they matter.  
5.  To establish and disseminate lessons for a broad range of stakeholders concerned 
with patient safety policy and management. 
THE ROLE OF PARTICIPANTS 
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Participation in this study will involve an interview (approximately one hour) to 
discuss your views of the local implementation of the three focal safety interventions 
selected from the Welsh 1000 Lives+ programme, and organisational factors which 
impact upon hospital patient safety. 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you decide we 
would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you. One of our team will go through the information sheet with you 
and answer any questions you have. We suggest this should take at least 10 
minutes. 
 
Talk to others about the study if you wish.  
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part. 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear. 
 
PART 1 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
It is estimated that one in ten National Health Service (NHS) hospital patients are 
harmed during their care, and one in 300 die as a result of adverse events. Along with 
these human costs, safety incidents are a drain on devolved NHS resources, costing an 
estimated £3.5 billion a year in additional bed days and negligence claims. 
 
As awareness grows about the systematic nature, scope, and costs of these problems, 
patient safety has been driven to the top of the NHS agenda, and numerous 
improvement programmes have been introduced. However, evidence that the 
outcomes of NHS patient safety improvement programmes vary across hospitals 
demonstrates that the organisational context of their implementation matters. Yet the 
relationships between features of organisational context (e.g., structure, culture, and 
managerial priorities) and the health outcomes of patient safety programmes are both 
under-theorized and poorly understood in empirical terms. 
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The study, Hospital Patient Safety: A Realist Analysis, is the first to employ 
insights from institutional theory (concerning the role of competing views, or ‘logics’ 
as mechanisms for change and resistance) within an innovative approach (realist 
analysis) to the study of patient safety research. The main aim is to examine which 
organisational contextual factors matter, how they matter, and thus explain why they 
matter in order that the processes and outcomes of hospital patient safety 
interventions may be improved. 
WHY HAVE I BEEN INVITED? 
During this study, the research team will collect available documents containing 
organisational and clinical improvement data related to the local implementation of 
the three safety interventions selected from the Welsh 1000 Lives+ programme: (i) 
Improving Leadership for Quality Improvement, (ii) Reducing Surgical 
Complications, and (iii) Reducing Healthcare Associated Infections. However, this 
information will be supplemented by extensive fieldwork at each participating Welsh 
NHS Hospital, including interviews with a broad range of hospital staff: 
 
(i)  Executive Board—Chair, Chief Executive, Board Secretary, and Board Directors 
(Finance; Human Resources, Workforce and Organisational Development; 
Medicine; Nursing; Planning, Performance and Delivery; Therapies and Health 
Sciences);  
 
(ii) Senior-Middle Corporate and Clinical Management—Chief Pharmacist, 
Consultants (Anaesthetist, General Medicine, Microbiology and Infection 
Control, and General Surgery), Directorate Managers (General Medicine, 
Operating Theatres, Recovery and Anaesthetics, Surgery), and hospital leads for: 
Risk Management, Clinical Governance, Clinical Coding, Patient Advice and 
Liaison, Litigation and Complaints Management;  
 
(iii)  Clinical Arena (1): Operating Theatres, Recovery, Ward Departure and Return—
Consultant Nurse (Surgery Assistant), Junior Doctors (Anaesthetist, General 
Surgery), Operating Department Practitioner, Radiographer, Theatre Sister 
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(Operating Theatres, Recovery and Anaesthetics), Ward Sisters (General 
Medicine, Surgery, and Intensive Therapy Unit/High Dependency Unit);  
 
(iv)  Clinical Arena (2): Infection Control—Consultant Nurse (Infection Control), 
Junior Doctors (Elderly Care Medicine, General Medicine, Paediatrics and 
Neonatology, and Renal Medicine), Specialist Clinical Pharmacist (Antibiotic 
Management and Infection Control), Ward Sisters (Elderly Care Medicine, 
General Medicine, Paediatrics and Neonatology, and Renal Medicine).  
 
In addition, this data will be complemented by interviews undertaken with consumer 
champions and representatives of external bodies, including: policy-makers, the 
National Patient Safety Agency, and the Health Foundation.  
 
In this study, we therefore seek your views of the local implementation of the three 
focal safety interventions selected from the Welsh 1000 Lives+ programme, and your 





All data collected in this manner will be treated as confidential and anonymised (at 
the individual, site hospital and organisational level). The only person identifiable 
data collected during this study will be: (i) participant's names; (ii) their 
organisational role; and (iii) employing organisation. This data will be held within the 
proposed study's anonymisation record, which will be stored in a locked filing cabinet 
in Cardiff Business School. All hard copy archive and anonymised data will be stored 
in a locked filing cabinet in Cardiff Business School, and accessible only by the 
research team. All electronic raw data files will be password protected and accessible 
only by the research team. 
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DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and unpaid. You are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. 
 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go through 
this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a consent 
form.  
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ME IF I TAKE PART? 
The Senior Research Fellow working in this study will contact you, via letter or e-
mail, to arrange a suitable date and time for you to be interviewed. This one-hour 
interview will normally occur in your employing organisation.  
 
It is anticipated that most participants will be interviewed once. However, key 
individuals who offer a great depth of insight into the focal areas of the study, will be 
approached to undertaken a follow-up interview. 
 
As the study progresses, you will be invited to attend a feedback workshop to 
comment on its interim and end-stage results. 
 
Throughout this study, contact may be maintained via the study’s dedicated web site: 
[www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/research/hospitalpatientsafety], and a specific e-mail contact 
address [ ]. 
WHAT WILL I HAVE TO DO? 
In this study, we are seeking your views of the local implementation of the three focal 
safety interventions selected from the Welsh 1000 Lives+ programme, and your 
opinion of the organisational factors which impact upon hospital patient safety. 
 
You will be asked to reflect upon our questions, and answer only those that you want 
to—there are no right or wrong answers. However, your opinion is very important to 
this study. All you have to do is express your beliefs and understanding of hospital 
patient safety. 
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WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF TAKING 
PART?  
This study poses a very low risk, or burden, to potential research participants. 
However, participant will experience:  
 (i)  minimal intrusion during the process of seeking their consent to participate in 
the study;  
 (ii)  limited disruption to their routine working day, incurred through the face-to-
face or telephone interview process, which will last up to one hour;  
 (iii)  assured anonymity, and  
 (iv)  complete confidentiality.  
Your inconvenience will be minimised by arranging interviews well in advance.  
WHAT IF THERE IS A PROBLEM? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study will be 
addressed. The detailed information on this is given in Part 2. 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF TAKING PART? 
The study presents all its research participants with an opportunity to express their 
beliefs and understanding of hospital patient safety, and specifically the organisational 
factors which impact upon the local implementation of the three focal patient safety 
interventions selected from the 1000 Lives+ programme: (i) improving leadership, (ii) 
reducing hospital acquired infection rates, and (iii) implementing surgical checklists.  
 
Given that the relationships between features of organisational context (e.g., structure, 
culture, and managerial priorities) and the health outcomes of patient safety 
programmes are both under-theorized and poorly understood in empirical terms, the 
information offered by participants is essential to further inform the design of such 
patient safety initiatives. Therefore, following collation of the study’s findings, its 
research participants—amidst others in the broader healthcare organisational and 
policy field—will, ultimately, benefit from the roll-out of new patient safety 
initiatives which are designed to reflect local constraints, challenges, and inherent 
strengths. 
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WILL MY TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence. The details of this are included in Part 2.  
 
This concludes Part 1. 
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PART 2 
WHAT IF THERE IS A PROBLEM? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher team’s Chief Investigator, Professor Martin Kitchener, who will do his best 
to answer your questions.  
 
Professor Kitchener may be contacted by telephone on  or via e-mail 
( . 
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, contact the 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Participants’ anonymity will be assured throughout this study. Each participant, 
hospital site, interview transcription, and researcher, will be assigned an identity code. 
(The study’s Senior Research Fellow will undertake the anonymisation of all data.) 
One source of person-identifiable information—the anonymisation record stating the 
participant’s name, role, employing organisation, and corresponding identification 
code—will be held as a paper record, and stored in a locked filing cabinet in Cardiff 
Business School. This information will only be accessible to the research team. No 
further person-identifiable information will be stored in the form of a paper document.  
 
An electronic version of the anonymisation record will be stored on the study’s 
dedicated shared drive within Cardiff University. Access to this drive will be 
restricted to the research team. No further person-identifiable information will be 
stored in the form of an electronic record. All anonymised electronic raw data files—
and collated, anonymised, and analysed data—will be password protected, and 
accessible only by the research team. The electronic transfer of data within the UK 
(via email or computer networks) between the research team will consist of 
anonymised and encrypted data. This data will be shared with the explicit proviso that 
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the recipients cannot: (i) disclose the data to third parties; or (ii) link the data with 
other data, which may render the information more identifiable.  
 
The publication of direct quotations from the study’s participants will be anonymised 
at the individual, hospital site and organisational level. Hence, no combination of 
incidental details of the participant’s employing organisation, specific role, age or 
ethnicity will be reported, thereby ensuring individuals remain unidentifiable. 
 
The study’s research data will be stored for at least two years post publication of the 
end stage report, in accordance with Cardiff University's Research Ethics and 
Governance Guidelines for research records management. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY? 
During the study, half-day interim workshops will be held to check data, feedback 
initial findings and elicit further comments from invited participants. In addition, our 
findings will be disseminated to user communities through articles in practitioner 
journals, and presentations to research forums. 
 
In the final year of the study, knowledge transfer will take place through a half-day 
final seminar to test the implications of key findings, plus a national, one-day 
dissemination conference in Cardiff for senior policymakers and practitioners across 
the UK. 
 
Furthermore, a project website will be created at the outset of the project. This will 
contain project reports and updates, academic articles, conference papers, and other 
material publicising our findings. The website will also incorporate an interactive 
bulletin board dedicated to the study that will provide a further means of establishing 
a dialogue with stakeholders and participants. In order to maximise use of the site we 
will publicise it through the workshops, conferences and short reports that we produce 
and publish.  
 
The academic dissemination of our empirical findings at the main patient safety and 
health research conferences, and in the highest ranked journals, will ensure impact 
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among relevant academic communities.  
WHO IS ORGANISING THE FUNDING OF THE RESEARCH? 
This study is funded by the National Institute for Health Research Service Delivery and 
Organisation Programme (NIHR SDO), managed by NETSCC, SDO, as part of the NIHR 
Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre at the University of Southampton. 
 
National Institute for Health Research 
Service Delivery and Organisation Programme 
Alpha House 




WHO HAS REVIEWED THE STUDY? 
As the funding organisation, the Commissioning Board of the National Institute for 
Health Research, Service Delivery and Organisation (NIHR SDO) programme, has 
undertaken a comprehensive two-stage (outline and full proposal) expert peer review 
and assessment of the scientific quality of the proposed research. 
 
Furthermore, prior to submission to the NIHR SDO, the research study was subject to 
internal peer review in Cardiff Business School, and across the wider research team 
located within the National Institute for Social Care and Health Research (NISCHR), 
Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality Registered Research Group, at the School of 
Medicine, Cardiff University, and Nottingham University. The research protocol, 
provisional questionnaire, and consent form have been approved by the Research 
Ethics Committee in Cardiff Business School, and by the Main Research Ethics 
Committee for Wales. 
RESEARCH TEAM AND CONTACT DETAILS 
For further information about the research, and advice about participation, please 
contact the Chief Investigator. 
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CHIEF INVESTIGATOR 
Professor Martin Kitchener BSc(Econ) MBA PHD 
Professor Jonathon Gray BMSc MBChB PhD MPH 
Dr Justin Waring BA MSc PhD 
Dr Andrea Herepath PhD MBA PhD 
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 HOSPITAL PATIENT SAFETY: A REALIST ANALYSIS 
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YOUR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
Case site code:   
Participant code:   
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Information 
Sheet dated: [___________________] [version: _______] for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
 
3. I understand that my participation in this study in this study will 
involve an interview to discuss the local implementation of the three 
focal safety interventions selected from the Welsh 1000 Lives Plus 
programme, and my opinion of the organisational factors which impact 
upon hospital patient safety, which will require approximately one hour 
of my time. 
 
4. I consent to audio-taping, and the possible use of verbatim quotations 
which will be anonymised. 
 
5. I understand that the information provided by me will be held securely 
in Cardiff University. I understand that, in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998), this information may be retained indefinitely. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Name of participant: 
 
 Date:  Signature: 
     
     
 
Name of person taking consent: 
 
 Date:  Signature: 
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Name of researcher: 
 
 Date:  Signature: 
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